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 I Introduction 
 1 Epistemic Interest 
The topic of national identity is highly complex and very difficult to grasp, yet 
every one is affected by it in some way. The reason why I chose to work on na-
tionalism in Sri Lanka in general and Sinhalese nationalism in particular lies 
without a doubt in my own Sinhalese origin. During my studies of International 
Development in Vienna I started to realise that the country from which I came is 
a country haunted by violence and conflict, where minorities claim to be op-
pressed and extremely violated by the majority. I come from the Sinhalese ma-
jority. Western media and Western literature enhanced this view, sometimes 
calling the Sri Lankan government Sinhala chauvinist or supremacist. On the 
other side, I was confronted in my every day life with Sinhalese people, none of 
who seemed to me to be chauvinistic or racist. To the contrary, I actually found 
that they were the most friendly and hospitable people I had ever met. Thus, I 
was confused and deeply irritated by the huge gap in my knowledge and under-
standing. How was it that I had no idea about the conflict or how somebody 
could call Sinhalese people ‘racist’, ‘chauvinist’ or ‘oppressors’?  
In fact, I started my quest by asking my family questions about Sri Lankan his-
tory and about the reason why my father decided to leave the country. As many 
children of South Asian expatriates know, topics like this are not frequently dis-
cussed; it took me a lot of time and patience to reach the core of the matter, but 
understanding Sri Lankan history and culture became a matter of my own pend-
ing identity. 
At first my view and perception was blurred by the violent attacks of the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), all the more so as there where only Sin-
halese people there to explain the conflict to me; the only thing they could offer 
was their one-sided perception, mainly enriched by descriptions of LTTE atroci-
ties. To my naive question as to why they were fighting a guerrilla war against 
the state, their only response was, “Because they want a separate state.” If I 
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asked further questions I would only be met by a yawning void. It was obvious 
that there was something missing in their explanations. Thus, I started reading; 
and the first thing one encounters while focusing on the Sinhala-Tamil divide is 
the year 1983: the year I was born and the year that marked the outbreak of the 
Sri Lankan conflict that caused extreme human suffering. 
The anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983 was the extreme violent and perverted manifes-
tation of feelings and actions canalized and instrumentalized by Sinhalese na-
tionalist agitators. During this ‘Black July’ I was an unborn child in my mother’s 
womb, who was at that time in Colombo visiting my grandparents. My mother 
described this event to me, and told me how Colombo was suddenly filled with 
gangs of rural Sinhalese that even came to my grandparent’s house and asked 
if they would hide any Tamil and told them that if they did, they would burn us all 
alive. Luckily they did not come in, and even luckier for the Tamil family my 
grandfather was hiding in his old unused wedding hall. Nevertheless, this year 
marks the rise of a tragic play whose main actors are the people guided by false 
nationalism, whether it be the Sinhalese version or the Tamil one.  
Thus I finally was given insight into my first question of why some people call 
Sinhalese oppressors, chauvinists or racist. At the same time it appeared to me 
that this issue was far too precarious and complex to simply brand it as Sin-
halese chauvinism. It needed to be approached with care and sensitivity, most 
of all with understanding, but at the same time without trying to legitimise the 
violence connected to it. 
The next task for me was to understand how it had reached this point. This part 
was not as easy to ascertain and I am still not sure if it is possible for anyone to 
determine how events can go so astray that humans become capable of killing 
each other. But I could walk a different path and look for different answers. I 
therefore decided to make the focus of my research Sinhalese nationalism. 
It was a topic to which I could gain access on many levels: through literature, 
interviews, or simple conversations with people from different ethnic communi-
ties − both rural and urban − as well as with NGO workers and the average in-
dividual. 
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I am aware of the fact that I cannot present a balanced view of the conflict, and 
that I likewise cannot comprehend the situation as person living in Sri Lanka 
does, especially a person from the Tamil community. At the same time, one can 
also infer that it is the distance that provides me with certain objectivity. Either 
way my aim of inquiry is not to put the blame on the one or the other side. It is 
not to legitimize any atrocity committed by the conflicting parties or the current 
war of the Rajapaksa administration. My aim of research is purely personal: I 
want to understand the Sinhalese and their perception of their national identity 
in the context of the conflict and determine how exclusive nationalism is nur-
tured by the conflict and how the conflict provides the justification for a radical 
outlook of Sinhalese nationalism.  
After these first initial steps I started devoting myself completely to the subject 
of identity and conflict in Sri Lanka. I discovered that discussing these topics in 
Sri Lanka was far more difficult than I expected. Opinions about the Sri Lanka 
conflict are extremely polarised, leaving no space for moderate opinions or ap-
proaches. Any person who commented on the Sri Lankan conflict who was not 
part of a certain section of the indigenous Sinhalese intelligentsia was branded 
as elitist, foreign-funded and therefore harmful to the country’s (and Sinhalese) 
cultural welfare.1 This emotionally charged reaction made it difficult for me to 
conduct my research, but it also guided me in the right direction.  
 2 Methodology 
I chose a historical framework for this study on Sinhalese nationalism. Looking 
in the depths of history and taking into account the changes connected to colo-
nialism and the process of becoming a nation-state appeared as crucial factors 
in my inquiry. Therefore, the main chapters of research are based on extensive 
literary research. Even though the main source of the thesis is scientific litera-
ture, there were various other sources that are worth mention.  
As previously discussed in the chapter on epistemological interest, the treatise 
was partly influenced by my own family history and discussions about Sri 
                                            
 
1
 See Matthews 1988−1989: 620. 
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Lanka. To make the process of research as transparent as possible it is rele-
vant to mention that to a certain degree the work was influenced by ideas 
gained through talks and discussions with relatives living in and outside of Sri 
Lanka. Additionally, it was possible to access expert information on the Sri 
Lankan conflict and peace initiatives through members of the Institute of Inte-
grative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in Vienna. 
I gained my main insights into the Sri Lankan experience realm − in particular 
Sinhalese perception – through a three-month trip to the south western province 
of Sri Lanka. I visited local NGOs and made use of their research facilities, 
which meant a lot of reading, copying and excerpting. I discussed relevant 
points of the conflict with NGO workers, in particular of the NGO Sarvodaya. I 
had talks with Sarvodaya members ranging from temporary interns to project 
coordinators, or external advisors. At the same time I was attentively following 
Sri Lankan media to find out in what way the conflict and ongoing war was re-
produced through media. 
I conducted additional interviews with rural Sinhalese youth, and asked them 
questions about their perceptions of different communities in Sri Lanka and of 
history, identity, conflict and peace. Despite my limited use of the material of-
fered by the qualitative research, the information I gained provided me with the 
needed guiding line during my discursive literature research, and illustrated im-
portant points. In an extra chapter I further discuss the impressions I had. Dur-
ing my trip and in an effort to pinpoint their differences in knowledge, perception 
and understanding, I used every opportunity to talk about the conflict with Sri 
Lankans from every community, from the Muslim tri wheel taxi driver to the Sin-
halese or Tamil guesthouse owner to the university student. 
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 II Introduction into a Theoretical 
Framework 
In the last century, the Sri Lankan conflict developed an outstanding character 
with regards to its intensity, duration, interaction of inside and outside communi-
ties and most of all bloodshed. This chapter aims at finding a theoretical frame-
work to analyse and explain certain aspects of the Sri Lankan conflict through a 
historical lens. The conflict in Sri Lanka is deeply connected to the question of 
identity, whether it be the Sinhalese identity2, the Tamil identity3, the Muslim 
identity4 or even the Burgher identity5. The separate subject of identity formation 
is such a complex and multi-dimensional process that it was narrowed down to 
the question of national identity in Sri Lanka, more precisely to the development 
of a distinct Sinhalese identity, which is mutually exclusive from any other ethnic 
community in Sri Lanka. I chose a historical dimension to point out how the 
specific ideology of distinct ‘Sinhaleseness’ arrived on the Island, changed 
throughout the centuries and finally became the mainstream ideology, particu-
                                            
 
2
 The Sinhalese are the principal ethnic group on Sri Lanka; they make up more than 74% of 
the Islands’ population. Their main language is Sinhala, which is categorized as an Indo-
Aryan language, in contrast to Tamil, which is a Dravidian language. The Sinhalese are 
overwhelmingly Buddhist. There is also a minor proportion of Sinhalese Christians, they 
make up about 6, 5 % of the Sinhalese community in Sri Lanka. (See Gunawardena 2005: 
72, 334-335). 
 
3
 The Sri Lankan Tamils form next to the Sinhalese the second largest ethnic group with 
about 12%. They trace back their history in Sri Lanka back to ancient times. In Sri Lankan 
Tamil community Christian proselytization was more successful than in the Sinhalese 
community. Apart from them, there are also Indian Tamils (also called Plantation Tamils or 
Up-country Tamils) who make up for another 6% of the Tamil speaking population. They 
were purposely brought to Sri Lanka during the 19th and 20th century to work on the tea, 
rubber or coffee plantation. (See Amirthalingam 2003:31). 
 
4
 The Sri Lankan Moor community forms about 7,6 % of the population and claim to be of 
Arab or Indo-Arab origin. Their language is mainly Tamil, but their principal source of iden-
tity is rather religion than language. The Sri Lankan Muslim community also includes a 
small community of Malays. (See Gunawardena 2005: 250). 
 
5
 The Burgher community of Sri Lanka are the descendants of a polyglot European commu-
nity of whose member were married to local Sri Lankans. The generic term Burghers 
means citizens. The Burghers developed as a distinct community, with English as their first 
language and Christianity as their religion. They occupied senior positions as administra-
tors and in the professions. After independence when Sri Lankan politicians favoured the 
use of local languages, many Burghers migrated, mainly to Australia. (See: Amirthalingam 
2003: 45-47, Gunawardena 2005: 59-60). 
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larly within Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka. To demonstrate that process, I 
initially turned to a set of literature about nationalism in general. Regarding 
these theories, all of them put emphasis on different patterns. Yet in order to 
describe Sinhalese nationalism as an entity it appeared to me that connecting 
various theoretical frameworks was a better way to understand the process than 
focusing on one single theoretical scheme. My conjecture is that a nationalist 
ideology requires very specific circumstances to become a popular mainstream 
ideology.  
With regards to Galtung’s peace and conflict theories, three different dimen-
sions need to be taken into consideration: the culture, the structure and the 
agent/agency.6 Culture is regarded as a social construction, the structure as a 
pattern of interaction and the agent/agency functions as a political-psychological 
dimension able to influence, manipulate and penetrate into the culture and 
structure. All of these dimensions are directly correlated. Collective actions of 
groups, in our case based on the ideology of nationalism, are evenly intercon-
nected to these spheres.7 Detailed explanations on the three dimensions will be 
given later. 
In relation to this three-fold framework one should not forget that the core piece 
of analysis centres on the basic human need for identity, in this case Sinhalese 
national identity. Like any other nationalism, Sinhalese nationalism places the 
need of national identity, as well as the survival of the state in the center.8 With 
regards to a more general definition of identity, I refer to Johan Galtung’s con-
cept of individual basic human needs, in which identity is regarded as a funda-
mental basic need.9 Galtung states that  
                                            
 
6
 See Graf 2008a: 11. 
 
7
 Ibidem, p. 21. 
 
8
 Ibidem, p. 19. 
 
9
 Galtung assumes that there are four basic human needs, two material and two non-
material (Survival, Wellbeing, Identity, and Freedom). All needs are interdependent and not 
hierarchically fixed. (See Graf,/Kramer,/Nicolescou 2008: 15) Any of these basic needs can 
be threatened or violated through direct, structural or cultural violence. Direct violence is 
defined as an event, structural violence is a constant, and cultural violence is permanence. 
(See Graf 2005: 4). 
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“[i]dentity in the sense of a basic human need, is the form not the content, 
and in that understanding neither a concept for any pre-modern cultural 
essentialism nor any post-modern cultural relativism.”10  
A short summary of the discourse on the identity will be provided later, including 
a post-Orientalist view that has proven to be of particular interest in deconstruct-
ing nationalist ideologies in Sri Lanka. Regarding Sinhalese nationalism, it is 
important to mention that nationalism brought about a change of meaning in the 
South Asian context. I acknowledge this alteration in a short subchapter. Like-
wise, it is not my purpose to provide a detailed survey on nationalism and iden-
tity; therefore only selective sources were incorporated. The study is divided 
into three main parts, starting with the British colonial experience, the post-
colonial period and the present situation. The third part on the present situation 
includes an analysis on the failures of the peace process initiated in 2001 and a 
personal introspection on the conducted qualitative research. The peace initia-
tive will be examined according to Lederach’s ‘Three Gaps in Peacebuilding’ 
while placing special attention on Sinhalese nationalist tendencies. As conclud-
ing remarks, emphasis lies on the value of conflict analysis in developmental 
work and aspects of peaceful national identities. 
The theoretical framework is based on - but not limited to - the ideas of Benedict 
Anderson, Johan Galtung, Ernest Gellner, Antonio Gramsci and Anthony D. 
Smith. Evenly included are various other scholars, who were not explicitly men-
tioned within this chapter, such as Michael Roberts, John. D. Rogers, Hardt & 
Negri, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Renan, John Paul Lederach et al. The treatise 
will be based on a transdisciplinary approach, connecting various disciplines. 
 1 Nationalism: Approaching a Holistic Framework of Under-
standing 
“The growth of nationalism and nation-building is an important, spectacular 
and highly consequential dimension of the worldwide processes of change 
connected with colonialism and de-colonisation. Nationalism is a kind of 
                                            
 
10
 See Graf/Kramer/Nicolescou 2008: 16. 
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ideology which exists almost everywhere in the world, although it assumes 
very different forms.“11  
Most theoretical examinations on nations and nationalism come to the conclu-
sion that these ideas are products of the modern world and arose out of Europe 
at the time of the French revolution.12 Just after the process of colonisation and 
de-colonisation, this Europe-rooted system was to be the result of that process 
and was virtually forced upon developing countries in Africa and Asia. Both 
terms, although constantly reproduced in popular and scientific discourses, are 
very difficult to define. Within this chapter I have arranged the ideas of various 
authors into three dimensions of culture, structure and agent/agency and ap-
plied them to the Sinhalese case.  
 2 The Cultural Dimension of Nationalism 
According to Galtung’s definition, culture is the mental ‘significances’ that con-
vey meaning to our actions.13 In the case of nationalism, national identity in-
cludes cultural meanings and symbols and is manifested in myths and national 
anthems, monuments, literature etc. The cultural dimension can be seen as a 
social construct that defines the inner world, manifested in our thoughts and 
actions, but not critically reflected upon. As Amartya Sen states, many contem-
porary political and social issues centre on conflicting claims of disparate identi-
ties because the conception of identity in various ways influences our thoughts 
and actions.14  
Benedict Andersons, one of the most cited theoretician on nationalism, inte-
grates the whole concept of a nation into the socio-cultural constructed field by 
defining ‘nation’ as following:  
“It is an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently lim-
ited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, 
                                            
 
11
 See. Hylland Eriksen 2001: 274−275. 
 
12
 Ibidem, p. 275. 
 
13
 See Graf 2008: 12. 
 
14
 See Sen 2006: xii. 
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or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion. […] [And] regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation 
that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, hori-
zontal comradeship […].”15  
We can presume that an actively supported ‘imagined construction’ (the nation) 
promoted by an ‘agent’ (the empire, state, elite) and an adequate ‘structure’ 
(socio-economic framework) created an imagined feeling of inclusion and com-
munion (collective identity). It manipulated the previous culture and fabricated a 
feeling of union between actual strangers, while at the same time promoting 
exclusion of people considered not part of the nation. 
In this sphere of culturally constructed assumptions, groups develop goals and 
claims, whereas behind those assumptions rests mostly the conflation of their 
human basic needs.16 For instance after Ceylon became independent, there 
was a very positive response to Sinhalese nationalist ideals, glorifying past 
achievements of ancient Sinhalese culture and trying to project them onto the 
future of the nation. Claims connected to this ideological movement, developed 
a rather marginalising character, creating a sense of discrimination within mi-
norities and gradually depriving them of their basic need of identity. 
Stigmatising the Sinhalese agitators as racist would be an unfair oversimplifica-
tion. To sufficiently understand the processes connected to this way of thought, 
one has to take a deeper look at the hidden forces that are linked to it. 
In a similar manner Anderson avoids describing nationalism as an ideology and 
connects it closer to concepts such as kinship or religion because it is perceived 
as destiny rather than choice. He stresses that the nation became important as 
some older identities began to lose their credibility.17 Anderson points out three 
central elements of the pre-nationalist ancien regime:  
“sacred languages and scripts (Latin, Arabic, Pali, Chinese), held to be the 
sole key to truth; divine monarchs; and a cosmological or equidistant 
sense of past time. […] the new factors which helped to erode these ele-
                                            
 
15
 Anderson 2006: 5−7. 
 
16
 See Graf 2008a: 21. 
 
17
 See Reid 1985: 497. 
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ments and laid the path for new imagined communities were the invention 
of print capitalism.”18  
 2.1 Print Capitalism and Promoting Nationalism: Spreading a 
‘Social Construction’ 
Thus the core of Anderson’s argument is that the invention and rise of print lan-
guage is directly related to an increase in nationalism per se.19 With regards to 
Anderson placing emphasis on print capitalism as an instigator of nationalism, 
one has to question if there was a mass readership in every European nation 
before the late 19th century.20 The existence and importance of a mass reader-
ship in Asian nations is even more doubtful, if one takes into consideration that 
there have been highly developed oral traditions which have enjoyed a unique 
popularity throughout South Asia, for instance the Hindu sage Ramayana21 of 
the Mahabharata; the epic has been translated into various languages and 
modified according to regional traditions or their own insights and interpreta-
tions. The Ramayana did not only function solely as an entertainment story, it 
encodes many of the cultural values of Hindu civilization.  
“[…] In this way, it has functioned less as a fixed message than as a kind 
of language within which South Asian culture thinks about itself, and pro-
ject (and argues about) its ideals of the good life and just society.”22  
One can conclude that these myths, songs and folklore fulfil a certain function of 
coping with and understanding reality. One finds comparable, but not similar 
developments with the Sinhabahu, a part of the historical chronic of Sri Lanka, 
the Mahavamsa. The Great Chronicle is constantly reproduced and provides 
the audience with questions and ideas, and its longstanding political value cer-
tainly stands out.. The Mahavamsa plays a very special role in creating a com-
                                            
 
18
 Ibidem, p.497−498. 
 
19
 See Anderson 1983: 117. 
 
20
 See Obeyesekere 2004: 6−7. 
 
21
 In this delineation I am not referring to recent populist politicisation of the Ramayana 
through the Hindu-nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This is a different case of po-
litical mobilisation and creation of community. For further studies I recommend reading Six/ 
Riesebrodt/ Haas (2004) on religious fundamentalism. 
 
22
 Lutgendorf Online in: 
  http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/sac/Outreach/ramayana/oral.asp. 
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mon sense of nationhood in Sri Lanka, but this subject will be discussed in a 
later chapter. In the case of Sri Lanka it seems adequate to assume that the 
spread of oral traditions on the Island had a certain value in the stimulation of 
nationalist sentiment, but it was only after the spread of printing facilities in Sri 
Lanka that it became possible for a mass readership to access this so-called 
ethno-historical heritage and a nationalist vision, which allows one to stress that 
oral tradition and the invention of print capitalism had their part to play in pro-
moting the cultural foundation of Sinhalese nationalism. 
 3 Structural Dimension of Nationalism 
The structural dimension serves as the underlying condition for nationalism. 
According to Galtung it is a pattern of interaction that defines who is related to 
whom, how, when and where? Hence it is a constant process.23  
Ernest Gellner places his emphasis on the structural aspects as the genesis of 
emergence of nations and nationalism. In his influential book “Nations and Na-
tionalism”, Gellner points out that certain structural formations need to be ful-
filled so that nationalism as an ideology can appear. He narrows down national-
ism primarily as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the na-
tional unit should be congruent.”24 Gellner’s main argument is that nationalism 
grew out of a reaction towards industrialisation and the decoupling of people 
from their primordial ties to kin, religion and local communities. People had to 
adjust themselves to different patterns of social interaction. In ancient times 
Sinhalese society had a feudal structure. Caste determined a person’s obliga-
tion and position within the hierarchy. After more than four hundred years of 
Western domination this system was severely weakened.25 The dissolution of 
traditional caste hierarchies and sudden economic mobility, no longer limited to 
caste, created severe disorder within society. 
                                            
 
23
 See Galtung quoted after Graf 2008: 11. 
 
24
 Gellner 1983:1. 
 
25
 See Amithalingam 2003: 22. 
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Furthermore, industrialisation caused greater geographic mobility, so that peo-
ple could participate in much larger societal systems. There was a need for a 
connecting ideology in these evolving societies - which nationalism could meet. 
A fundamental difference between former primordial ties and the concept of na-
tionalism is that the latter implies the existence of an abstract community.26 
Gellner observes, therefore, that nations are not natural entities, but social con-
structions.27  
By stressing the interrelation of primordial ties and the rise of nationalism, Gell-
ner’s view is mainly influenced by a functionalist standpoint. After the decrease 
of the former bonds, another substituting ideology was needed to create a 
sense of unity. “His argument is that at a certain point in industrialized life, a 
shared culture- meaning particularly a shared language and shared education- 
becomes a state wide necessity.”  
In Sri Lanka one finds that less than ten years after independence the demand 
for one common language was expressed through the 1956 ‘Sinhala only’ de-
mand. ‘Unfortunately’ Sri Lanka was multi-lingual, thus after the introduction of 
the ‘Sinhala only Act’ conflict about the right of language was almost a natural 
conclusion. Again the working forces behind this exaggerated demand have to 
be looked upon with care; otherwise we again fall into the trap of painting a 
black and white picture of subjects that are too complex to press into these lim-
ited dichotomous categories of good against bad, right against wrong. 
Coming back to Gellner’s standpoint, nationalism appears to be the product of 
industrialisation and the route to a universal culture in which only the nation can 
serve as a unit.28 His thesis that nationalism is a result of an industrialisation 
process seems quite suitable even though contemporary Sri Lanka is still 
largely dominated by agrarian structures. Through the past process of foreign 
colonisation and the current trend towards globalisation, a system of greater 
mobility was introduced in Sri Lanka, which has replaced a village-centred iden-
tity construction model that had dominated Sri Lankan society. It should be 
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pointed out that the structure describes the outer world. It is in this dimension 
that contradictions become visible, for example when incompatible goals and 
claims (Unitarianism vs. federalism, Sinhala only vs. protection of minority 
rights, etc.) based on different groups’ culturally bound assumptions encounter 
each other. Consequently, conflict and/or violence will emerge between these 
fractions.29 
 4 The Agent/Agency − Dimension of Nationalism 
Thirdly, we have to consider the political-psychological dimension of the 
agent/agency. The agency/agent controls, influences and manipulates the cul-
tural and structural sphere, while being evenly bound and connected to these 
spheres. It is mostly a political agent or agency that penetrates into the percep-
tion and thinking of the masses. In the process of nation building the agent be-
comes the most vital leading force. In this section on nationalism the focus on 
the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and Anthony D. Smith.  
Anthony Smith’s theories are not clearly defined as one of the three delineated 
categories; in fact, they relate to all three dimensions. In the case of Sinhala 
nationalism they provide us with a very interesting framework for analysis.  
 4.1 Defining National Identity 
Smith distinguishes nationalism as an ideological movement from the broader 
phenomenon of national identity. He states that one cannot 
“understand the power and appeal of nationalism as a political force with-
out grounding our analysis in a wider perspective whose focus is national 
identity treated as a collective cultural phenomenon”.30  
The self of every individual is a composition of multiple identities and roles, de-
pending of familiar, territorial, ethnic, religious, gender related aspects. National 
identity is just one facet of identity and Smith defines it as follows: “[…]’national’ 
identity involves some sense of political community, however tenuous. A politi-
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cal community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single 
code of rights and duties for the members of the community. It also suggests a 
definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which 
the members identify and to which they feel they belong.”31 
 4.2 Ethnic Heritage and Nationalism 
One of Smith’s main assertions is that every nation has a dominant ethnic core. 
His concept on national identity is definitely a synthetic work that has its roots in 
modernist and traditional scholastic disciplines. He argues that: 
“nationalism derives its force from its historical embeddedness. As an ide-
ology, nationalism can take root only if it strikes a popular chord, and is 
taken up by, and inspires, particular social groups and strata. […] Unlike 
other modern belief systems, it depends for its power not just on the gen-
eral idea of the nation, but on the presence and character of this or that 
specific nation which it turns into an absolute.” 32 
The utterance of nation it creates is derived from pre-existing and highly particu-
larized cultural heritages and ethnic formations.33 Until the rise of nationalism 
ethnic and religious forms of collective identification were predominate. Even 
nowadays many ethnic minorities retain strong religious bonds and emblems, 
for instance the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the Serbs and 
Croats, as well as the Sinhalese are among the many ethnic communities 
whose identity is based on religious criteria of differentiation.34 
The fundamental features of his conception of identity are therefore: 
“[…] an historic territory, or homeland; common myths and historical 
memories; a common, mass public culture; common legal rights and du-
ties for all members; a common economy with territorial mobility for mem-
bers.”35 
                                            
 
31
 Ibidem, p. 9. 
 
32
 Ibidem, p. vii. 
 
33
 Ibidem, p. viii. 
 
34
 Ibidem, p. 7. 
 
35
 Ibidem, p. 14. 
»» 18  
 4.3 Educating Consensus 
With the experience of colonialism and the creation of new nation-states the 
principles of political legitimacy changed “[…] from sacred, inclusive hierarchies 
legitimising the rule of kings […] to the egalitarian ideal of a state governed in 
the name of ‘the people’ in its threefold meaning citizenry, nation and sover-
eign.”36  
One has to examine the process of how people came to accept the new form of 
rule and the way it was introduced to the people. I refer to Antonio Gramsci’s 
writings on hegemony; we have to take a deeper look into the process of creat-
ing consensus between ruler of the state and subject of the state. Gramsci ex-
plains that modes of rule strive for a specific balance between elements of force 
and consensus, but always let consensus prevail.37 
A hegemonic group can only exercise consensus when they are able to get 
their ideas, values and norms accepted as the leading ones; leading is hereby 
understood as political, moral and cultural charisma, which should likewise func-
tion as an orientation device for the thoughts and cultural lifestyle of the majority 
of society.38 The relationship between ruler and subject is considered similar to 
the pedagogical relation between teacher and student, but extends to society as 
a whole and is not a unilateral, but a dialectical process.39 The state possesses 
various hegemony-creating gadgets, through which consensus is not only de-
manded but also taught. Hence the state fulfils the function of an educator, cre-
ating a new form of civilization.40 The agent/agency is therefore able to actively 
influence, manipulate or even penetrate into the society, in constructive and 
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deconstructive ways. It is able to imperiously propagate its ideology. Conse-
quently, one of the main goals of state politics is creating a nationalist society, 
which places the interest of the state and its apparatus in front of the individual 
interest, and prioritizes the national facet of identity. 
In this context education becomes a central field of politics, because education 
can never be considered neutral. To overcome existing modes of political and 
cultural orders one must question content and forms of education and peda-
gogy.41 In post colonial Sri Lanka one finds that within the educational system 
the fault lines for conflict between ethnic communities were already drawn, mak-
ing the only unknown variable the length of time that would pass before the ac-
tual occurrence of conflict. Additionally, Andreas Wimmer explains that in post-
colonial states  
[…] in many cases the new elites are not capable of marshalling enough 
support for their project of nation-building – which in most cases implicitly 
or explicitly consists in generalising their particular ethnos to the whole 
population and thus transforming it into the nation.”42  
One recognizes the fact that Sri Lanka was neither mono-lingual nor mono-
ethnical and again conflicting lines are easy to foresee. Wimmer’s statement 
gives us one explanation as to why conflict over identity occurred on the multi-
cultural heterogeneous Island, but just as well it shows us the embeddedness of 
the agent/agency in the actual process of creating and maintaining consensus.  
 4.4 The Functions and Meanings of National Identity 
Returning to Smith, we can divide the function of national identity in external 
and internal aspects. The external functions are territorial, economic and politi-
cal. A nation will first define a definite social space and provide its individuals 
with ‘sacred centres’, which mirror the uniqueness of their nation; economically 
it means the quest for control over resources and politically its legitimization of 
common legal rights and duties of legal institutions. 
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The internal functions of national identity are mostly the socialisation of the 
members as ‘nationals’ and ‘citizens’.  
“Today, this is achieved through compulsory, standardized, public mass 
education systems, through which state authorities hope to inculcate na-
tional devotion and a distinctive, homogenous culture, an activity that most 
regimes pursue with considerable energy under the influence of nationalist 
ideals of cultural authenticity and unity.”43  
This social bond is created by the use of symbols like: flags, coinage, anthems, 
uniforms, monuments and ceremonies. Through such practices people are re-
minded of their common heritage and cultural kinship.44 Smith concludes, simi-
lar to Wimmer, that the new political elites coming from a dominant ethnos “[…] 
fashioned a new political mythology and symbolism to legitimate their rule.”45 In 
the fresh born nation state of Ceylon the ruling stratum emphasized culturally 
narrow defined forms of nationalism based on ethnic lines, for instance between 
1930 to 1980 large-scale sponsored agricultural development was showcased 
as the restoration of the glories of a pre-colonial Buddhist Sinhalese order. 46  
And as mentioned before, nationalism can only take root if it strikes a popular 
chord in the minds of the people. And what could be more popular within the 
majority Sinhalese than propagating the glories of ancient Buddhist kingdoms 
and cultural heritage in Sri Lanka? 
 5 The Non-Western Conception of the Nation 
The concept of nationalism has no absolute and universal meaning to it. Just as 
every person has a different interpretation of nationalism, states and their citi-
zens also differ in their basic perception. As an Austrian citizen and who grew 
up in a country with a history so deeply connected to the horrors of National 
Socialism, I find it important to acknowledge the difference in perception. While 
conducting research in Sri Lanka it was extremely surprising that almost every 
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person I talked to proudly claimed to be nationalist, some of them were even 
willing to sacrifice their lives and belongings for the country they loved. On the 
other side I hardly found any young person in Austria who would openly claim to 
be nationalist. This opinion might vary substantially based on the social back-
ground of the person, but there is a definite disparity between what people think 
of nationalism in general. 
In theory Hardt & Negri state that the term ‘nation’ developed a significant 
change of meaning outside Europe, especially in the colonised regions of the 
world. Whereas the term ‘nation’ remained in the hands of the ruling powers as 
a symbol for cessation and restoration, in the hands of the oppressed it trans-
formed into a meaningful symbol in the struggle for change and revolution. It is 
also argued that the so called ‘subaltern nationalism’ had two main functions. 
The first one was the creation of a defence line against the dominance of alien 
nations, against external economic, political and ideological powers. The term 
‘nation’ was used as an ideological weapon against the hegemonic discourse of 
the foreign ruling nations. It worked against the belief of the colonising nation 
that the people and the culture of the ruled region were inferior to their own. 
This quest for independence and self-governance should reconstitute the dig-
nity and pride of the people. The obverse of this philosophy is, according to 
Hardt & Negri that the same power that tries to fight alien oppression oppresses 
within its boundaries in the name of the nation and its unity. This form of new 
nationalism appears to be progressive and reactive, providing an opportunity for 
change while at the same time being a hindrance for plurality.47 
Smith equally differs between the concept of a Western and non-Western model 
of the nation; he divides them into two categories, a civic and an ethnic model of 
the ‘nation’. He considers the Western nation as a predominately territorial con-
ception, in which the main components of it are: “historic territory, legal-political 
community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and 
ideology.”48  
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In Asia a new form of nation emerged, which added significant new elements to 
it. Smith terms it an ‘ethnic’ conception of the nation. The nation was primarily a 
community of common descent and: 
“[…] the place of law in the Western civic model is taken by vernacular cul-
ture, usually languages and customs in the ethnic model. […] by creating a 
widespread awareness of the myths, history and linguistic traditions of the 
community, they succeeded in substantiating and crystallizing the idea of 
an ethnic nation in the minds of most members […]”49  
In this Asian model the emphasis lies more on the ethnic conception of the na-
tion, but in every nation you will find civic, as well as ethnic conceptions.50 
Hence, one can conclude that in Asia the concept of the nation and nationalism 
enjoys a much more positive connotation within the people than in some coun-
tries in Europe, especially the ones who already experienced the dangers con-
nected to radical nationalist ideologies. 
 6 Discourses on Nationalism and Identity 
Debates about nationalism in South Asia are normally categorized into different 
approaches. Wimmer defines four ways of approaching nationalism:  
“The first approach [is based on] rational choice theory […]. Its exponents 
regard the politicisation of ethnicity as an option that promises maximum 
return for individuals under certain ‘incentive structures’ unrelated to the 
mega-trends of modernisation. Secondly, from a neo-romantic perspective 
ethnicity is portrayed as a constant of social life, making nationalism and 
the nation-state appear as late manifestation of the eternal quest for cul-
tural autonomy. Thirdly, ethnicity and nationalist politics may be regarded 
as birth pains of modern society as a transitional phenomenon in the evo-
lutionary process. Lastly one may argue that the rise of nationalism and 
the nation-state constitutes a genuine component of, if not the functional 
prerequisite for, modern society.”51 
Nowadays Wimmer’s last referred to; the modernist approach succeeded the 
scientific discourse and has proven to be very influential. One can connect 
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Anderson’s and Gellner’s views to this position. Modernists also trace the roots 
of cultural nationalism back to the impact of the colonial experience. Social or 
religious movements that occurred in the nineteenth century, such as the Bud-
dhist Temperance Movement in Sri Lanka, are thereby interpreted as an indige-
nous response to the hardships of colonialism. Movements of cultural national-
ism vary on the emphasis they lay on aspects but it includes;  
“[…] cultural influences, such as Western education, economic factors, in-
cluding changes in class structure; and political changes, such as the ex-
tension of representative government.”52  
Furthermore, the neo-romantic perspective of Smith is evenly relevant. He 
claims that: 
“Ethnic communities have preserved their identity and asserted their politi-
cal autonomy for centuries on the strength of myths of predestination and 
the idea of a historic mission.”53  
Within the Sinhalese one finds that legends based on the ‘Mahavamsa’, which 
serves as the principal source of information on Sri Lanka’s early history, are 
used to consolidate Sinhalese Buddhist over lordship of the nation. In Sri 
Lanka’s popular science and political culture one often encounters primordialist 
stances that centre more on the direct linkage between ethnic nationalism and 
pre-colonial identities. This approach becomes easy prey to misleading ideas of 
essentialism. 
Recently a new interpretation of identity began to take shape. John D. Rogers 
labels it the ‘Post-Orientalist’ approach. It carries the clear influence of Edward 
Said and Michael Foucault and is a variant of modernist interpretation on ethnic 
and cultural nationalism. It directs its attention to the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries when the British arrived. According to Rogers:  
”Post-Orientalists place great importance on the role of the British in the 
construction of new identities through the power of colonial discourse on 
India. This discourse, which was based on the scientific documentation of 
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Indian society, was designed to bolster colonial power by subordinating 
Indian to Europeans in general and the British in particular.”54  
In Sri Lanka one finds a similar colonial discourse, for instance through the 
works of the Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch (RASCB). The works of this 
academic circle introduced racial categories into the island that shaped the Sri 
Lankan identities in fundamental ways. The ‘scientific documentation’ was 
based on the idea of essentialism, which Inden defines as: 
“[...] the idea that humans and human institutions … are governed by de-
terminate natures that inhere in them in the same way that they are sup-
posed to inhere in the entities of the natural world”55  
Furthermore the colonial census in Ceylon and in British India led to the con-
struction of mutually exclusive communities and promoted communal con-
sciousness that previously had not existed.56 British scientism and the colonial 
administration implemented a process of documentation and classification 
which was similar in manner. Even though there are some divergences, it 
served to crystallize social categories in the two South Asian nations.  
As far as this academic approach is concerned, it is likewise important to illus-
trate the creation of fixed social categories by examining the role of census of 
Ceylon and the work of the Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch in promoting 
the racial discourse out of which Gunarwardena alleges the modern Sinhalese 
nationalism arose.57  
 7 Conclusion 
As I already mentioned the theories were arranged into one theoretical frame-
work and applied onto the Sinhalese case through a historical examination. It is 
my belief that we need to connect at least all three of these dimensions in order 
to cover the subject of Sinhalese nationalism in Sri Lanka. Aside from that, all 
three approaches are dialectically connected to each other, therefore the divid-
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ing lines become indistinct in the process of analysing. As my work is focusing 
on a historical perspective it is not possible to go into detail about processes 
connected to the individual identity on a micro-level. By also offering a Post-
Orientalist view misleading ideas of essentialism will be deconstructed, which 
can be used for the justification of discriminate ideologies. By merging different 
approaches into one framework I aim to provide a more balanced analysis on 
how the situation progressed to the present moment in the Islands history. 
»» 26  
 III Laying the Foundations for 
Modern Sinhalese Nationalism 
in Ceylon 
The starting point of this historical examination on Ceylon is the arrival of the 
British in 1802, even though Ceylon was already partially colonized by the Por-
tuguese and the Dutch.58 The British were the ones who left the deepest imprint 
on the Island and eventually on its nationalisms especially in terms of culture, 
structure and agency. They managed to capture the whole Island by penetrating 
into the heartland of the Sinhalese, the kingdom of Kandy. The last bastion of 
the Sinhalese kingdoms was annexed by the British in 1815, whereas its 
coastal lines have already been long controlled by the Portuguese, Dutch and 
British.59  
After more than four hundred years of Ceylon’s subordination to colonial power, 
far reaching changes in structural and cultural terms had place, which resulted 
in the need to construct a new sense of collective group identity. As the histo-
rian K. M. de Silva points out “[…] the colonial experience has had a profound 
impact on its culture, its traditions and its development, and indeed on its na-
tionals identity.”60  
The focus of this chapter lies on the context and circumstances that made it 
possible for Sinhalese nationalism to appear and finally become a driving force 
in the postcolonial Sinhalese-Tamil identity conflict. This will be discussed ac-
cording to the three different dimensions of nationalism in Sri Lanka, which in 
most cases correlate to each other. 
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 1 Sinhalese Societal Structure in the Eighteenth Century 
In the eighteenth century there were two distinct zones with predominately Sin-
halese populations, the interior mainly referred to as the Kandyan Kingdom and 
its surrounding areas and the maritime region at the coast. Subsistence agricul-
ture was the main economic activity in the interior of the island and most needs 
of the people where met locally, whereas the coastal regions were dependent 
on international trade through export of agricultural goods and import of rice and 
cloth.  
As there were differences in the economic structure, slight modifications were 
also to be found in the social structure. Sinhalese culture was not egalitarian; 
hierarchical structures were omnipresent in all social relations. In the interior 
almost all Sinhalese were Buddhist and the Goyigama caste (cultivator) was at 
the top of the hierarchy, control over land and political power was bound to 
them. In the maritime regions the long dominant position of market economy 
brought about a distinct social feature. Economic mobility was not limited to 
persons with specific social backgrounds; castes, like the Karawa (fisherman) 
and the Salagama (cinnamon peeler) challenged the traditional dominance of 
the Goyigama. Ritual ties and services between the Goyigama. Karawas, Sala-
gamas, Vahumpuras were no longer evident. There was no clear link between 
caste and class anymore. Another attribute of the coastal regions was that 
many villages were predominantly Roman Catholic due to conversions during 
the Portuguese rule and many Moors - Sri Lankan Muslims - also lived along 
the coast.61 
The caste structure in Sinhalese society is different from the Hindu caste sys-
tem of India. The most diverging characteristic is that the cast pyramid is re-
versed. The majority in the traditional hierarchy are the high-caste Goyigamas, 
even though there is an aristocracy in Sinhalese society, namely the Bandaras 
and Radalas. They are considered as a sub-caste of the Goyigamas. Goyiga-
mas occupy an active role in public affairs and in the protection of Buddhism.62 
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The confusion about social positioning created much disorder and resulted in a 
continuous strive of various groups for status and power in independent Ceylon. 
 2 Structural Changes through British Colonialism 
The British colonial administration undertook significant structural changes in 
the local administration and law. Additionally, by imposing their religion, lan-
guage, customs, dress, and culture, the British challenged the traditional life of 
ordinary Ceylonese in manifold ways.63 
These changes interfered with the usual modes of interactions, hierarchies and 
lifestyle. It forced Ceylon’s inhabitants to adjust to a different environment. In 
Kandy these changes resulted in a rebellion (1817-1819) led by the former elite, 
aimed at the restoration of the Sinhalese Monarchy.64 After the British crushed 
the rebellion it was obvious to the majority of the Sinhalese that they could not 
dispel them and: 
“[…] from this point on most protests against the government were aimed 
at obtaining specific changes in policy, not bringing colonial rule to an end. 
It was clear to the more dynamic elements in Sinhalese society that the 
Kandyan Kingdom would never be restored and most Sinhalese came to 
accept the colonial state as legitimate.”65  
One crucial consequence of this incident was the unification of the former king-
dom of Kandy and the maritime districts to a single social and political unit. The 
colonial administration began opening up the interior of Ceylon for economic 
utilisation. Sir Edward Barnes, the colonial governor of Ceylon, focused on 
building and expanding streets. He relied on the former traditional obligation of 
the Sri Lankan inhabitants to do unpaid work for the ruler (Rajakaariya).66 One 
can assume that by capturing the kingdom of Kandy the British managed to 
embody the symbol of lordship67 and then restructured the entire Island. By so 
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doing, the British not only effectuated economic changes, they also utilized tra-
ditional patterns of interaction and loyalties, while at the same time modifying 
them. 
The Colebrook-Cameron Commission also formulated a program through which 
Sri Lanka should be shaped according to the doctrines of liberalism. The pur-
pose of the commission was to modernize Ceylon’s traditional economic system 
and to impose a uniform system of justice, education, and civil administration.68 
Different autonomous units of Ceylon were brought by force under one single 
unit. 
Coming back to the economic changes, the foundations for plantation economy 
in the maritime regions were already laid due to the early colonisation of these 
regions. However, the uncultivated land of the central highlands that was avail-
able to Kandyan highland farmers became property of the state and was then 
sold to speculators or planters. This led to the pauperisation of the highland 
farmers, which, in combination with the colonial administration’s negligence of 
the important irrigation system for rice farmers, turned into a triggering point of 
social conflicts.69 Furthermore, the systematic influx of South Indian labourers 
started in 1840.70 In the relatively homogeneous and separated Kandyan region 
the changes were felt the most, and led to a disruption of the traditional social 
relations between the Kandyan elite and the peasants. As already mentioned, 
the land cultivator is on the top of the Sinhalese hierarchy. One observes that 
through economic changes traditional modes of social interaction were equally 
challenged.  
Another vital component of the Ceylon becoming a plantation economy is that 
its infrastructure changed completely. A transport system was built linking the 
interior of the island with the coastal regions, marking the beginning of a mod-
ern transport system and moreover the development of a modern economy.71 A 
growing proportion of Sri Lankan inhabitants travelled more frequently from one 
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place to another; they were subjected to change and interaction, and were thus 
no longer bound solely to their traditional village structures. As Ernest Gellner 
describes, in these ‘evolving societies’ a connecting ideology was needed and 
as one later finds in history, nationalism would become this connecting ideol-
ogy, unifying people from different Sinhala-speaking communities with different 
loyalties, different histories and lifestyles, with no knowledge of each other, 
Through the power of ideology, these distinct peoples were merged into a whole 
nation of Sinhalese people. 
What should not be forgotten while explaining the changes connected to British 
colonialism and the beginning of nationalism is that although much of the plan-
tation export industry was mostly in the hands of Europeans, some sections of 
the Ceylonese also participated in the export industry.72 It offered new economic 
opportunities to the peasants in the Kandyan villages as well as to a significant 
amount of the low-country Sinhalese. The restructuring process that was sup-
posed to benefit the British also benefited some local inhabitants. Out of these 
emerging indigenous capitalists the leading forces in the reform and nationalist 
movement descended.73 Although here it is postulated that the radical changes 
of the structure serve as the underlying condition for nationalism to appear, the 
nationalist position of these indigenous capitalists is more connected to proc-
esses of the agency-level, which will be explained separately. Nevertheless, it 
illustrates the dialectical connection between the three dimensions of structure, 
culture and agency.  
The following decades of British rule in Ceylon were surprisingly calm, with the 
exception of the Matale rebellion in 1848, which “[…] were essentially protests 
against the sudden imposition of unreasonable taxation, not a serious rebel-
lion”74 and the anti-Moor riot of 1915, which will be discussed in a later chapter. 
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 2.1 State and Religion in Ceylon 
One important feature of the experience with colonialism was the conflict it cre-
ated between intrusive Western culture and religion and Buddhism in Sri Lanka. 
It drastically changed the traditional link between state and religion, especially 
after the capture of the Kandyan kingdom in 1815. The traditional, more than 
2,000 year old bond lost its foundation and practically meant the de-
establishment of the Buddhist heritage.75 The Sinhalese refused to accept the 
disestablishment between the state and the religion. The relationship between 
the king and Theravada Buddhism, in particularly the monkshood, was an im-
portant strain of the royal ideology dating back to the first century A.D.76 This led 
to regular protests on this subject by Buddhist activists.77 The Matale rebellion 
of 1848, although not in the fore of the protests, had religious overtones. Some 
of the rebel leaders articulated their resentment against effort of the British to 
terminate the traditional link between religion and state. More important rebel-
lions against foreign influences took place in the southwest of Sri Lanka and 
were largely organized by Buddhist Bhikkus.78 The revision of the Constitution 
in independent Sri Lanka in 1972 and 1978 to make Buddhism the national re-
ligion can be interpreted as a way of compensation for not restoring the link be-
tween Buddhism and the state.79  
By now one can see that the changes affiliated with the colonial penetration of 
Ceylon led to changes of a structural dimension. It changed the way people in-
teracted with each other, traditional hierarchies were severely challenged or 
replaced. The traditional economic, religious and cultural systems were drasti-
cally modified. In the Sinhalese social structure where hierarchical relations 
were omnipresent, people suddenly had to adjust themselves to a completely 
new pattern of interaction and new surroundings, and had to learn new defini-
tions of who is related to whom and in what way. The huge influx of foreign 
workers contributed to this confusion, not only by changing the demographic 
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balance; additionally, the reorganization of the islands infrastructure led to 
greater geographical flexibility, resolving the foundation of rural Sinhalese iden-
tity and creating the need for another connecting ideology, which nationalism 
was be able meet. 
 3 Cultural Changes: Religious Revival as Precursor for Na-
tionalism 
During the rule of the British Empire and the spread of Christian missionaries 
throughout the nineteenth century, a massive transformation of the public 
sphere in Sri Lanka took place that manifested itself in the introduction and 
rapid development of means of communication.80 This transformation marked 
the arrival of print capitalism in Sri Lanka, which following Benedict Anderson’s 
work on ‘imagined communities’ can be directly linked to the beginning of na-
tionalism. The rise of indigenous publicists and independent editors was funda-
mental to the conduction of the nationalist movement in South Asia.81 This sub-
chapter illustrates how the mechanisms introduced by a foreign power triggered 
a new movement that aimed to uplift the collective identity and national con-
science, most of all through the work of Anagarika Dharmapala. 
 3.1 Arrival of Print Capitalism and the Formation of ‘Protestant 
Buddhism’ 
Even though Christian proselytization in Ceylon was meager compared to other 
colonised nations, it left remarkable imprints on the island, albeit in diffusive 
ways. Christian missionaries unleashed unprecedented amounts of tracts and 
pamphlets on the island to win the minds of the people. This triggered a counter 
offensive movement in the major ethnic communities and led to a new, con-
structive approach in the discursive activity of the indigenous elite, which “[…] 
‘revitalised and restructured’ existing methods of debate and of social and politi-
cal critique.”82 In the case of the Sinhalese, the process resulted in the forma-
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tion of ‘Protestant Buddhism’ or ‘Buddhist Modernism’. The Western methods of 
spreading the British doctrine and ideas of Christianity reinforced a similar in-
digenous process that gave rise to the Buddhist religious and cultural move-
ment. It started with the purchase of a disused mission press overlooked by 
Mohittivatte Gunananda, who was a prominent monk and founding father of the 
Buddhist revivalism movement. In 1862 he created the ‘Society for the Propaga-
tion of Buddhism’ and “[…] led the Buddhist clergy in a series of public debates 
with leading Christian proselytizers such as Wesleyan David de Silva. Mohitti-
vatte went so far as to adopt a style more like evangelical Christian preach-
ing.”83 Traditionally the pose of Buddhist monks in Ceylon is very impersonal. 
The monk sits in a chair next to a fan while offering a prayer in an ‘unemotional’ 
manner, yet Mohittivate quite distinctly stood upright, employed gestures and 
made use of other rhetoric tools.84 His greatest and most far-reaching success 
was the Panadura-debate with Christian missionaries. It was a two-day open-air 
debate that reached a crowd of approximately 15,000. Its success was pub-
lished in Sinhalese and English newspapers that even reached the United 
States; first and foremost it greatly influenced and thus gained momentum 
through Colonel Henry Steel Olcott, President of the Theosophical Society. 
Shortly thereafter, Colonel H.S. Olcott and Madame Blavatsky visited Ceylon in 
1880. This marked the beginning of the involvement of the Theosophical Soci-
ety in Ceylon’s Buddhist revivalism movement and the creation of the Buddhist 
Theosophical Society in Colombo.85 In cooperation with Theosophists and the 
‘rejuvenated channels of indigenous social communication’86, Buddhist propa-
gandists were able to counter the Christian propaganda offensive. They printed 
and distributed anti-Christian tracts, as well as indigenous manuscripts and ma-
jor classical Sinhala works. As Rogers describes, the “[…] first viable Buddhist 
newspapers, published in the 1860s, served as vehicles to promote education, 
doctrinal debate, the construction of temples, and other religious activities.”87 
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British scholars encouraged projects like T.W. Rhys David’s, the founder of the 
Pali Text Society (1881) and author of the RASCB. He made the classic texts of 
the Pali canon available to a wider audience in both English and Sinhala, the 
most notable being the Mahavamsa, the Great Chronicle of Ceylon. It presents 
a distinct perspective of the island’s history, especially the flourishing of Bud-
dhism and the wars against Tamil invaders.  
“Some of the chronicle’s famous passages referred to King Dutthugamani 
who encouraged monks to leave the Sangha and fight in his army and 
who placed a Buddhist relic in his spear to serve as his standard in bat-
tle.”88  
The Mahavamsa then started to serve as a basis for the newly constructed Sin-
hala Buddhist conscience and identity. Since 1870 the Buddhist revivalism 
movement continuously gained influence and its protagonists “[…] were among 
the earliest exponents of economic nationalism”89, arguing about the need to 
become self-sufficient and pursue rhetoric against the European capitalist, who 
exploited the island’s resources.90 In 1898, C.S. Dissanayake, a convert from 
Roman Catholicism founded the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) in 
Colombo. It was modelled after the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). 
In the following years about 900 branches of YMBA were established in other 
cities on the island. Besides providing spiritual guidance the YMBA also held 
weekly debates which examined Western culture.91 At the beginning of the 
twentieth century the Buddhist Theosophical Society began promoting the cele-
bration of Vesak. They disbursed Vesak cards and sung Vesak carols: the cele-
bration of Vesak was to function as an alternative to the Christian Christmas 
celebrations.92  
It should be noted that although they oppose Westernization and Christianity, all 
initiatives reflect a substantial degree of modernisation and adoption of Western 
cultural practices coupled with the aim of restoring ancient Buddhist values and 
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cultures. The need to fabricate a collective conscience was acknowledged the 
first time in an overarching manner by trying to uplift Buddhism and thereby lay-
ing the foundations for a nationalist conscience. 
 4 Anagarika Dharmapala as an Agent of Early Sinhalese Na-
tionalism 
One of the most endeavours figures of the Buddhist nationalist movement, as 
well as the Buddhist revivalism movement, was Anagarika Dharmapala. Nowa-
days he is still celebrated as the leading figure in the Sinhala nationalist move-
ment, as a reformer and preacher. He founded the Maha Bodi Society which 
“[…] set out to give Buddhist missionaries, both priests and laymen, a scientific 
western education, to teach them English and the Indian vernaculars and then 
to send them off to convert the world, beginning with India.”93 It originally was 
designed to raise funds to purchase the religious site of Bodhgaya - where 
Buddha found enlightenment - and to restore it as a holy place for pilgrims. It 
should “[…] become to the Buddhist what the Holy Sepulchre is to the Chris-
tians, Zion to the Jews and Mecca to the Mohammedans”94. Anagarika Dhar-
mapala was likewise able to mix traditional Buddhist ideas with Christian con-
cepts.95 
By being subject to all sorts of influences and knowledge combined with the 
revolution in communication and the broadening of social networks, Dharma-
pala embodies all that exemplifies the past Zeitgeist. His father was a furniture 
dealer. He attended a Roman Catholic primary school, then an Anglican secon-
dary school, all the while remaining a practising Buddhist at home. He then 
worked as a clerk in the Education Department and after Colonel Olcott’s arrival 
to Ceylon he became actively involved in the Theosophical Society.96 He ac-
companied Olcott during his visit to the island and worked as his guide and in-
terpreter. Dharmapala and his mentor were trying to create and promote a 
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transnational Buddhist identity; thus, they were spent more and more time trav-
elling outside of Ceylon. Olcott dreamt of creating a ‘United Buddhist World’. He 
came up with two very successful initiatives: the Buddhist catechism and the 
creation of the Buddhist flag.97 During his work with Colonel Olcott, Anagarika 
Dharmapala became a consistent critic of Christianity and a leading demagogue 
of Buddhist revivalism.  
Through the Sinhalese Newspaper, Sinhala Bauddhaya, run by Dharmapala, he 
could attract wide ranges of the Sri Lankan vernacular audience; still, much of 
his work was targeted at the bilingual Elite in Colombo, whose readership im-
pacted how Theravada Buddhism is interpreted today. Dharmapala also con-
ceptualised a new Buddhist order, which strikes a balance between the layman 
and the monk. It allows for devotion to the Buddhist way of life without requiring 
renouncement of worldly life, for example a worldly political life, as was Dhar-
mapala’s case.98 
Even though he was a fierce opponent of British rule, at the same time he ad-
mired Western scientific discipline and rationality. Once he was quoted:  
“Europe is progressive. Her religion is kept in the background… [used] for 
one day in the week, and for six days her people are following the dictates 
of modern science. Sanitation, aesthetic arts, electricity, etc., are what 
made the Europeans and American people great. Asia is full of opium eat-
ers, ganja smokers, degenerating sensualists, superstitious and religious 
fanatics- Gods and priests keep the people in ignorance.”99 
Over the years Dharmapalas outlook changed and he moved in a different di-
rection, taking on a more traditional attitude that emphasized pilgrimages and 
sacred places. Probably because of his focus shift, he was able to attract a 
broader section of society that included more than just Western-educated Bud-
dhists.100 Dharmapala can be considered the first Sinhalese propagandist who 
realised the need to construct a collective identity and national conscience and: 
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“[b]ecause of his strident and sometimes militant pronouncements on be-
half of Sinhalese Buddhism and against the British colonial presence, 
Dharmapala has often been depicted as an early father of Sri Lankan na-
tional awakening.”101 
 5 The Temperance Movement and the Anti-Moors Riots of 
1915: Two Examples of Arousing Nationalist Sentiments  
In Ceylon it was religion that provided the framework to challenge the ideologi-
cal dominance of colonialism. Kumari Jayawardena argues that the Buddhist 
revival of the 1880 can be seen as a forerunner to nationalism in Ceylon be-
cause:  
“[i]n colonial societies where the connection between politics and religion 
is very close, movements of religious revival have frequently had a distinct 
political content and religious activities have served as a convenient fa-
cade for political agitation.”102  
Therefore the movement first directed its concerns against Christianity and mis-
sionary education. At the end of the century it was linked to an interest in an-
cient history and texts. Spurred on by the discovery of impressive ruins that 
gave credit to past Sinhalese greatness, it led to a process of self-assertion 
within the Sinhalese Buddhist stratum and then the agitation was further chan-
nelled against foreign invaders, so to speak against all non-Sinhalese groups in 
Ceylon.103 That process became clearly visible at the outbreak of the anti-Moors 
riots in 1915. This reaction was apparently a reaction to British domination, but 
directed against the economic powers of minority groups in Ceylon.104 
The Temperance Movement of 1904 and 1912-14 was led and dominated by 
Sinhalese Buddhists who pointed out that the consumption of alcohol was pro-
hibited by their religion. It was later taken over and modified by Sinhalese Bud-
dhist leaders of Colombo and became an “[…] outright rejection of what was 
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seen as an imported, western vice, inconsistent with Buddhist dictates.”105 In 
1912 a government reform that increased the availability of liquor by legalizing 
toddy shops resulted in the establishment of the Colombo Total Abstinence 
Central Union that coordinated an island-wide agitation. In 1915 the member-
ship of the Temperance societies had reached about 50,000 people and the 
Chairman of the Central Union Colombo stated:” It is becoming evident that our 
Temperance Convention will in the near future become our National Convention 
and we should all work with that end in view.”106 
This movement encountered a hearty, responsive audience among the growing 
populations to whom ‘village Buddhism’107 no longer seemed as relevant as be-
fore. In particular the inhabitants that became affluent through entrepreneurial 
opportunities in the South Western coastal regions, as well as the growing Eng-
lish-educated Buddhist elite actively participated in the movement.108  
In May 1915 riots broke out, mainly directed against Moors. Years before these 
riots “[…] the growth of nationalism among the Sinhalese [had] led to an in-
crease of communal tensions. The Sinhalese newspapers and Buddhist jour-
nals led the campaign against minority groups.”109 Papers run by Anagarika 
Dharmapala like Sinhala Bauddhaya (Sinhala) or Mahabodi Journal (English) 
were most blatant in their attacks:  
“From the day the foreign white man stepped in this country, the indus-
tries, habits and customs of the Sinhalese began to disappear and now 
the Sinhalese are obliged to fall at the feet of the Coast Moors and 
Tamil.”110 
And when the anti-Moor riots quickly spread to Colombo the British government 
officers shared the clear opinion that this riot was not actually a reflection of a 
Sinhalese-Moor dispute, but preliminary to a resurrection against the British 
Crown. In 1915 the inspector of the general police observed that “[…] national-
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ism and politics figured largely in these temperance meetings [which where] 
political meetings held under the cloak of temperance.”111 
Most of the rioting was carried out by the Sinhalese against Moors. Thousands 
of shops were looted, mosques were destroyed, and about forty Moors died. 
According to Rogers: 
“[…] rioters acted on the basis of Buddhist revivalist ideas propagated by 
wealthy Colombo Buddhists, especially on the view of history that pictured 
Sri Lanka as a Buddhist land where non-Buddhist were foreigners.”112  
Additional economic pressure brought by inflation and changing patterns of land 
use generated frustration that was responsible for the outbreak of violence. Af-
ter the communal riots broke out the government quickly suppressed the riots 
and the leading members of the Young Men’s Buddhists Association, the Bud-
dhist Theosophical Society and the Maha Bodhi Society were detained without 
trial. These arrests contributed to the island-wide sympathy for the detainees, 
but as soon as they were released they had to “[…] make immediate expres-
sions of loyalty to the colonial government.”113 
After the realization that the Temperance Movement could evocate a Sinhalese 
nationalist sentiment and awakening efforts were made to de-communalize the 
movement and committed themselves to a more cosmopolitan outlook of multi-
ethnic harmony.114 With reference to Mark Frost, the Temperance Movement’s 
failure to transform itself into a national political movement was largely a conse-
quence of the Colombo leadership’s actions. 
John D. Rogers connects outbursts of collective violence in Ceylon to an ancil-
lary effect of the interaction between social change and popular ideology. He 
defines social change as: 
“[…] the structural development of the Sri Lankan economy and the con-
sequent changes in the distribution of political, economic, and social 
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power [and by] popular ideology […] the ideas and assumptions that de-
fine the ways the Sinhalese create social identities and view politics.”115  
The unrest was channelled away from economic conflict into religious passion 
in a visible and scattered minority. According to Rogers the Buddhist revivalism 
movement had some secular aspects to it:  
“It was an indirect way to challenge British economic, political, and cultural 
authority; it provided the new middle and working classes with a social and 
cultural identity lacking in traditional village-based Buddhism; and it en-
ables upwardly mobile Sinhalese to challenge the more traditional elite 
families, many of whom were Christians.”116 
Furthermore, the importance of this movement was that the religious agitators 
were able to garner support for their causes across geographical lines; people 
from urban as well as rural areas participated. The Buddhist revivalism created 
a sense of solidarity that had been lacking since the demise of the Kandyan 
Kingdom and this ideology had the power to provoke riots in places that were 
not directly affected by the matter in question.117  
The movement of cultural, as well as religious revivalism can be interpreted in 
large part as a reaction against Westernization that was foremost directed 
against Christian fanatics agitating against Buddhism. New means of communi-
cation and public debate led to the transformation of the public sphere that 
aimed for the restoration and recovery of a perceived authentic cultural and reli-
gious past.118 Anagarika Dharmapala gave this process a greater effect within 
the Sri Lankan population, which therefore led to the substantiation of the Sin-
hala Buddhist identity and a means of uplifting Sinhalese self-respect.119 Reli-
gious revivalism had acted as a device for local grievances and by striking a 
popular chord recreated the Sinhalese Buddhist ethnic identity.120 
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 6 Agents of Change: National Identity and the Role of the 
Ceylonese Elites 
Ceylon’s inhabitants that converted to Christianity, especially during the pres-
ence of the Dutch and the Portuguese, were treated as a privileged group; in 
contrast, penalties and severe restrictions were imposed on people practising 
primarily Buddhism, but also Hinduism and Islam. Nevertheless, during and af-
ter the colonial period the number of Christians (Protestants and Roman Catho-
lics) never rose above ten percent. However, they still managed to play a sig-
nificant role in Sri Lankan history as the island’s elite. They were and were per-
ceived to be the country’s wealthy and socially prominent group, which inherited 
most of the political supremacy. Their influential status became one of the dis-
sensions creating problems the country had to face during the transition from 
colonialism to independence and even decades after.121 At some moments in 
history it actually seemed that this chasm rather than the Sinhalese-Tamil gap 
would remain the most divisive factor in Sri Lanka’s political life.122 Understand-
ing the role of Sri Lanka’s elite in formulating a nationalist vision for the island 
and how it is linkable to the current conflict situation gives us informative in-
sights. 
 6.1 English and Vernacular Education 
The introduction and spread of Christianity in Ceylon wasn’t a very successful 
objective but it led to the construction of some of the most influential missionary 
schools.123 Even though missionary schools dominated the scene they didn’t 
have a monopoly on providing Western education. The Madras-based Theoso-
phical Society promoted the establishment of several Buddhist English and An-
glo-vernacular schools in Colombo, as well as Shivite English schools and Mo-
hammedan’s schools. These institutions, like ‘Ananda College’ or ‘Dharmaraja 
College’ were designed to challenge the threat of Christian missionary schools 
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that were supposed to proselytize through education.124 Furthermore, providing 
Western education to individuals out of each community was necessary for cre-
ating the next generation of Ceylonese political leaders and thus to “[…]break 
the hold that a native Christian elite had managed to secure for itself in ap-
pointments to municipal and legislative council seats.”125 
The opposite side of the newly introduced Anglo-vernacular education was that 
it simultaneously strengthened the notion of communal identity. Nonetheless, 
the use of English as lingua franca in the public sphere was a connecting me-
dium between communities of different ethnic or religious backgrounds. Robert 
Kearney points out that: 
“[…] the ‘middle- class’ world of English language schools, public service, 
law courts and British-owned commercial and financial establishments, to-
gether with the residential intermingling created by urbanization, fostered a 
‘bond’ between Sinhalese, Tamil and other elites, in which it was a sign of 
modernity to reject communal sentiments as barbarous.”126 
 6.2 The Elite in Colombo and its Notions of Nationalism 
When the access to government service and profession was opened up in 
1870, Western-educated Sinhalese and Tamils challenged the dominant posi-
tion of the formerly privileged Christian Burgher community. As Mark Frost ar-
gues “[t]he creation of this multi-ethnic, western-educated elite was equally the 
consequence of varied intake of the capital’s educational institutions.”127 Too, 
imperial cities in the Indian Ocean, such as Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Co-
lombo and Singapore became thriving centres of cultural and intellectual intel-
lectual exchange between 1870 and 1920. Journalism and associational life 
flourished in the centres of intensified imperial networks and communication. 
These crossing points “[…] functioned as entrepôts for the reception and trans-
mission of knowledge and information as well as of goods, labour and capi-
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tal.”128 The enhancement of imperial communication networks led to greater 
interconnectedness and the growing communities of western-educated literary 
intelligentsia found themselves with increasing contact with each other and the 
outside world. Ideologies, news and views from different parts of the world trav-
elled the ‘imperial highway’ with a much greater speed and concentration.129 
This interconnectedness can be directly linked to the communication revolution 
in the British Empire, which caused: 
“[…] a massive diffusion of newspapers, pamphlets, books and letters, all 
of which circulated with a relative degrees of freedom.”130 The new emerg-
ing elites “[…]drawn from the ranks of civil servants, company clerks, doc-
tors, teachers, public inspectors, communication workers, merchants, 
bankers and (above all) from the legal profession began to form them-
selves into intelligentsias by immersing themselves in discursive activity, 
and quickly developed habits of intellectual sociability that became organ-
ized and systematic.”131  
This bilingual intelligentsia had enjoyed the fruits of western education and were 
highly anglicized in habits and manner. In that particular social stratum it be-
came increasingly acceptable for people of different religious and ethnic back-
grounds to frequent public gatherings and join forces in the same political or 
social reform initiatives. It was acceptable, even fashionable to nourish an inte-
grated and multi-ethnic sense of national unity. Some even pledged to eliminate 
distinctive labels like Sinhalese, Tamil or Burgher and to adopt the name ‘Cey-
lonese’ for all inhabitants. Throughout this period, initiatives were launched that 
promoted an inclusive form of nationalism and created sympathy between all 
communities.132 133 
The so-called ‘brown Englishmen’ in the capitals of British India or its Crown 
Colonies were often an integral part of the early nationalist movements. 
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Through Western education they came in contact with Euro-American ideas of 
the nation-state and nationalism and re-modelled it to make them suitable for a 
wider Sri Lankan audience.134 Through their education they absorbed the con-
cept of a nation-state, which had remarkably influenced their views on the Sri 
Lankan state.135 The English-educated leaders were attracted by its secular 
emphasis.136  
 6.2.1 Communal versus Universal 
At the end of century the newly created local elite and intelligentsia articulated 
goals that aimed for participation in governing the island.137 According to their 
political education, terms like ‘communalism’ or ‘tribalism’ became enemies to 
the West European single nationality concept and they began to downgrade 
ethnic loyalties and viewed them as parochial and divisive.138 During the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, sectionalist claims from various ethnic or religious 
groups in Sri Lanka were stigmatized as ‘communalist’ and through a relative 
dogmatic interpretation of the borrowed Gandhian ‘One Nation Concept’ denied 
legitimacy: as inspiring as the universal inclusive approaches of early ‘Ceylo-
nese Nationalism’ may have been, they were only bound to individuals of the 
English educated elite.  
“Attempts to fashion a national identity that took account of the global di-
mension and aspired to be multi-ethnic may look like wishful thinking on 
the part of a westernized cadre that was [completely] out of touch with the 
strength of communal feeling in the hinterland.”139 
Michael Roberts point out the ideological persistence of the West European 
single nationality concept, which manifested itself in the minds of the educated 
class in Sri Lanka and “[…] hindered fruitful inter-ethnic accommodation within 
the island and has contributed to the process by which Sri Lanka’s political inte-
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gration and survival as a state are seriously threatened.”140 During the begin-
ning of the twentieth century the Sinhalese leaders feared that if they started 
making serious concessions to so called ‘communal demands’ it would weaken 
their movement and compromise their objectives.141 
For instance in 1917, Ponnambalam Arunachalam, a Tamil politician, became 
the leader of the Ceylon Reform League, from which the Ceylon National Con-
gress emerged in 1919, with Arunachalam as president.142 The National con-
gress was founded to demonstrate Ceylon’s readiness for long- postponed con-
stitutional reform.143 In its first years it repeatedly expressed its commitment to a 
multi-ethnic nationality.144 These integrative aspirations were blocked through 
the attitude of the former Governor William Manning, what according to K. M. de 
Silva was “[…] an illuminating text-book case study in the application of a policy 
of divide et impera.”145 Manning tried to strengthen communal feelings among 
the high-caste Kandyan elite and to set them in opposition to the Ceylon Na-
tional Congress by subsequently attempting to foment a divide between the 
Tamil and Sinhalese elites. A few years later it broke apart due to the dis-
agreement between Ceylon Tamil political leaders and the Kandyan Sinhalese 
leadership. and both sections built up their own units of representation. The 
Congress developed a rigid attitude towards communal representation and “[…] 
alienated regional and ethnic factors, except the politically dominant “low-
country” Sinhalese of southwest Ceylon.”146 Congress members were mostly 
Anglicized lawyers and large landowners, who wanted to maintain constitutional 
unity.147 Around 1920 the British were ready to devolve political power to the 
Ceylonese and established the Donoughmore Commission, which then intro-
duced the Donoughmore Constitution. Thus Ceylon was the first British domin-
ion where universal suffrage was adopted. As Rogers points out, the “[…] nine-
                                            
 
140
 Robert 1978: 355. 
 
141
 Ibidem, p. 375. 
 
142
 Berchert 1992: 53. 
 
143
 See Peebles 1980: 858. 
 
144
 See Frost 2002: 951. 
 
145
 K.M. de Silva quoted after Frost 2002: 951. 
 
146
 Peebles 1980: 858. 
 
147
 Ibidem, p. 858−859. 
»» 46  
teenth-century colonial consensus that there were two equal majority communi-
ties, the Sinhalese and the Ceylon Tamils, broke down in the face of the clear 
numerical superiority of the Sinhalese.”148 The sudden introduction of universal 
suffrage dramatically changed the balance of power and resulted in the quest of 
the party leaders to retain their position, gradually giving up their notion of a 
Ceylonese nationality in order to catch the votes of the hinterland, which was 
highly disconnected from the universalistic ideas of the Colombo elitist subcul-
ture. 
One aspect in this process of political divergence becomes noticeable. It ap-
pears that the deep influence of the West European model originally hindered 
suitable concessions to ethnic claims.149 This leads one to the assumption that 
the apprehension of communal demands and its integration into a universalistic 
vision in Ceylon during the period of becoming an independent nation would 
have possibly absorbed the risk of the outbreak of communal violence and 
eventually the violent conflict in Sri Lanka. 
 7 Post-Orientalist Identity Discourses in Ceylon 
Through British scientists and the colonial administration, a system of classifica-
tion was introduced in Sri Lanka that still functions on the Island, albeit in differ-
ent ways than during the colonial period. It shaped Sinhalese and Tamil identity 
and it created boundaries that haven’t been there before, but more importantly it 
laid one of the many foundations of the postcolonial conflict, which has haunted 
the Island for more than 25 years. There may be various reasons for why the 
British intervened in this ideological dimension; one of them was obviously the 
need to bring order to a seemly incomprehensible complexity concerning the 
cultural diverse island’s population. Perhaps, too, it was the extension of the 
‘Divide et Impera policy’ that the British colonial administration implemented in 
order to exercise their power over the Islands inhabitants. However, it most 
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definitely functioned as a legitimization of the structural violence that colonialism 
engendered. 
One result of this ideology was that mutually contrasting groups were created 
that based their national identity on a narrow and biased construction; sup-
ported by a majority-based electoral system, it offers the foundation of su-
premacist ideologies in contemporary Sri Lanka. It should also be mentioned 
that just a small proportion of the present-day Sinhalese nationalists adhere to 
such racist ideologies. 
 7.1 The Invention of Modern Ethnic Identities  
When the British arrived in Ceylon the Island was exceptional in terms of its 
enormous heterogeneity and cultural diversity. The main inhabitants of the Is-
land of Ceylon were believed to have arrived from the Indian subcontinent, cen-
turies ago; at the same time, it was also naturally absorbing people coming from 
different parts of the world into its society. In contrast, present day Sri Lankan 
inhabitants have divided into three major distinct categories: Sinhala, Tamil and 
Muslim.150 This section will focus on the emergence of distinct ethnical groups 
in Sri Lanka. How can one trace the distinct identity category Sinhala back to its 
roots in Sri Lanka and what significance can we attribute to it? 
Various scholarly investigations make it possible to suggest that prior to the 
nineteenth century the identity of the people tended to be variable and contex-
tual. The term ‘Sinhalese’ for instance seems to have functioned as both a cul-
tural and political label without implying any belief in shared ancestry. Rajas-
ingham-Senanayake points out that records of ethno-linguistic mixes are evi-
dent in the Pali-Vamsas, the Buddhist mytho-historical chronicles “[…] where 
royal and aristocratic marriages between Dravidian and Aryan linguistic groups 
[…] were contracted.”151 Those marriages were contracted across ethno-
linguistic lines, but within the warrior or kingly caste. One can assume therefore 
that the priority of identity shaping categories must have changed later in history 
of the Island. The main point is that the construction of ethnically pure and dis-
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tinct communities, such as the Sinhalese or Tamils, were constructed through a 
process of documentation and categorisation, which took place recently in his-
tory, namely through the colonial Census of Ceylon. 
 7.2 Colonial Census in Ceylon 
The British colonial officers classified and constructed identities of natives with 
the aim of reifying an administrative penetration of the whole society as soon as 
possible. The function of the Census in Ceylon has to be understood within this 
context . One of its underlying assumptions it that every individual fits in a defi-
nite category and it constructs the false image of including everyone.152 
In 1871, the first Census Report in Ceylon listed 78 different nationalities and 24 
races on the Island of Ceylon. Forty years later, a process of rationalization had 
taken place and the Census counted only eleven races: Low Country and 
Kandyan Sinhalese, Indian Tamils, Ceylon Tamils, Indian Moors, Ceylon Moors, 
Malays, Burghers, Vedas, Europeans and Others.153 In 1922, a court ruled that 
the Low Country Sinhalese and the Kandyan Sinhalese did not belong to differ-
ent races. This became the trend and major dividing lines emerged between the 
majority Aryan Sinhalese and the minority Dravidian.154 These race-based la-
bels, which were externally imposed, became indigenised and vital to those to 
whom they were applied.155 The Census of 1901 additionally included a chapter 
on the history of Ceylon, which was a record of conflict between the two com-
munities; as Bhasin- Malik points out, instances of coexistence and interaction 
were not given much importance in British administrative traditions of writing 
history.  
Furthermore, the Ceylon Census must be explained as the British colonial gov-
ernment’s attempt to collect systematic information about the society and econ-
omy of the countries they ruled.156 By trying to capture the reality of the Island 
the colonial officials played around with identity categories in the Census. They 
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continuously combined, separated, intermixed and restructured them. They as-
sumed that the natives were members of a definite group and their behaviour, 
physical features and needs were pre-assigned based on the particular group to 
which they belonged. 157  
When the colonial census inquired about mother tongues, people were forced to 
make a choice and label it, and their answer had political impact.158 During this 
process of documentation one must bear in mind that like many South Asian 
languages, pre-modern Sinhala had no words that expressed the distinctions 
used by the British. Identity based categories like ‘race’,’ religion’, ‘caste’ had no 
equivalent expression in Sinhala. Most commonly people used the term ‘jatiya’, 
which is very contextually used and “[…] refers to what is now labelled family, 
caste, religion, ethnicity, or even gender”.159 160 
Identity-shaping aspects like religion and race were used as fundamental cate-
gories. Through the use of these classification system they created a particular 
image of reality and the shifts and changes in the categories used to describe 
the population of the Island reflected firstly the changes in colonial perceptions 
of their subject and secondly the changes in the self-perceptions of these sub-
jects.161 What kind of effects can we discern from this process of categorization 
and description of social reality? 
Firstly, this modern ‘scientific’ racial coding of cultural and linguistic differences 
among ‘native’ populations transformed local identities and continues to config-
ure identity conflict in Sri Lanka, in the form of an Aryan and Dravidian dichot-
omy, where Sinhalese and Tamils consider themselves two different and mutu-
ally exclusive ‘races’.162 
When the Legislative Council was established in 1833, the Governor nominated 
one Low Country Sinhalese, one Burgher and one Tamil to be the Ceylonese 
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representatives. In turn, the native population, through the introduction of repre-
sentative government, emphasized these group identities. 163 Thus secondly, 
the colonial discourse had enormous influence because the Census became 
the basis for the distribution of political power, government patronage and ac-
cess to education and employment.164  
And thirdly the: 
“[…] assumption about the nature of the colonial society […] created prob-
lems for the postcolonial states because it made it extremely difficult to 
conceptualise the nation in relation to any sort of civil society on the west-
ern model, since all social groups, all habits of thought, and all tradition of 
politics were seen as emanations of group identity and essential bodily dif-
ferences.”165  
The British substantialized heterogeneity and laid the basis for political repre-
sentation according to ethnic lines.166 It deepened the perception of differences 
between seemingly racially different communities in Sri Lanka and especially 
gave those categories a totalising character, which it did not possess before. 
The need and practice of categorization and homogenization of the population 
was then: 
“[…] inherited by anti-colonial nationalisms and was fundamental to the 
nationalist imagination. […] Nationalism reinforced the clear definition of 
people and communities as being Sinhala Buddhist or Tamil, Hindu or 
Muslim, majority or minority, and this tendency has only intensified with 
the growth of ethnic and communal conflict in the South Asian region.”167 
Colonial and modern construction of the Island’s people and past converged 
with the Pali- Vamsas, ancient Buddhist mytho-historical chronicles.168 The se-
lective reading of ancient texts like the Mahavamsa combined with the colonial 
discourse on racial differences resulted in the mutually exclusive and bi-polar 
construction of modern Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic identity categories. This 
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tendency plays a substantial role in Sinhala nationalist discourse and conflict 
perceptions in present day Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese community and should not be 
underestimated. 
 
Ethnicity Rather than Caste: Differences in Categorising South Asia 
The main difference in the categorising process in Sri Lanka and India is the 
different emphasis on the terms ethnicity and caste. In Sri Lanka, ethnicity ri-
valled caste as an administrative social category. Reasons for why the British 
preferred ethnicity to caste can be explained by the fact that it was more attrac-
tive to the British to divide along racial lines rather than caste or religion. By so 
doing they could treat Sinhalese Christians, who gained importance as collabo-
rators with the colonial administration, as representative of all Sinhalese. An-
other reason was that when the British discovered that not Hinduism but Bud-
dhism was the main religion in Sri Lanka they realized that caste was an inap-
propriate tool; they wanted to bring progress to the island by ignoring caste as 
much as possible.169 
 
 7.3 The Introduction of the Aryan Theory  
The introduction of Aryan theory of languages and in a more subtle form its 
convergence with the Aryan theory of race through British scientism in the nine-
teenth century plays a considerable role in the contemporary self-conception of 
the Sinhalese population in Sri Lanka. It also shaped the idea that Sinhalese 
and Tamils were essentially different.170, Most of the scholarly research about 
Asia was conducted by the Royal Asiatic Society, which was considered a ‘club 
of the intelligentsia’; the work of the society, therefore, offers interesting insight 
into how the British related to Ceylon. Theories published through the Royal 
Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch (RASCB) developed a life of their own and still 
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function in manifold ways in present-day Sri Lanka. Nira Wikramasinghe has 
acknowledged the role of the nascent academic discipline anthropology in cre-
ating and aiding racial thinking:  
“Developments in physical anthropology and linguistics at the turn of the 
twentieth century were responsible for the definition of essentially linguistic 
groups such as Tamil and Sinhalese in Ceylon in terms of physical charac-
teristics which were supposed to be specific to those groups.”171 
First, one has to separate the two theories of language and race from each 
other. The first theory argues that Indo-European and Aryan languages share a 
common origin. Scholars from the Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch classi-
fied Sinhala, the language of the Sinhalese, as an Aryan language. The most 
notable of these scholars was the German philologist and orientalist Max Müller, 
who proved the accuracy of the Aryan theory in 1861. It was argued that Sin-
hala was a direct derivative of the Aryan language family, whereas Tamil was 
Dravidian in origin. After this discovery, the cleavage between the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils became greater, but it was only after it was equipped with the 
Aryan theory of race, which assumes that there is one common distinct (supe-
rior) race from which speakers of the Aryan or Indo-European language de-
scend, that Sinhalese and Tamil adopted a definitely divergent character.172 
Although Friedrich Schlegel, a German Romantic philosopher, already con-
nected linguistic aspects to cultural and racial theories at the beginning of the 
19th century, it was only with Max Müller’s efforts that it was introduced into 
mainstream scholarship in Ceylon.173 The RASCB then took a stance that ar-
gued that “[…] the Sinhalese are both linguistic and racially Aryan; that Tamils 
are Dravidian; and that the Sinhalese Aryan race is superior both racially and 
(therefore) culturally.”174 To consolidate their theory, ‘scientific’ procedures ap-
propriate to the times were used to prove, amongst other things, that in physical 
anthropology “[…] Sinhalese were the more pleasing (?) race […].175 Many arti-
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cles published by the Royal Asiatic Society were in favour of the Sinhalese 
people and their culture; voices that argued against this position were not pub-
lished. Marissa Angell alleges that the reason behind this attitude was pre-
sumably that by valorising the Sinhalese culture, they actually worshiped their 
own Aryan ancestry. Thus, the British racially identified themselves with the 
Sinhalese and therefore promoted the ‘glories’ of the Sinhalese culture.176 
In summation, the Aryan theory of language was ‘racialized’, integrated into Sri 
Lankan mainstream discourse and created irreconcilable gaps between com-
munities that had up to that point been socially porous and interactive. This 
leads one to the question: where else does one find imprints of the linguistic-
racial ‘scientific’ discourse on aspects of Sinhalese national identity? 
 7.4 The Pali-Chronicles: The Role of Religious Mythology 
Without arguing about the content and validity of the Pali chronicles, especially 
the Mahavamsa, their relevance in shaping Sinhalese nationalism will be dis-
cussed here. The Pali chronicles, Dipavamsa and the Mahavamsa, were first 
composed around the sixth century and updated in the thirteenth, fourteenth 
and eighteenth century. In 1837, it was first published by the colonial govern-
ment and then widely interpreted as a history of the Sinhalese nation.177 Schol-
ars like Kemper argue that “[…] the content of the chronicle influenced the 
shape of modern Sinhalese nationalism.”178 Referring to Michael Roberts’s 
analysis about the Asokan Persona and Sinhala kingship, he poses that the 
chronicles are inscribing that: 
“[…] the Sinhalese were (are) a chosen people destined to maintain the 
Buddhist doctrine in its pristine purity. […] In shorthand, these are what 
can be referred to as the interrelated and overlapping concepts of Dham-
madīppa and Sīhadīpa (island of the Dhamma and island of the Sinhala 
people.) […] They are didactic by nature and written as a sacred history, 
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as a political charter with a ‘midrashic’ tendency to actualise the past 
events in the present.”179  
This history imposes a single and continuous view on the past that is purely 
Sinhala and Theravada Buddhist and its polemical value is certainly due to the 
fact that it is like a court chronicle, expressing a state ideology and written as a 
kāvya, a work of praise.180 The Mahavamsa developed a myth about the Bud-
dha’s visit to the island of Lanka. He foresaw that Lanka would be the place 
where the glory of his doctrine would shine, created a cosmic order to tame the 
demonic, represented by the island mythical aborigines (the Yakhas and Na-
gas), and declared that the island belonged to the Buddha. On his death bed, 
the Buddha decreed that prince Vijaya should protect Buddhism and its follow-
ers on Lanka and thereby raised the Sinhalese kings to a similar position, 
charging them with the duty of protecting and upholding the religion.181 This left 
the Sinhalese kings with immense authority, which manifested itself through 
patronal and symbolic acts.182 
The RASCB published a report on the translation of the Mahavamsa, invoking 
an image of a Ceylon ransacked and plundered by Tamil invaders throughout 
ancient history.183 Tamils were deemed aliens and categorized as invaders of 
the Sinhalese culture, clearly contrasting with the Sinhalese culture. At that 
time, historical images were fundamental to the crystallization and consolidation 
of colonial perceptions. By then the Mahavamsa was generally accepted as the 
history of the Sinhalese nation.184  
Furthermore, Guneratne states that the “[…] Aryan myth helped to reinforce a 
particular view of the island’s history that had begun to take shape during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century.”185 This view, which was actually bound to 
the academic circle, trickled down to the local population. Anagarika Dharma-
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pala, the founder of the Buddhist revivalism movement, was one of the popular 
advocates of the Aryan theory. Once he was quoted: “The bright, beautiful is-
land was made into a Paradise by the Aryan Sinhalese before its destruction 
was brought about by the barbaric vandals.”186 The perception of Sinhala or 
Tamil culture as two pure entireties was (is) consequentially misleading be-
cause they are randomly imposed and stimulate a very narrow definition of na-
tional identity.187  
In 1882, Ernest Renan gave his famous speech ‘What is a Nation?’ and warned 
of the dangers connected with the confusion of race with nation,188 be it the 
case of Sinhalese nationalism or Tamil nationalism or any nationalism world-
wide. It is important to deconstruct seemingly fixed concepts of identity or race 
to point out the highly dynamic structure of identity formation in colonial as well 
as post colonial Sri Lanka.  
 8 Conclusion 
In my attempt to explain the emergence of Sinhalese nationalism in colonial 
Ceylon I referred mainly to three different perspectives of structure, culture and 
agency/agent, but also included a Post-Orientalist view to deconstruct assumed 
fixed identity categories.  
Gellner describes the rise of nationalism as often connected to changes in 
structure, for example the process of industrialisation. In colonial Ceylon it is 
connected to the changes owing to the impact of colonialism. The Portuguese, 
the Dutch and the British who penetrated into the indigenous system of political, 
economic and social organisation changed the landscape of Ceylon completely.  
“The rapid expansion of plantation agriculture in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury was the major catalyst of social change in Sri Lanka as it formed the 
basins upon which the economic development that arose in the period of 
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British rule in the county came to have such a powerful influence in inde-
pendent Sri Lanka.”189  
Through the introduction of plantation economy a better transport system and 
infrastructural measures were implemented in Ceylon. This led to greater mobi-
lisation and interconnectedness of the Island inhabitants. Local boundaries 
were upstaged and primordial loyalties were neglected. This development 
erased the much-needed sense of community and group affiliation. The main 
source of political legitimacy and loyalty expired with the capture of the Kandyan 
Kingdom in the nineteenth century. The forceful introduction and spread of 
Christianity led to suppression of local traditions and religion, coupled with the 
aura of superiority of the ‘white men’s’ colonial administration led to the curtail-
ment of self-perception within the inhabitants. Religious revivalism during the 
end of the nineteenth century was able to revive the former primordial senti-
ments and uplift the Sinhalese self-respect when it laid the foundation of the 
Sinhala Buddhist identity on the reconstruction of the past glories of the Sinhala 
Buddhist kingdoms. The movement’s wide appeal and success was due to the 
revolution in communication technology. New forms of print media made it able 
to draw on the attention of various sections of the society. Methods of Christian 
proselytising were also adopted to counter foreign influences. All these innova-
tions made it possible for the Sinhalese to gradually grow into one significant, 
island-wide community.  
Developments made in South Asian studies and the translation of the Maha-
vamsa into English and Sinhala provided the basis for the glory of Sinhala his-
tory and its people. Like K M de Silva concludes, “[o]ld societies struggling to 
establish a new nationhood […] have seldom been able to put their long and 
complex history behind them.” In Sri Lanka the new nationhood was consoli-
dated when Sinhalese nationalist activist sought to restore the link between 
Buddhism and the state and trying to reduce the privileges enjoyed by the 
Christian minority.  
The concept of being Sinhalese or Tamil is a modern phenomenon that arose 
out of a specific situation connected to the process of colonialism and the social 
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and economic transformation process that took place afterwards. Assuming that 
there was a meaningful contradiction between those two folks in pre-modern 
times is very doubtful, even though selective reading and interpretation of the 
Mahavamsa tends to reinforce this ‘ancient antagonism’. Sri Lanka’s or any 
other country’s history is definitely far too complex and diverse to be reduced to 
a simple “[…] binary opposition favoured by nationalists and some scholar.”190  
Furthermore, when analysing aspects of national identity one cannot just con-
clude that after the cessation of people’s loyalties, be it religious or secular-
ideological to a king, the state just stepped in and propagated the ideology of 
nationalism.191 But it is very likely that the construction of nationalism was more 
successful when, as Eric Hobsbawm says, the new-born states ‘borrowed and 
fostered’ sentiments that already existed.192 Leaders may place emphasis on 
the constructive or destructive aspects. What is certain is that the structure of 
colonialism challenged Ceylon in many diffusive ways, thus placing it in a very 
vulnerable position. When the colonial state began to lose its ideological sanc-
tion around the turn of the twentieth century, more broadly based ideologies, 
including cultural nationalism, secular nationalism, and socialism, competed for 
the political loyalties of the Sinhalese. 193 During these times of upheaval agents 
of nationalism started educating consensus towards its people, meaning lobby-
ing to have their norms, values and ideas accepted as the leading ones. This 
turned the new-born nation into a battlefield for the individual power struggles of 
its political elite, which had a tremendous impact on the country and its people. 
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IV History of Identities in Post-
colonial Sri Lanka 
As I have already discussed in chapter two, nationalist ideas and rhetoric oc-
curred in Ceylon during the 19th and 20th century, first in a religious culturalist 
and second in a universalistic secular form, overlapping in time and societies 
(rural and urban). Both of them fulfilled needed functions concerning various 
dimensions of the societal system, be it the need for self-assertion, freedom, 
solidarity etc. 
To start, I want to mention that when Ceylon gained independence, ethnic po-
larization between the majority Sinhalese and the Ceylon Tamils was not a ‘his-
torically’ inescapable path. There had been some minor incidents and riots be-
fore but they mainly triggered by economic grievances rather than ethnical 
prejudices in the form of Sinhalese cultural nationalism.194 Furthermore, we 
must take into account that after support of the urban Colombo elite diminished, 
organisations and advocates of Sinhalese cultural nationalism in Ceylon did not 
disappear and for the most part the social basis in the rural areas in favour of 
the movement was still completely in tact. Therefore, what dynamics of post-
colonial Ceylon led to the massive diffusion of narrowly defined Sinhalese cul-
tural nationalism rather than the universalistic Ceylonese nationalism that 
wasn’t bound to a distinct ethnic community in Ceylon? What aspects led to an 
unprecedented disintegration of ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka, hence the violent 
Sinhala-Tamil divide? Can one call it the curse of Sinhalese nationalism, or of 
the nation-state in general? 
 1 Majority Politics: Consolidating Nationalist Values 
The gateway to the rise of exclusive nationalist attitudes lies within Ceylon’s 
political framework at the time of independence. Ceylon’s constitutional affairs 
in the 20th century entailed various features that can be seen as a stimulus for 
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the solidification of Sinhalese nationalism and thereby the Sinhalese-Tamil di-
chotomy. Jonathan Spencer assumes that the main preconditions for the out-
break of violent conflict were the illiberal consequences of liberal institutions in 
Sri Lanka:  
“The conflict, it is argued, had to be understood first of all in political terms, 
as the outcome of a specific history of electoral politics, which from the 
1930s on, was structured along ‘ethnic’ lines.”195  
The British felt a natural obligation towards those who had been loyal to them 
and served them in the public service, foremost the Burghers and Tamils. Be-
fore the introduction of universal suffrage in 1931, the Burghers, Moors, Indian 
and Ceylon Tamils were able to ensure their constitutional protection. This left 
the Sinhalese Buddhists overly underrepresented until 1923. Combined with the 
Christian domination in providing high status education, the British gave the im-
pression that they were actively supporting the minorities against the Sinhalese 
Buddhist majority. And when communal representation was abolished and re-
placed with adult universal suffrage in 1931, it was of course heavily opposed 
by the minorities based on the fear that it would not sufficiently safeguard their 
position.196 Indeed, it led to a break down in the pre-independent consensuses 
between Tamil and Sinhalese politicians when faced with the clear numerical 
superiority of the Sinhalese electorates, consequently the possibility of conflict 
increased.197 Ceylon’s cosmopolitan politicians hurried to adjust themselves to 
this new form of mass politics.198 Their rhetoric turned into a language to which 
they assumed the masses would respond ‘positively’. Spencer says that it “[…] 
was a language of linguistic and religious identity, laced with experiments in 
xenophobia directed at different minorities: Indian Tamil labourers on the tea 
estates and Malayali immigrants in Colombo, in particular.”199 Thus, one ob-
serves that the main focus of Ceylon’s politics in 1931 drifted towards “[…] how 
to take advantage of the political situation to preserve their interest, once for-
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mally guaranteed positions were no longer available in the legislature.”200 The 
late representative structure of the British colonial administration distorted state-
level politics and led them towards the use of ethnic symbols and allegiances 
from the very start.201 The introduction of the national flag in 1951 supports this 
point because it actually is a modified version of the lion flag of the last king of 
Kandy, a cultural symbol popular with the Sinhalese Buddhist majority popula-
tion.202 
Furthermore, English, the language associated with status and the lingua franca 
in politics, courts and administration was by common consent perceived as a 
linguistic entrance card to the upper levels of society.203 After 1948 it was clear 
to the ruling stratum that they gradually had to replace English with Sinhalese 
and Tamil. In 1955-56 this pressure resulted in the ‘Sinhala Only Act’. Needless 
to say, the Ceylon Tamils opposed it. Until then, they had been the favoured 
beneficiaries of English language schools, which American missionaries had 
established.204 The constitution did not define the official language. This would 
have at least been deterrence against imposing the ‘Sinhala Only Act’ in 1956. 
However, it only required a simple majority.205 The ‘Sinhala Only Act’ is one of 
the crucial points in the Island’s history and must be interpreted as a combina-
tion of forces. By demanding that Sinhala become the only national language, 
the majority population expressed their desire to improve their living conditions. 
They did so by uttering a radical and exclusionary demand, which should be 
understood out of the colonial experience of the Sinhalese. In the ‘Sinhala Only 
Act’ clearly lies the collective perception that the Sinhalese are the legitimate, 
albeit historically marginalised people of Sri Lanka and therefore they should be 
promoted. Political agents after independence put extra burdens on the cultural 
and structural dimension by maintaining the economic and social patterns of the 
colonial system and by further penetrating into the cultural dimension in order to 
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maintain their power. Myopic campaigns of this manner were the beginning of 
cultural violence that gradually took shape after Ceylon’s independence. 
Another visible example of encouraging ethnic allegiance was changing Cey-
lon’s official name to Sri Lanka in the 1972 constitution. ‘Lanka’ had long been 
the name in Sinhalese.206 The adaptation of the ‘sri’ had already been an issue 
in 1956 when Ponnambalam condemned the government’s decision to use the 
Sinhala ‘sri’ letters on all vehicle license plates and called on all Tamils to use 
the Tamil equivalent ‘shri’ while simultaneously instigating a peaceful protest.207  
From the very start the Sinhala and Tamil politicians only acted on behalf of 
their own community.208 The incautious constitutional drafting encouraged a 
self-sustaining circle of fears generated within minorities and their demand for 
more rights, while a spin-off effect, created a growing resentment within the 
Sinhalese Buddhist majority. Spencer explains that:  
“[…] the new constitution already set in place the patterns of a vertical po-
litical mobilisation within ethnic communities and obviated the need for any 
broad horizontal mobilisation base on common opposition to the colonial 
presence.”209 
In reference to Gramsci theories, a hegemonic ruling group needs to have their 
ideas and values accepted as leading ones. This happens through a pedagogic 
relationship between subject and agent. One must not forget that this relation-
ship dialectically connects the two. Furthermore, we find that from the very start 
the new elite generalized their own particular ethnos onto the whole population 
to marshal support for their nation-building process. As the voting power laid 
predominately with the Sinhalese, it was Sinhalese politicians who could get 
their ideas and values accepted and therefore Sinhalese nationalist discourse 
dominated the scene. Thus, an unstable political framework led to the gradual 
alienation of ethnic minorities whilst consolidating Sinhalese nationalism. 
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 2 Constitutional Developments: Framing Identity and Dis-
crimination 
Three Constitutions followed each other in Ceylon, slowly defining a majority 
community from within its citizens. Similar to Spencer, Wikramasinghe points 
out: 
”Paradoxically the rights mechanism used by liberal states to engineer 
equality of opportunity for minorities were systematically utilised by suc-
cessive Sri Lankan government to shore up the dominance of a Sinhala 
Buddhist majority. 210  
The Donoughmore Constitution, which enabled general elections and adult uni-
versal suffrage, was valid until 1947. One year later, Ceylon was declared inde-
pendent and the Soulbury Constitution, which was modelled after the Westmin-
ster Parliament, was legally recognized.211 The constitutional draft was estab-
lished with the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948. It had more stringent definitions 
of citizenship and thereby deprived more than one hundred thousand Indian 
Tamil estate workers of their voting rights.212 Prior to that, “Sinhalese politicians 
pictured Indian Tamils, whose ancestors mostly migrated to Sri Lanka in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as a foreign, privileged group that had 
arrived at the expense of the Sinhalese peasantry.”213  
The next constitutional revision occurred in 1972 when the Republican Constitu-
tion was ratified. The official name of the country changed from Ceylon to Sri 
Lanka and Buddhism was lifted to the status of a state religion. Tamil parties in 
parliament refused to participate in the framing of the Constitution, claiming that 
it did not contain the minority rights protection clause that the earlier Soulbury 
Constitution included in section 29.214 Its representatives officially boycotted the 
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Republican Day ceremonies and organized protests against what they called 
the ‘Sinhala constitution’, which denied them fundamental rights of language 
and religion.215 Sirimavo Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D Bandaranaiks’s political suc-
cessor, had ‘institutionalized’ the Sinhalese nationalist ideological movement of 
1956 in the Constitution. From then on every Constitution stressed the special 
place of Buddhism. The constitution was further altered in 1978, turning it into a 
Gaullist-presidential system with a Bill of Rights that guaranteed individual–
based fundamental rights but no community rights.216  
It becomes clear that the newborn nation of Ceylon strived to construct an in-
digenous political framework. Ethnic nationalism thereby functioned as the theo-
retical framework of the new nation state. This theoretical framework became 
more and more mono-ethnical in its outlook and left the different socio-
economic realities of Ceylon’s multi-ethnic population unseen and unheard. The 
political remnant of colonialism, as well as the colonial experience itself supplied 
the socio-culturally constructed material needed to legitimize the exclusivist po-
litical practices, while obfuscating the fact that the formerly oppressed were well 
on their way to having the same hegemonic attitude as their predecessors.  
 3 Influencing the Socio-Cultural Perception: Obstacles to In-
ter-Ethnic Accommodations 
From the very conception of an independent Ceylon the main threat to political 
stability was on the need to accommodate minorities, in particular Ceylon and 
Indian Tamils.217 Yet development in Sri Lanka until 1956 can be described as 
moderate, especially in comparison with the following years. It was just after 
1956 when the fusion between politics, Sinhalese identity, Buddhism and social 
frustration merged into a mass movement and set an irrevocable ball of ethnic 
unrest rolling. In this process the cultural dimension of nationalism unfolded it-
                                            
 
215
 See Phadnis 1972: 1139. 
 
216
 See Wickramasinghe 2006:183−185. 
 
217
 The particularness with Indian Tamils is different, complex issue that needs special atten-
tion and is one of the many serious social problems that were neglected due to the ur-
gency of the Sinhala-Tamil divide. (See Jupp 1968: 170). 
»» 64  
self. Individuals with no real relation to one another other than ethnicity found 
themselves bound together by nothing more than the idea of a common history 
and ancestry to express claims and fears. Culturally bound assumptions mate-
rialized based on common awareness of the socio-cultural reality. This puts in 
motion a self-sustaining circle of fears and claims and legitimizes discriminatory 
political actions, not to mention that it is often a political agent who infiltrates this 
sphere whilst deriving power and legitimation out of it. 
The United National Party was the party that first formed a government in Cey-
lon and until 1956 no other political party was able to challenge its dominant 
position.218 The UNP’s ideological stance was (is) centre-right with a laissez-
faire economic policy. Some critics argued that the UNP appeared to be little 
different than the colonial regime.219 It was a party led by elite politicians de-
voted to a universal and pluralistic outlook of nationalism, such as ‘Ceylonese 
nationalism’. Its politicians were from the professional classes and landed aris-
tocracy, who were educated in Britain and highly obliged to parliamentary 
methods. All the prominent family clans, such as the Senanayakes, 
Goonetillekes or Bandaranaikes, were well represented in the dominant political 
positions when they formed the UNP. The party cautiously led Ceylon to inde-
pendence without using violent methods or creating a mass movement like the 
Indian example.220 Rogers states that even though the politicians who took 
power at independence  
“[…] were members of a highly anglicized elite subculture, […] they were 
not entirely divorced from the more popular religious and social move-
ments that attracted their fellow Sinhalese. In the 1930s and 1940s they 
had attempted to fulfil some of the goals of cultural nationalism, finding it a 
useful way of maintaining their own support.”221  
A language assembled with tones of linguistic and religious identity was pur-
posefully used from independence onwards. Politicians attempted to arouse an 
ethnic sentiment within the Sinhalese to maintain their power. At the same time 
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they created a social force that no one was able to control. They also failed to 
distinguish between the ideology of Sinhalese Buddhist cultural nationalism and 
secular nationalism. Thus, while promoting a nationalist cause they used sym-
bols that were only relevant to the Sinhalese majority. 222  
In the 1950s a revival of Sinhalese Buddhist cultural nationalism started to blaze 
and gradually took the form of a mass political movement.223 In 1956 it found 
one of its zeniths with Buddha Jayanthi224 and Sinhala Only. In response to the 
fear of becoming undermined by the majority, the Tamil Federal Party tried to 
secure autonomy for the Northern and Eastern provinces. It would have tipped 
the balance of the system in favour of the Ceylon Tamils, but unfortunately it 
seemed to the Sinhalese “[…] as though it [the Tamil Federal Party] is trying to 
restore the independent Tamil kingdom which existed at Jaffna before the Brit-
ish came, or, worse still, that it is simply a branch of Madras Tamil imperialism 
trying to attach Northeast Ceylon to India.”225 According to Jupp, stumbling 
blocks in the young nation’s political development are firstly that “[…] communal 
policies favoured by Sinhalese nationalist have forced Tamil counter-action, 
while attempts to ameliorate the positions of Tamils have brought resistance 
from the Sinhalese, cutting across party lines.” Secondly, the Sinhalese inten-
sively oppose any change in the unitary system, which makes the process of a 
peaceful devolution very unlikely.226  
Tamils and Sinhalese have driven themselves into a cycle of historically per-
ceived inequalities. First Tamils were perceived to hold an unfair share in edu-
cation, jobs and business in relation to their population percentage, leading to 
affirmative action regarding the Sinhalese and periodic anti-Tamil violence. 
This, in turn, led to the Tamils’ feelings like second-class citizens.227 B.H. 
Farmer notes some social facets that make the Ceylon case unique. Even 
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though the Sinhalese in Ceylon hold a numerically dominant position, they have 
a fear of being overrun by their Tamil neighbours in India. Although they have a 
clear majority on the island, they are a minority compared to the prevalence of 
Indians and in particular the Tamils of Tamil Nadu. Farmers and many contem-
porary social scientists frequently conclude that “[...] the Sinhalese are a major-
ity with a minority complex.”228 This fear was enhanced by Sri Lankan politics 
and media. Phadnis sets forth: 
“Continued intellectualisation of old memories of Tamil intrusion on the ter-
ritorial integrity as well as the Sinhala-Buddhist cultural identity of the Sin-
halese, enshrined in the Sinhalese chronicle which form part of their liter-
ary tradition, provide the historical base for such feelings.”229 
Furthermore, the Sinhalese consider themselves the sole preservers of the an-
cient Sinhala language and culture, as well as the guardian of Theravada Bud-
dhism on the Indian subcontinent, which is another contributing factor to the 
feelings of uneasiness within the Sinhalese society towards Dravidian regional-
ism.230  
 
When I first started taking up the issue of the ‘Tamil issue’ and asked my rela-
tives about the beginning of this problem they explained that after independ-
ence thousands of Indian Tamils came to Sri Lanka, drifting toward the island in 
search of opportunities and better prospects. They explained that every day 
hundreds would arrive in boats or even swim to Sri Lanka. Everybody could ob-
serve this happening in the media. According to my relatives, the government 
had to protect the country from an unending stream of Indian Tamil immigrants, 
because where else should they (probably only the Sinhalese) go? Jump into 
the ocean? Indian Tamils have been considered a social, economic and political 
threat to the wellbeing of Ceylon. 231  
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It becomes obvious that the Sinhalese constantly perceived themselves to be 
threatened by Tamils.  The demographic reality of Tamil Nadu being in such a 
close proximity combined with the writings of the Mahavamsa makes generous 
concession concerning the Tamil population almost impossible. Believing that 
Ceylon is the Island destined to guard Buddha’s doctrine additionally substanti-
ates this stance with a spiritual aura. 
 4 The Rise and Success of Sinhala Nationalism 
1956 marked a sudden change in Sri Lanka’s political culture; it was the year 
when ethnic unrest accumulated and imagined fears took the shape of real po-
litical decision-making. It was the time when former UNP member Solomon 
West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) and took over the ruling power with the ‘Mahajana Eksath Peramuna’ 
(People’s United Front) coalition. Even though Bandaranaike was one of the 
first to propagate ideas of federalism in independent Ceylon, he became the 
leading mouthpiece for Sinhala nationalism. 
 4.1 Creating Unity and Empowering the Sinhalese Masses 
Some years before Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike formed the 
SLFP, he founded the Sinhala Maha Sabha (Sinhalese Great Assembly), an 
organization devoted to promoting Sinhalese culture and communal interests. 
Its significance can be seen as a prelude to the creation of a real majority com-
munity. In one particular speech, Bandaranaike, in his capacity as Sinhala 
Maha Sabha spokesman, elaborated: 
“We [i.e. the Sinhala Maha Sabha] saw differences amongst our own peo-
ple- caste distinctions, up-country and low-country distinctions, religious 
distinctions, and various other distinctions- and we therefore felt that we 
should achieve unity, which is the goal of us all. Surely the best method 
was to start from the lower rung; firstly, unity among the Sinhalese; and 
secondly, whilst uniting the Sinhalese, to work for the higher unity, the 
unity of all communities.”232  
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It is possible that Bandaranaike encountered so many obstacles while trying to 
unite only the Sinhalese that he did not have the opportunity to unite all com-
munities. And indeed he was able to ally the Kandyan and the Low Country 
Sinhalese.233 By aiming to create unity among the Sinhalese, Bandaranaike 
brought forward some structural conditions for nationalism, meaning a shared 
culture, education and language. Furthermore, Bandaranaike, a critic of the elit-
ist political structures, claimed that Ceylonese politicians would continue with 
colonial politics without considering the conditions of the country. He probably 
was the first politician who was willing to understand the indigenous social reali-
ties.234 This attitude was a contributing factor to his popularity among the rural 
Sinhalese masses.235 He designed his party as a reformative alternative to the 
elitist UNP; nevertheless, both parties adopted the slogan of ‘Sinhala Only’ dur-
ing their elections campaign.236 However, it was the SLFP that assumed power 
in 1956 in a wave of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. The determining factor was 
the support of a new group: the new village leadership (NVL). This group was 
able to unleash social forces that previously had not existed.237 Its members 
were Sinhalese rather than English-educated and consisted of Buddhist priests, 
‘Vedaralas’ (practitioners of traditional Ayurvedic medicine), ‘Mudalalis’ (village 
money-lender-shopkeepers) and teachers. The NVL was increasingly aware of 
their influence on the voting habits at a rural level, and - by uniting with the 
SLFP - also at a national level.238 The village leadership considered itself de-
prived of upward mobility because of to their lack of English education. Hence 
they tended to foster feelings of: 
“[…] envy, jealousy, and righteous indignation against the English-
educated, especially the Ceylon civil service; against the village headman, 
who though not all English-educated were derived for the most part from 
the traditional rural aristocracy; and against the Ceylon Tamils, and Chris-
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tians of whatever community, who were both said to hold more posts in 
Government Service than their number alone would warrant.”239  
Sentiments against Ceylon Tamils were later further reinforced with concepts 
like communalism, religion and backward-looking nationalism.240 Bandaranaike 
was able to gain control of this group by arousing sentiments for Sinhala lan-
guage, religion and cultural nationalism. Another factor that contributed to the 
Sinhalese nationalist wave was religion. Once before, religion had functioned as 
a uniting force, but the British colonial administration hindered it from growing 
beyond pure religious content. In 1956, Buddhism in Ceylon reached its peak in 
popularity. It was the year of Buddha Jayanti, the 2500th anniversary of Bud-
dha’s entry into Nirvana. Wriggins writes:  
“Buddha Jayanti year had a peculiarly Sinhalese significance. The coinci-
dence of the landing of Vijaya [the legendary founder of the Sinhalese na-
tion] and the death of the Buddha made it possible to see the year 1956 as 
a unique, three-fold event- the completion of 2500 years of Buddhism, of 
the life of the Sinhalese race [sic], and of Ceylon’s recorded history”241  
At least since Buddha Jayanthi, the message of a shared culture has trickled 
down to all layers of Sinhalese Buddhist society. Buddhist monks and their tra-
ditional place in politics made an additional contribution: many of them were 
leading agitators in the second wave of nationalism.242 Buddhist monks dis-
played the link between primordial ties and nationalism. Farmer points out vari-
ous reasons for this role: 
“[T]he great and so far almost unchallenged influence of the priests in the 
villages, their identification with the linguistic and cultural aspects of Sin-
halese nationalism, their membership in the same vernacular-educated 
group as other members of the new village leadership, their numbers and 
their power to add their numbers (for it is relatively easy for a layman to 
take to the robe), and the limelight that was theirs in Buddha Jayanti 
year.”243 
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Bandaranaike was able cumulate these various factors into a single social 
movement. He united the Sinhalese, in particular the rural masses from 
throughout the Island, not only in contrast to non-Sinhalese, but also in contrast 
to the Westernized elite. By merging their manifold socio-cultural realities into 
one and emphasizing Sinhalese Buddhist cultural glories, he empowered them 
ideologically and politically. The crucial point is that enjoining the Sinhalese 
masses suddenly became a determining factor in the island’s politics. 
 4.2 Sinhala Nationalising the State 
In this section it is important to clarify that the active propagators of Sinhala 
Buddhist nationalism are members of a militant form of Buddhism, which exists 
next to the three orders of the Buddhist Sangha. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism 
troubles the collective conscience of monks loyal to the message of 
non-violence and also contributes to the paralysis of the peace process be-
tween the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil separatists. Behind their activ-
ism lies the assumption that Buddhism in Sri Lanka is endangered by the 
Tamils separatists and therefore needs to be protected, by violent means if 
necessary. Their doctrine has lost all its universal intent and marks a crisis in 
the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.244 This chapter provides examples of how 
the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist agenda gradually took root and infiltrated the 
political constitution of the state. 
After becoming independent “Sinhalese nationalists strove to adopt the princi-
ples of democracy for themselves and erase their European origins.”245 Bud-
dhist monks, who had a vision of society based on the Mahavamsa, organized 
themselves into pressure groups.246 Their main assertion was that the Sangha 
was actually the prototype of democracy, but superior to the West European 
System. It led to the demand that the state recognise the moral authority of the 
Sangha and that Buddhism be elevated to a privileged position in society.247 
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The same pressure groups protested against the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987,248 
“[…] claiming the agreement betrayed the Sinhala people by conceding too 
much to the Tamils and allowing Indians to enter the Island as a peacemaker 
force.”249 The Sinhalese nationalists’ demands were met when the following 
amendment was introduced into the Constitution in 1972:  
“The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the fore most place and 
accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Bud-
dha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 
and 14.”250 
The introduction of the clause implies on the one hand an elevated status of 
Sinhalese Buddhists in the eyes of the state, and on the other and leaves indi-
viduals from other communities with an adverse impression. Enforcing Sin-
halese Buddhist values had a symbolic, as well as a real impact on Sri Lanka’s 
multiple ethnic communities251, foremost because the Sinhala language also 
became fully enshrined as the official language at a constitutional level. From 
then on, every constitution granted a special place to Buddhism. Even though it 
was obvious that Buddhism enjoyed affirmative action from the state, many of 
its proponents still portrayed it as a religion under threat. Nira Wickramasinghe 
aptly asserts that all measures taken to elevate Buddhism in Sri Lanka must be 
understood as “[...] a process of rectifying perceived colonial favouritism to-
wards Catholics.”252  
Political parties began reinforcing Buddhism as the state religion by performing 
Buddhist ceremonies at almost every state function.253 The Sangha gradually 
adopted its role of ancient Sinhala Buddhist times by providing legitimacy of 
political procedures. A few years later the Sinhala Buddhist nationalization con-
tinued when nationalist pressure resulted in the abandonment of the parliamen-
tary democracy and the introduction of a presidential regime from 1977-78. The 
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parliamentary democracy was abandoned in the name of the Buddha’s doctrine. 
In contrast to a non-absolutist and peaceful Buddhist doctrine, Meyer states that 
“[t]he model of enlightened despotism, already present in the Buddhist tradition, 
is embodied in the Indian emperor Asoka: Asoka denounced unjust violence but 
not fair, universal, absolute power.”254 The Sri Lankan upper class had a keen 
interest in the new role the system of revived ancient monarchy would offer 
them:” […] protector of the Buddhist community, and provider of wealth and 
prosperity to the people by way of irrigation projects, construction of hospitals, 
and land distribution.”255 President Premadasa launched the Ministry of Buddha 
Sasana (Message of the Buddha) during his term in the 1980s. During his reign 
facets of the Western democratic model were successively abandoned for the 
adoption of a model based on the Jathika Chintanaya (National Ideology).256 
Manifestations of Sinhalese nationalism became apparent on different levels, 
for example the large-scale state-sponsored agricultural development from 
1930 to 1980. They were designed as a restoration of the glory of pre-colonial 
Buddhist kingdoms.257 These well-intended projects had multiple effects and 
causes:  
"[…] Accelerated Mahaweli Development Scheme, as massive hydroelec-
tric and peasant- resettlement project, launched in 1977, […] invoked na-
tionalist visions of the ancient Sinhala Buddhist hydraulic civilization, [and] 
further exacerbated Tamil anxieties on a national scale."258  
This trend was perceived by the Tamil population as Sinhala Buddhist coloniza-
tion of Tamil areas. One again recognizes that it was one particular ethnos that 
was imposed on all inhabitants. The push forward of Sinhala Buddhist national-
ism as a political force exemplifies many obstacles to a peaceful cohabitation of 
the Island different communities. These obstacles are, firstly, cultural national-
ism based on one perspective of the Island’s many histories, which consequen-
tially hindered the formulation of a common national identity (particularly since it 
                                            
 
254
 Meyer 2003: 122. 
 
255
 Ibidem, p. 123. 
 
256
 Ibidem. 
 
257
 See Spencer 2008: 612. 
 
258
 Somasundaram 1998: 5. 
»» 73  
displayed an ethnic concept of national identity) and, secondly, the steady poli-
ticization of the Buddhist Sangha as a result of the reformative movement led by 
Anagarika Dharmapala. His efforts to promote Sinhalese Buddhists as legiti-
mate rulers and inhabitants of the Island was the impetus for the rise of Sinhala 
Buddhist pressure groups, which, thirdly, led to the alteration of the Constitution 
in favour of Sinhala Buddhist whilst marginalising other communities in front of 
the state. 
One dubious result in contemporary Sri Lanka is that it faces a situation in 
which Buddhist monk are Members of Parliament, most notably the Jathika 
Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party) which seeks to protect Sri Lanka’s in-
tegrity, or more subtly the integrity of their Sinhala Buddhist state.259 
 5 The Janatha Vikmuthi Peramuna: Insurrection in the Name 
of a Sinhalese Nation 
In the last third of the 20th century Sri Lanka’s inhabitants enjoyed improved 
living conditions due to the state’s social policy and greater access to education; 
at the same time, they faced slow economic growth. In Ruhuna, which became 
the centre of the Janatha Vikmuthi Peramuna (JVP), the People’s Liberation 
Front uprising, unemployment ran and still runs high. Even though the govern-
ment tried to empower the region, the results were not prosperous when one 
takes into account the exceptional human potential found in area.260 This gen-
eration of young, educated Sinhalese adults grew into an idealistic rebellious 
movement that sought a Marxist-Leninist revolution coupled with the ideas of 
Sinhalese nationalism.261 The JVP launched two abortive insurrections - the first 
in 1971 and the second in 1987 - in the name of the Sinhala Buddhist nation. 
The latter gravely exceeded the first in terms of human cost and societal conse-
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quences.262 The movement aimed to occupy territory, then to assume power 
over the media and police stations, and finally to take control of the government 
by encircling cities from the countryside. Their strategy was to paralyse and 
dominate all areas of government control.263 
There are varying reasons for why revolutions and uprisings take place in third 
world democracies. They can be interpreted as mass socio-psychological dis-
turbances, poverty or in structural terms such as ‘weakness of elites’, ‘armed 
forces’ and ‘the influence of international economic or political pressures’. Cer-
tainly, it was interplay of forces. Moore redresses the JVP uprising as an: 
”[…] intelligent, creative and highly ambitious political leadership, dedi-
cated to the achievement of state power, but blocked from achieving it by 
electoral means [which] exploited […] the reservoirs of political alienation 
found within Sri Lankan society […].”264 
The charismatic leader of the JVP, Rohan Wijeweera, who had studied at the 
University of Moscow, enjoyed absolute authority within the JVP.265 The move-
ment’s doctrine was mainly socialist or Marxist, but these aspects were increas-
ingly neglected and replaced by Sinhalese chauvinist and indigenist elements 
targeting the Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil ethnic groups, as well as the Indian 
armed forces during the ongoing civil war in 1987.266 In the same tenor, the rival 
left parties were branded as traitors because of their support of the negotiated 
solution to the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict.267 
Nationalism played a key role in mobilizing the masses in both insurrections. 
Consequently, nationalism became increasingly interpreted in terms of local 
differences.268 The dominant moral basis was ‘Patriotism’, of course again in-
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terpreted in Sinhalese Buddhist terms.269 Sinhalese students, mainly of Karava 
origin, an enterprising caste, established the JVP. Its ranks were filled with 
mostly non-Goyigama, quasi people with non-elite status.270 According to 
Meyer: 
“[t]hese young students were educated in rural, exclusively Sinhalese 
schools and harboured a deep resentment toward the English-speaking 
bourgeoisie of Colombo, as did their parents who voted for Bandaranaike 
or Marxist candidates.”271  
As in most revolutionary movements their programme was increasingly directed 
against the indigenous elite because they were (are) closely associated with 
neo-colonial foreign powers.272 Because of their inability to speak (and igno-
rance of) English their chances of finding a job and their access to university 
were reduced. Hence “[…] they established a political counterculture founded 
on a combination of Marist-Leninist theories and nationalist Sinhalese ideals.”273 
One factor behind the eager support of the JVP lay mostly in the fact that un-
employment was constantly high and the output of the educational system was 
far too large to be absorbed into the labour market.274 The JVP was against par-
liamentary democracy, the Marxist left and the so-called Sinhalese nationalists 
whom the SLFP had accepted. They wanted to redevelop the welfare state that 
was threatened by the intervention of foreign powers.  
The first insurrection was put down within a few weeks; many members were 
hunted down and executed until the government changed their stance and 
placed them in re-education camps. According to Meyer the government did not 
want to attack the descendants of those who had elected them in the first place. 
When the UNP came into power in 1977, the remaining prisoners were rehabili-
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tated and the JVP transformed itself into a political party, procuring about four 
percent of the votes in the 1982 presidential elections.275  
One year later the anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo took place, for which the gov-
ernment held the JVP responsible and consequentially banned the party. The 
prohibition urged the movement to go underground and reaffirm itself with na-
tionalist and anti-Indian propaganda. Their moment to resurrect arrived in 1987, 
when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi imposed the Indo-Lanka agreement 
on Sri Lanka.276 It needs to be clarified that during this turbulent period the rul-
ing stratum felt more threatened by the leftist revolutionist than by the emerging 
Tamil separatist conflict.277 The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was a perfect 
situation for the JVP to gather ideological support by exposing Indian expan-
sionism.  
Meyer describes the JVP the sudden appearance to be “[…] the only authentic 
incarnation of Sinhalese nationalism […]”278 in contrast to all the other parties. 
Even the police and the armed forces shared the aversion to Indian intervention 
and as Moore elaborates  
“[…] [It] appeared to represent the realization of an old, deeply rooted, and 
carefully nurtured collective Sinhalese paranoia about Indian expansion-
ism and the vulnerability of Sri Lanka to betrayal by leaders who where not 
genuine Sinhalese Buddhists.”279  
The second rise of the JVP occurred almost simultaneously “[…] with the emer-
gence of a indigenist middle class Sinhalese intellectual movement, known as 
Jathika Chantanaya (The National Ideology), which constituted an attempt to re-
establish and reaffirm the Sinhala culture and language in the face of foreign 
influence and the re-popularization of the English language.”280 
Unplanned riots broke out shortly after the agreement was signed, forcing the 
government to unleash special police force units while the support for the 
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movement increased. During the 1987 insurrection the JVP launched a cam-
paign of terror to eliminate corrupt politicians and the local mafia. Their actions 
aimed to destabilize the Colombo elite. Suddenly the whole nation turned into a 
security-conscious militarised state with a perplexing array of arms, uniformed 
men, barriers, check points, searches and ID cards, creating an atmosphere of 
tension and insecurity.281 Due to their intimidating methods the JVP quickly lost 
their popularity.282 Between mid 1987 and mid 1989 a situation of anarchy 
emerged in the southern and central areas. Sri Lankans no longer knew who 
was responsible for all the mass killings that occurred.283 The fatal mistake that 
the leftist movement committed was to threaten to harm the families of police-
men and soldiers who refused to desert the government and join the movement. 
This tactical move resulted in a brutal campaign of counter-terrorism meant to 
eradicate all traces of JVP support. The government made use of death squad-
rons, kidnapping and executing JVP members without trial and then burying 
them in mass graves along highways, near villages or even in the middle of uni-
versity campuses.284 The pervasive difference between the handling of the first 
and the second insurrection was that during the first the convicts were handed 
over to a court system, whilst during the second rebels were simply executed.285 
This period marks the successive breakdown of political affairs in Sri Lanka. 
Interestingly, after the insurrection the JVP was once again able to convert itself 
to a political party; it still enjoys solid support in the South. According to Meyer’s 
analysis: 
“[…] they have regained control of several student unions, benefiting from 
the support of advocates of a ‘national ideology’ (Jathika Chintanaya) and 
adversaries of globalization, who exhort purging all foreign influences from 
the intellectual life of the country.”286 
A combination of factors created an environment supportive of the uprising: 
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“[…] increasing poverty, frustrating unemployment and diminishing natural 
resources (particularly land), compounded by a mismanaged economy, 
exposure to unattainable luxury goods and unrealistic expectations of 
prosperity, […] [were] the economic determinants of the continuing youth 
unrest and violence, especially the JVP phenomenon in the south."287 
The increasing economical gap between the English-educated and Sinhalese-
educated can be connected to the re-emergence of Sinhalese cultural indigen-
ism, which has been used as a weapon by the middle and professional classes 
against the ‘westernized’ elite, whom they felt excluded them. As Eric Meyer 
states:  
“Their ideological discourse systematically denounced the hegemony of 
the English-speaking middle class- whom they considered as foreign and 
out of touch with national reality- and the power of high-ranking families 
such as the Bandaranaikes, whom they considered feudalists.“ 
The masses behind the JVP can be seen as one outcome of a societal transi-
tion process. During the transformation the Sinhalese rural youth were not will-
ing to accept the dominance of the Sri Lankan political elite. Sinhala nationalist 
values provided them with the ideological impetus for challenging that domi-
nance. Furthermore, it seems likely that one of "[…] the main reason for the 
emergence of the JVP after 1987 was the perceived threat to the Sinhalese 
identity, particularly its territorial integrity from the intervention of India (from 
whom there is supposed to be a 'racial' memory of repeated invasions in his-
tory)." Again the content of the Mahavamsa is brought to life and used to agitate 
nationalist sentiment. 
 5.1 Socioeconomic Stimulation for Sinhalese Nationalism 
My argument here is that the postcolonial economic policies and circumstances 
proved to be a stimulus for the outbreak of conflicts on the island, for example 
by providing the basis for the Sinhalese to readdress their socioeconomic griev-
ances through a perceived threat to their identity. This perception was en-
hanced by a certain section within the Sinhalese Buddhist stratum of society 
that called for Sinhalese Buddhist super ordination, which consequently meant 
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the subjugating of minorities. Thus, the massive endorsement of this idea could 
not have come about if there had not been general consent within the Sinhalese 
Buddhist majority community that they needed to restore their neglected collec-
tive identity.  
Nevertheless it is important to mention that the causes for violent conflicts in Sri 
Lanka or any other conflict are multidimensional and go beyond a pure identity 
conflict. One dimension in the Sri Lankan example is the contradictions created 
by the national development policy in independent Ceylon/Sri Lanka. At this 
point ‘ethnicity’ was used as a mobilization device rather than a root cause.288 
At the time the country declared independence, the Sri Lankan economy had for 
centuries already been dependent on the global market through the export of 
tropical goods and the import of rice.289 Besides economic structures the colo-
nial heir "[...] included a high human development standard, well-developed in-
frastructure, a well functioned judiciary and a democratic political system [...].”290 
Thus contrary to other newly independent Asian states Sri Lanka’s main issue 
was not to raise the living standard of the people, but to maintain it amidst the 
tremendously fast growing population.291 Thanks to the welfare system the 
population grew rapidly and almost doubled between 1950 and 1980.292 Abey-
ratne argues that one of the main reasons for the almost simultaneous outbreak 
of the two violent insurgencies, and therefore the intensification of exclusive 
nationalisms,293 was the social demand gap created by the extension of the wel-
fare system and economic reality. The Sri Lankan economy was able to satisfy 
neither the number of people nor the high expectations stimulated by the wel-
fare state and access to free education. He concludes therefore that: 
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“The gradual exclusion of individuals, social groups as well as regions 
from the mainstream development process was an inevitable outcome of 
these contradictions in development.”294 
The post-independent government launched two radically different economic 
policies to overcome these urgent issues. Thus, first self-sufficiency and bu-
reaucratic control was first explored in 1960s and then exploited from 1970 to 
1977. 295 In the years after 1950 the Sri Lankan economy was confronted with a 
steady decline in market prices, in particular its three main exports: tea, rubber, 
and coconut.296 By the mid 1950's, with no corresponding economic develop-
ment, there was strong competition for limited government jobs, as the govern-
ment was the country's main provider of employment. And just like the ideologi-
cal thrust of Sinhalese radicals had first turned against Muslims in the 1920s 
and against Indian workers occupying the labourer positions in government de-
partments in the 1930s followed by a reaction against Christian influence, it now 
increasingly turned against educated Ceylon Tamils with white collar aspira-
tions.297  
The next economic shift took place in the early 1970s when the state national-
ised the plantations. The result of this shift was a major decline in the private 
sector and the increasing importance of the state’s role in being the main ‘en-
trepreneur’ as well as the main ‘supplier’ to the economy. During that time of 
actual economic stagnation the public sector expanded and became the main 
source of employment opportunities.298 Coupled with the gradual ethnic nation-
alization of the state it contained a great deal of conflict potential. 
Twenty years later, profitability had dropped so far behind because of bureau-
cratic management and lavish salary practices that the state had to step back 
and hand over management to private local or foreign companies.299 Since then 
(1980s), the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka has experienced a major slowdown 
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caused by the nationalisation of the economy and the start of separatist con-
flict.300 Thus in 1977 the Sri Lankan state had to abandon its restrictive import 
substitution policy in favour of economic liberalisation.301 
When the conservative United National Party took over, their laissez-faire eco-
nomic programme was based on globalizing the economy by emphasizing the 
textile industry, tourism and export of its labour force. Deregulation and privati-
sation started with foreign aid to finance the development of the country’s infra-
structure.302 During these years of actual economic growth the country was 
haunted by the outbreak of two violent conflicts, one of which turned into a 
massive civil war. 
 6 The Role of Elites and the Masses 
“If one surveys the political scene of Ceylon since Independence one can-
not help noticing that the island has been governed throughout by a nu-
merically small elite the composition of which has cut across political, reli-
gious, ethnic and caste divisions. Those who wield political power and 
those who have in the past, whether they claim to be of the Left of Right 
ideologically, are a part of the same social elite and therefore there has 
been no significant broadening of the base of power despite four decades 
of electoral politics with universal adult franchise.”303 
Many of today’s former colonies are governed by the elite, who are clearly dis-
tinguishable from the masses. Through Western education they inherited a dif-
ferent worldview, which disconnected them from the traditional society and most 
of all from the peasant worldview in Sri Lanka.304  
“Westernization, which involves radical changes in life style and the adop-
tion of universalistic world view, invariably results in the loss of identity 
with the masses, stepped in tradition, poverty and parochialism.”305  
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One can therefore see that the new governing elite in Sri Lanka had almost as 
little to do with the masses as their colonial predecessors. Hence there was just 
as little empathy for their concerns.306 Even though the elite were fairly decoup-
led from the rural masses they still were dependent on their voting power. The 
new national leader had to be positively identified with the masses. As previ-
ously mentioned nationalism can only take root if it strikes a popular chord and 
derives its force from its historical embeddedness. This means that the masses 
must recognize the politician as their national leader and spokesman and “[…] 
in Ceylon this involves populist rhetoric, compromising a subtle mixture of 
Theravada Buddhism and socialism […]”307 The elitist agent therefore not only 
makes use of existing socio-cultural patterns, he also manipulates them for his 
own purpose. Thus, invoking populism became the central dogma in Sri Lankan 
politics.308 But staying in power by only keeping an image alive has its limita-
tions and the JVP uprising occurred when the elitist system started to crack dur-
ing a period of economic deterioration and mass unemployment. Social exclu-
sion and the young generation’s frustrations in Sri Lanka created a fertile 
ground for the emergence of conflict in Sri Lanka; the socio-cultural sphere con-
tributed to the trend that these conflicts were staged on the basis of ethnic divid-
ing lines.  
Another interesting perspective is that neither the Sinhalese nor the Tamils 
were homogenous communities; within each community was a constant conflict 
of interest and competition for power. Based on Abeyratne’s analysis “[...] the 
political conflict developed in Sri Lanka is not only between the communities, 
but also within the communities.”309 It was the youth who instigated uproar 
against the traditional political elite and they presented themselves in a far more 
nationalist manner than their majorities.310 While their human capabilities 
gradually increased after independence, the space for social, political and eco-
nomic participation stagnated and generated masses of frustrated youth in the 
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Sinhalese community and in the other communities as well. This concentrated 
passion suddenly turned against the state authorities and against every factor 
which they thought prevented them from fulfilling their expectations. 
 7 Cultural Production through the State:  
  Education and Media 
In most cases education has the potential to reduce conflicts and create aware-
ness of ‘the other’, but in Sri Lanka neither its current institutional structure, nor 
its content is designed to create peace and mutual understanding.  
Rather, its content inflames ethnic differences and its outdated institutional 
structures promote a sense of perceived inequalities within the Sri Lankan 
youth, the latter refers to the Tamil youth, especially when the language of in-
struction in most secondary schools was changed in 1959 from English to Sin-
hala and Tamils. Suddenly large groups of educated Sinhalese and Tamils with 
little knowledge of each other emerged, recognizing the other mainly as a com-
petitor. These divisions were amplified during the university admission crisis of 
the 1970s.311 With the diminishing role of English, linguistic polarization has 
contributed to the increasing support of movements that affirmed group identi-
ties, which are the Tamil separatists and the Sinhalese nationalists.312 
Another implication of institutional deficits can be connected to the causalities of 
the JVP uprising. Chandra de Silva states that JVP supporters  
“[…] regarded the education system as one which guaranteed special ad-
vantages to the elite, who either had knowledge of the English language or 
the financial resources to acquire it. This was, in their view reinforced by 
the state’s provision of a much better education to students from rich and 
middle-class urban families than those from poorer rural families.” 313 
Furthermore, the educational system is based on linguistic lines and its content 
leaves enough space for cultural misunderstanding and discrimination between 
                                            
 
311
 See de Silva 1999: 109−110. 
 
312
 Meyer 2003: 58-59. 
 
313
 de Silva 199: 117−118. 
»» 84  
communities.314 The language of education is either Sinhala, Tamil or English. 
School textbooks published by the state teach school children myths of diver-
gent racial origins, which help to divide the Sinhalese and Tamils for genera-
tions to come. After a study of school text books in Sri Lanka, Reggie Siriwar-
dena stated that history is exploited as an instrument of divisive ethnic ideolo-
gies. They project an image of Sinhala Buddhist identity, which is defined fun-
damentally through opposition to and struggle against Tamils in past history. 
And Tamil textbooks are likely to strengthen a communal feeling and foster a 
patriotic feeling towards Tamil Nadu, not Sri Lanka.315 K. M. de Silva further 
highlights a study that observes the connection between school textbooks, 
communal relations and what outlook and attitudes regarding communal rela-
tions are likely to be fostered by its content:  
“[…] The study demonstrates in particular, that while the Tamil readers ‘do 
seek to create an understanding of and respect for the way of life and cul-
tures of non-Tamil and non-Hindu linguistic and religious groups, and do 
attempt to project a sense of a common national identity’, the Sinhala 
books are exclusively mono-cultural in their content- that is, the way of life 
they present is not only solely Sinhala, but also solely Sinhala Buddhist. 
[…] The Tamils are identified throughout the books as the traditional ad-
versary. On the present occasion of the celebration of national independ-
ence, particular attention must be drawn here to the fact that in one of 
these readers, which still continues to be used in schools and copies of 
which may have been handed out by the President on January 31st (1983), 
the independence won in 1948 is describes as having been gained and to 
be enjoyed only by the Sinhalese.”316 
Sri Lanka’s education system is probably as outdated as its constitutional struc-
tures and drastically needs to be revised. It is a relic of former times that segre-
gates society rather than uniting it. Reggie Siriwardene goes so far as to con-
clude that this two-faced educational policy promotes continued discord, conflict 
and bitterness and fosters divisiveness and separation. It creates the polarised 
perceptions that caused the conflict.317 The impression I gained whilst carrying 
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out my qualitative research aligns with Siriwardene’s points. There seems to be 
a huge knowledge gap in Sri Lankan Tamil history within the Sinhalese edu-
cated stratum. A gap so wide that even assuming that there was a Tamil king-
dom in Sri Lanka before the British arrived appears ridiculous. Another contrib-
uting factor, or simply an extension of the segregated education system, is the 
Sri Lankan media. As Daya Somasundaram points out:  
"The presence of mass media that constantly feed misinformation accen-
tuates and aggravates these different views and the resulting absence of 
meaningful contact, communication and information about how the other is 
thinking and feeling, in short the ability to understand the other's point of 
view or empathy becomes the root cause of this polarisation."318 
Therefore if one wants ethnic polarisation, mistrust and conflict to be defused, 
Sri Lanka needs to improve its education system and the public information 
flow. Sri Lanka needs to build a system in which trust, co-operation and com-
mon goals are fostered- in educational institutions as well as in the media. 319 
 8 The Rise of the Tamil Tigers 
In this part of my historical examination I will focus on the emergence of radical 
Tamil movements only in relation to the aggravation of Sinhalese nationalism. 
Several well-reputed scholars have already explicitly elaborated on the move-
ment of the LTTE, for further studies I recommend reading the works of Hell-
mann-Rajanayagam, Gunaratna or Rösel. As my work is concerned with tracing 
the Sinhalese perspective, the version of events concerning the Sinhalese-
Tamil conflict is far from balanced. One of the underlying assumptions is that 
Sinhalese nationalism provided one precondition for militant Tamil nationalism 
to rise. During the past thirty years violence has always forced counter actions, 
be it on behalf of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment. In contrast to the perpetrators, the victims were mostly the same: Sri 
Lankan citizens all over the Island. The long years of ethnic warfare have left 
immense imprints on Sri Lanka, so a short overview on the most important 
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events concerning the ongoing agitation is included below. The current situation 
- meaning the peace process of 2002 and the reasons for its failure - will be dis-
cussed separately. 
The movement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam started in the mid 1970s 
when moderate Tamil politicians like Samuel James Veluppillai Chelvanayakam 
began a political quest for Tamil rights by making use of non-violent political 
activism, like ‘Satyagraha’. According to Peebles, the agreements negotiated 
with the Sinhalese governments (SLFP as well as UNP) were repeatedly 
nullified or not implemented, like the Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact or the 
Senanayake- Chelvanayakam Pact. 
In 1974 the Sri Lankan state abused its office when the police attacked the 
International Tamil Conference in Jaffna and caused nine deaths. Even though 
the attack was condemned, no one took actions against the perpetrators. It is 
important to mention that a change in the composition of the security forces 
took place in the late 1960s. The police and army underwent a transformation 
that consolidated the Sinhalese- Buddhist identity. This resulted in the 
perception that the North and the East was being occupied by hostile forces.320 
Obviously unsatisfied, Chelvanayakam’s successors turned to more radical 
forms of political activism. Militant Tamil activism started to flourish in 1975 
when henchmen of the LTTE assassinated Alfred Durayappah, the mayor of 
Jaffna. One year later in 1976, the Vaddukoddai Resolution was adopted under 
the direction of Chelvanayakam. Wickramasinghe states: “The resolution was in 
many ways a ‘manifestation’ of the ascendancy for radical Tamil secessionism 
within mainstream Tamil politics.”321 During his political lifetime 
“Chelvanayakam sought recognition of Tamil minority rights in a modified 
institutional system, inspired by the Indian Federation […]”322, not categorically 
separatism, but by 1976 he had abandoned his federalist ideas and was 
arguing for an independent Tamil Eelam.323  
                                            
 
320
 See Wickramasinghe 2006: 280. 
 
321
 Ibidem, p. 280. 
 
322
 See Meyer 2003: 175. 
 
323
 See Wickramasinghe 2006: 282. 
»» 87  
While his efforts were constantly parried, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism rose 
to the heights of constitutional recognition when Buddhism received a superior 
status in Sri Lanka. More precisely, anti-Tamil violence broke out after the 
elections of 1977 and when President Jayewardene approved a constitution 
that maintained most of the Sinhalese Buddhist features, while offering no more 
minority protection than the previous constitution, Tamil militancy intensified.324 
The revised constitution practically meant the institutionalization of 
discriminatory practices, naturally opposed by the Tamil minority. As Michael 
Roberts points out:  
“At the political level they [Tamils] can look back on a history of broken 
promises and agreements on the part of several Sinhalese political asso-
ciations. Their sense of relative deprivation is now acute.”325 
In the following years and with the support of UNP sections, criminals carried 
out a series of atrocities against Tamil civilians.326 The worst, next to the human 
tragedies that occurred, was the burning of the Jaffna library.327 This cultural 
offense left a huge scar on the collective conscience of the Tamil minority in Sri 
Lanka. Consequently, various state-backed discriminatory events combined 
with the following anti-Tami pogrom of 1983 persuaded any undecided Tamil to 
support the militant cause.  
Some scholars stress the importance of economic rivalry between the 
Sinhalese and Tamil business community in causing the outbreak ethnic 
violence. During that time the UNP advocated an open market economy, which 
made it possible for a […] large number of Tamils to utilize their ethnic and 
business connections with Indians and become upwardly mobile.”328 Sections of 
the Sinhalese business community fell behind because of this strategic 
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advantage. During that time several incidents ‘occurred’ that stirred up the 
communities against each other. The killing of thirteen soldiers provided a 
perfect legitimation for a large scale counter attack. Thus, the ‘Black July’ ethnic 
violence was staged as a defensive reaction towards the threats of Tamil 
insurgency and a just punishment.329  
 
Black July: the Anti-Tamil Pogrom of 1983 
In 1983, the LTTE killed thirteen Sinhalese soldiers in the northern Sri Lanka. 
This event resulted in an immediate retaliation by the Sinhalese majority against 
the Tamil minority. According to Nira Wickramasinghe: ”During ten days of 
widespread violence, the lives and property of innocent Tamil civilians were 
systematically destroyed. The late intervention of President J.R. Jayawardene 
to appeal for cessation of the violence and other telling evidence suggests pre-
planning and organization in the July events.”330 For further examination of the 
amount and extent of violence that took place before and during the pogrom, I 
recommend reports and publications by the University Teachers for Human 
Rights, Jaffna (UTHR (J)).331 
While government sources estimated that only 300 to 400 people died, 
unofficial sources estimate the number of deaths as high as 3,000, creating 
about 200,000 refugees.332 The refugees of 1983 represent the Tamil Diaspora 
of today. The tragic event of July left another lasting imprint on the collective 
conscience of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and “[m]any Tamils clung on to the 
illusion of a single collective agent- the Sinhala people-as being responsible for 
what had happened.”333  
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Black July of 1983 was an incident of devastating human error, unforgettable for 
the so-called Sinhalese Buddhist society of Sri Lanka. After the pogrom open 
violence between the state and non-state actors reached a new intensity, since 
then any peace agreement or negotiated settlement has failed.  
The LTTE emerged as the strongest group by forcefully monopolizing militant 
Tamil activism.334 In 1987, the Indians intervened and introduced the Indo-
Lanka Agreement, resulting in the 13th Amendment to the constitution. The 
Intervention of the Indians provided dynamite for another resurrection, the JVP 
uprising, subsequently forcing the Sri Lankan government to change their 
political course regarding the Indian intervention. 
On this basis and other compulsive circumstances the Indians finally had to pull 
out in 1990. Fighting between the government and the LTTE resumed. The 
LTTE steadily gained more territory and in the areas of their control ethnic 
cleansing started. They were accused of orchestrating massacres of Sinhalese 
villages and settlements. Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka was not only directed 
against Sinhalese; there were also severe assaults against the Muslim popula-
tion in the North, resulting in the expulsion of the entire Muslim community from 
Jaffna within 48 hours in 1990.335  
In 1994, when the People’s Alliance (PA) government of Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga came into power, the LTTE agreed to resume 
peace talks. The ambience of peace did not continue long and in 1995 
hostilities recommenced. During these times of mutual hostilities the govern-
ment gradually succeeded in branding the LTTE as a terrorist organization, 
which so far was only outlawed in India after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi 
by an LTTE female suicide cadre. In addition to dealing with the LTTE militarily, 
the government of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga also promoted a 
‘peace package’: 
“[…] [T]he ‘peace package’ which promised to institute a highly decentral-
ised system of government that would create seven regions endowed with 
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more autonomy than in the provincial council system. Avoiding the nega-
tive image that the term ‘federalism’ had acquired in the Sri Lankan politi-
cal debate, the government’s proposals called for Sri Lanka to become a 
’union of regions’. The presidential-parliamentary structure of the govern-
ment was to be replaced by a parliamentary one. The Northern and East-
ern Provinces were to be merged into one region […] [and] the popularly 
elected regional government […] would be granted clear powers over wide 
range of policies including taxation, law and order, police, land, agriculture, 
industry, development and planning, education, culture and communica-
tion. Both Sinhala and Tamil would be official languages.”336  
Even though this package was more decentralised than the Indian solution of 
1987, the peace process came to a standstill. The reason was that the major 
opposition party was against the abolition of a unitary system.337 Sinhala Na-
tionalist sections evenly regarded the proposal with suspicion.338 In January of 
2001 the LTTE attacked the most sacred place for Sinhalese Buddhist, the Sri 
Dalada Maligawa. The Sri Dalada Maligawa, the ‘Tooth Temple’ in Kandy, is 
considered the heart of Sinhalese Buddhists; it holds the tooth relic of the Lord 
Buddha. Besides the enormous religious significance, the temple is also very 
closely associated with the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. In response to the LTTE-
bombed Dalada Maligawa the official website of the Government of Sri Lanka 
showed the following statement:  
“For the Sri Lankans, it is more than a place to worship. It is the jewel in 
the national crown and a symbol of sovereignty.339 
One night after the bombing the Sri Lankan government outlawed the LTTE with 
immediate effect.340 After the bombing even the most moderate Sinhalese was 
confronted by the feeling that his or her faith was under threat and that it was 
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not just the state, but the Sinhalese people as a whole that was under threat.341 
In the same year, a political shift took place, meaning the election defeat of 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. UNP politician Ranil Wickramasinghe 
assumed the premiership and a peace initiative was reinitiated, this time facili-
tated by the Norwegians.342 
 9 Conclusion  
Searching for causalities and explaining the forces that shaped Sinhalese na-
tional identity in postcolonial Sri Lanka is certainly a very complex and contro-
versial quest. What can be assumed is that colonialism placed many obstacles 
of interethnic accommodation on the south Asian island. One of the nation’s 
main buttresses certainly was the sudden introduction of universal suffrage that 
accompanies political mass participation. The British colonialists had introduced 
political reforms in former Ceylon more quickly than in India, where a large-
scale nationalist movement sought independence. Hence, a united anti-colonial 
movement was not created on the island, nor did the spirit associated with a 
common opposition to colonial rule lead to an overarching establishment of a 
national identity. From the beginning of independence politicians made use of 
limited sectional identities for their own purpose, which resulted in the current 
situation in which Sri Lanka finds itself, namely that “[…] Sinhala and Tamil 
identities have hardened and polarized in the context of specific political actions 
and counter-actions.”343 Spencer acknowledges three forces that shaped Sin-
halese Buddhist nationalism: 
“One is the long history of Buddhism as a source of political legitimation on 
the Island. Another is the long colonial presence and its cultural and socio-
economic effects; […] the third force, and the reason for the sudden move 
to mass politics, is the shadow cast by Sri Lanka’s giant neighbour, In-
dia.”344 
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Politicians imagined themselves to be indigenous rightful leaders in order to 
achieve popularity with the masses, even though they were more connected to 
the preceding foreign powers according to their lifestyle and mindset. In order to 
present themselves as ‘natives’ the elite politicians drew upon the historical and 
cultural contents of the Sinhalese Buddhist ethnic community. 
These contents are nowadays deconstructed through post-Orientalist discourse, 
but when discovered were interpreted through Western lenses and then, un-
questioned, were used for political propaganda, penetrating the socio-cultural 
spheres of perception. The selective interpretation has now trickled down to the 
masses and become the mainstream discourse of how to perceive Sinhalese 
Buddhist history on the island. Two major results are that Sinhalese medium 
education also reflects this perception of history and; the formation of the JHU, 
a political party that aims to protect the Sinhalese Buddhist national heritage. 
The impact of colonialism manifested itself more than just in the Sinhalese be-
lief that they were socially, culturally and politically marginalised. The impact of 
the ‘divide and rule' policy in Ceylon had not only left the impression of victimi-
zation, it also provided the fuel for upcoming conflicts. The seeds planted during 
Colonial attempts to homogenize and divide certain sections of society bloomed 
after independence. The unification of the Low Country Sinhalese with the 
Kandyans, as well as the increasing schism between Sinhalese and Tamils are 
constrained results of this trend. These tendencies completely contrast with 
newer research about pre-colonial Sinhalese society, stating that the particular-
ness of Sinhalese communities actually was their potential of incorporation. The 
Karava, Salagama and Durava were mostly the product of south Asian emigra-
tion to Ceylon during the twelfth and seventeenth century. 
Rogers writes that before British colonialism non-Sinhalese were either incorpo-
rated into a caste while maintaining non-Sinhalese status, or incorporated into 
an existing Sinhalese caste, or they were incorporated as Sinhalese caste. 345 
Dividing lines and the fear of south Asian emigration such as we now find in Sri 
Lanka were in pre-colonial times clearly not existent to such a degree, but colo-
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nial rule was too intense and endured too long to return to practices of ancient 
times. Ultimately, colonial ideology prevailed in one way or another. The gradual 
change of the constitution in favour of Sinhalese Buddhism is one of the result-
ing interethnic stumbling blocks.  
By looking at the socio-economic processes one understands the rise of Sin-
halese nationalism from a different angle. Processes like these can be con-
nected to the structural sphere of nationalism, for example, shifts in social posi-
tioning. The traditional societal systems and the economy were severely altered 
through colonial practices, an insufficient structure that was retained in the 
postcolonial nation. According to Spencer one has to observe: 
“[…] the forces of the market, which send men and women hundreds- and 
now thousands- of miles in search of work but which also have local ef-
fects in breaking down older ideas of identity and difference embodied in 
the rhythms of everyday life and everyday work; [and] the forces of the 
state, which all over the world takes ever greater responsibility for the re-
production and control of culture through the provision of formal educa-
tion.”346 
A rebellious generation of Sinhalese youth in the south of the island were the 
outcome of these transitional processes. They no longer wanted to be the pas-
sive spectators of elitist politics and of mechanisms that were simply too similar 
to previous British domination. A different socio-economic surrounding had fu-
elled different expectations. When the youth actively sought change, their 
movement, the Janatha Vikmuthi Peramuna, adopted a language of Sinhalese 
nationalism, striving on issues of caste and class, or remains of past identities. 
Social exclusion and economic frustration created a fertile ground for the rise of 
Sinhalese nationalism and its ethnic diving lines. A similar process occurred 
during the rise of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Both movements share 
similar sociological roots: 
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“[…] a superficially similar blend of social justice and ultra-nationalism in 
its appeal to its supporters, and a shared vocabulary of ‘traitors’ and 
‘treachery’ to describe more conventional politicians.”347  
Sadly, both movements “[…] failed to transcend the divisions of language and 
community. In each case the shared language of distributive justice they in-
voked was yoked to a vision of ethnic division and cultural exclusion.”348 
When India reacted and intervened in Sri Lanka during theses times of unrest 
and protest, the JVP made use of the long nourished cultural complex of Indian 
hegemony over Sri Lanka. Increasing fears of Indian hegemony is another facet 
that can be attributed to a single-sided interpretation of Sri Lankan history, em-
phasizing threatening aspects instead of the religious, cultural and social com-
monalities. The Indian intervention of 1987 triggered the culmination of Sinhala 
nationalism at its worst sending to their deathbeds thousands Sri Lankans who 
were either followers of or traitors to the Sinhalese nationalism cause. 
As Hard & Negri explain this new form of nationalism appears to be progressive 
and reactive at the same time, providing an opportunity for change whilst simul-
taneously being a hindrance to plurality. 
What cannot be forgotten is the year 1983, when mobs of Sinhalese, nurtured 
by hate and a false sense of nationhood attacked and killed thousands of Tamil 
civilians in the country’s capital. It was a human tragedy that clearly goes be-
yond my means of explanation. Radical Sinhalese Nationalism was probably an 
abetting ideology. 
The media and educational system enhanced the social construction of exclu-
sive Sinhala and Tamil identity, providing grave spaces for misunderstandings 
and competition of limited perspectives and opportunities. Culture, now spread 
through media and education, travels along new communication routes, and is 
no longer limited to the privileged circles of the urban educated. 
With increasing literacy and a free educational system in which access to his-
torical information is available in the vernacular language, a sense of unity has 
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been created within each community; the history of a common past and present 
that also affects the borders of a common future. The two competing national 
identities of the Sinhalese and the Tamils are a result of these manifold proc-
esses. The only space left for hopes and aspirations in a country that was once 
well versed in multicultural pluralism are the moderate voices that seem so quiet 
and suppressed in these years of ethnic warfare. 
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 V Sinhala Nationalism − Identity, 
Conflict and Peace in Present-
day Sri Lanka 
Since the mid seventies violence has dominated the relationship between the 
Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. As previously 
mentioned, one of the underlying assumptions is that Sinhalese nationalism 
provided a precondition for militant Tamil nationalism to manifest itself. In return, 
militant Tamil nationalism nurtured Sinhalese nationalists; in particular the rigor-
ous demands and brutalities of the LTTE insurgency keep strong currents of 
Sinhala nationalism in Sri Lanka’s political culture alive.349 Until 2001 one ob-
serves that every peace accord failed to take root and ultimately resulted in re-
peated outbreaks of violence. The reasons for the failure of past peace efforts 
are manifold: first, the two main parties, the UNP and SLFP could not fulfil the 
interests of Sri lanka’s minority communities due to the countries economic de-
cline; Second, when in opposition the main parties always agitated against the 
peace process, mostly with support of the Buddhist clergy who perceive them-
selves as safeguards of the nation and therefore reject any change in the uni-
tary system or concession to the Tamil minority, and third; the constitution of 
1972 made it clear to every Tamil that, on a political dimension, they are power-
less.350 
When Chandrika Kumaratunga came into power in 1994, her peace proposal 
was the most far-reaching devolution plan in Sri Lanka’s history, but it was de-
feated because of UNP opposition joined with the Buddhist Sangha and the na-
tionalistic JVP, who organized hunger strikes, protests and roadblocks against 
the proposal.351 Sinhala nationalism, therefore, must not only be seen as a 
stimulus for Tamil nationalism, but also as one obstacle to the resolution of the 
Sri Lankan conflict. Ethnically defined nationalisms of Sinhalese and Tamils 
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have catapulted themselves in a self-sustaining cycle of fear and violence. 
Hence, in order to create peace in Sri Lanka, any peace facilitator not only has 
to take into account the grievances of Tamil nationalists and the Sri Lankan 
government, but also the concerns of Sinhalese nationalists and probably also 
various other parties who are affected by the conflict. In the following chapter 
the failures of the peace process initiated in 2001 under Prime Minister Wickre-
masinghe will be analysed according to Lederach’s ‘Three Gaps in Peacebuild-
ing’. It was the longest period of peace on the island and since the 1980s; even 
though it appeared so promising in the beginning, its setup was destined to fail.  
 1 Three Gaps in Peacebuilding 
John Paul Lederach, a respected theoretician and practitioner of conflict resolu-
tion, has identified several key gaps that arise from peace-building activities in 
his experience. Gaps, according to Lederach, refer to “[…] inabilities or insuffi-
ciencies in our conceptual and practice frameworks that weaken our capacity to 
sustain a desired process.”352 The three gaps are interdependence, justice and 
process-structure gaps. He highlights an additional fourth gap, the authenticity 
gap. The Norwegian facilitated peace process in Sri Lanka became easy prey of 
all four gaps. In the following sections, Lederach’s three gaps will be explained 
and then applied to the Sri Lankan case, placing special attention to the Sin-
halese nationalist fraction that emerged as a powerful stumbling block due to 
the insufficient conceptual framework of the process. 
 1.1 The Interdependence Gap 
By Interdependence Lederach refers to relationships, as they are the most fun-
damental aspects of peace building. During a conflict relationships are broken 
and need to be rebuilt across the lines of division. Usually peace-building efforts 
try to rebuild confidence along horizontal lines, neglecting the vertical capaci-
ties, which means that people with a similar status meet each other. High-level 
political leaders meet high-level leaders, community organizers meet commu-
                                            
 
352
 Lederach 1999. 
»» 98  
nity organizers, mid-range leaders encounter mid-range leaders and so on. In 
order to sustain the peace process vertical relationships need to be fostered, 
high-level politicians, community and grass-root levels of leadership on every 
side need to respect and understand each other. By emphasising the vertical 
capacity people are encouraged to recognize “[…] that peace building involves 
multiple activities at different levels of leadership, taking place simultaneously, 
each level distinct in its need and interdependent in effects.”353 Sustainable 
peace building, therefore, requires horizontal as well as vertical relationship 
building and coordination.354 
 1.2 The Justice Gap 
A peace process mostly succeeds in stopping direct violence, whereas the 
deeper roots of the conflict remain. The structural dimension of violence gave 
rise to the conflict in the first place. According to Galtung people who engage in 
direct violence are actually trying to address the perceived injustice, respec-
tively ‘structural violence’. If the situation of direct violence leads to an environ-
ment in which one or all conflicting parties perceives themselves worse off than 
before, people begin to re-evaluate their goals and methods. Hence they start 
redefining their relationship and start negotiating. Negotiation mostly ends with 
the signing of tremendous peace accords, yet does not comply with the peo-
ple’s desires that the structural dimensions of violence vanish simultaneously 
with the direct violence. This gap is what Lederach describes as the justice gap. 
Peace negotiations result mostly in more political participation of the conflicting 
parties, but “[…] the expectations for social, economic, religious, and cultural 
change are rarely achieved, creating a gap between the expectations for peace 
and what is delivered.”355 Sustainable peace building should therefore focus 
evenly on transforming structural violence.356 
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 1.3 The Process-Structure Gap 
According to Lederach there is a misconception about the nature of a peace 
accord. It is often seen as an endpoint of the peace process; in reality a peace 
accord is “[...] nothing more than opening a door into a whole new labyrinth of 
rooms that invite us to continue the process of redefining our relationships.”357 
Lederach prefers the term conflict transformation over conflict resolution, be-
cause a resolution creates the impression that conflicts have an enclosed end-
point. By contrast, conflict transformation implies that something unwanted is 
changed into something wanted. It makes one reconsider the idea of a process 
that is dynamic in nature. People who are engaged in peace building have to 
commit themselves towards “[…] embracing the permanency of relationship 
building.”358 It requires one to work at building an infrastructure, which is able 
“[…] to support a peace process of desired change, and change is perma-
nent.”359 
 1.4 The Authenticity Gap 
People who live in conflict settings often express feelings of suspicion, indiffer-
ence and distance after a peace accords is signed. These feelings can be con-
nected to what Lederach refers to as the authenticity gap. People have the feel-
ing that they aren’t part of the process. The structure of the peace process lacks 
authentic engagement of the public sphere. “In other words, our least developed 
capacities are the practical mechanism for how people, whole communities, are 
provided access and engaged in the change process and how that engagement 
creates a sense of ownership, participation and genuine commitment.”360 Peace 
should develop from within, instead of being imposed from outside. Therefore, 
individual as well as communal ownership of peace should be promoted.361 
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 2 The Sri Lankan Peace Process in Brief 
After the 2001 elections the UNP took over rule in Sri Lanka: Ranil Wickre-
masinghe became the Prime Minister, while Chandrika Bandaranaike Ku-
maratunga retained presidency. The new premier minister had been secretly 
talking to the LTTE and once he was in power things moved quickly.362 The 
UNP didn’t maintain C.B.K’s strategy of ‘War for Peace’; instead, they almost 
instantly agreed on a ceasefire with the LTTE in December 2001, facilitated by 
Norwegian mediation. In February 2002 the conflicting parties signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU), which should have provided the foundations 
for further negotiations. The signing of the MoU depicts the first shortcoming of 
the peace process, because Prime Minister Wickremasinghe only presented the 
paper to the president after it was already signed.363 The president’s displeas-
ure about his exclusion revealed itself in his criticism of major contentual points. 
According to the report of the International Crisis Group the president was not 
the only party to disagree with the peace approach:  
“Another source of opposition to the CFA was a more politically powerful 
group- the Sinhalese nationalists, who viewed the agreement as tanta-
mount to diplomatic recognition of the Tigers and feared it would eventu-
ally lead to a separate LTTE state.”364  
Still, the SLFP and the UNP proceeded with the peace-oriented collaboration 
until they encountered more obstacles.365 The first peace talks were launched in 
Thailand in September 2002 Even though nothing substantial was achieved the 
communication appeared cordial.366 In December of the same year both parties 
finally agreed on some political issues. The statement of the Oslo talks said that 
they wanted to:  
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“explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination 
in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking peoples, based on a 
federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.”367  
Despite hopes generated through the Oslo talks the negotiation atmosphere 
deteriorated due to repeated ceasefire violations, mostly by the LTTE.368 There-
upon the LTTE rather unexpectedly announced that it was pulling out of talks in 
April 2003. The explanation given for this move was that they were excluded 
from a Washington donor’s conference.369 
After negotiations broke down the LTTE and the government put out separate 
proposals for interim administrations, but the government was not willing to 
come up with far reaching proposals and the LTTE did not want to compromise 
on its goals. In October the LTTE came up with a detailed proposal for an In-
terim Self-Governing Administration (ISGA). The ISGA was highly problematic 
in its content and it was clear it would not receive any support from the regional 
Indian hegemony or the Sinhalese nationalists in the south. The ISGA proposal 
also stirred up much of the Sinhalese media. Its introduction into the peace 
process actually ended the hopes that a serious negotiated settlement could be 
achieved.  
“There was no consensus among Sinhalese politicians around even lim-
ited autonomy for the Tamils, and the maximalist ISGA idea tended to fuel 
those Sinhalese political forces that argued devolution would inevitably 
lead to secession.”370  
Thus, President Kumaratunga took over three ministries, claimed that the gov-
ernment was jeopardizing national security and then finally called for elections 
in 2004, which the SLFP won.  
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Excursion: Tsunami, Peace and Sinhala Nationalism 
The Island of Sri Lanka was one of the most severely affected regions hit by the 
tsunami in 2004. The tsunami destroyed the basis of existence of thousands Sri 
Lankans around the coastal regions, killing at least 35,000.371 In the aftermath 
of the tsunami there was sudden hope that the catastrophe could bring about a 
positive dialogue between the two conflicting parties in the form of cooperation 
on reconstruction. Those hopes and aspiration were short-lived and the conflict 
soon escalated again on the grounds of unfair aid distribution. The government 
and the LTTE attempted to create a joint management structure for aid deliver-
ies to the north and east of the island, the Post Tsunami Operational Manage-
ment Structure (P-TOMS). The proposal was strongly opposed by Sinhalese 
nationalist factions and consequently President Kumaratunga was unable to 
bring the process forward, mainly because of the JVP’s threat to quit the gov-
ernment.372 The JVP criticized any deal put forth by the government and the 
LTTE because they as the deals recognized the LTTE as the sole representa-
tives of the Tamils, which would be the first step in giving in to the LTTEs de-
mand of a separate state.373 The JVP and JHU organized protests against the 
agreement and monks of the National Bhikku Front even organized a ‘fast to 
death’. President Kumaratunga in a way was abetting the resistance movement 
by not adequately informing to the public what the P-TOMS agreement was 
about. The media was suddenly full of rumours of hidden agendas and conspir-
acy theories.374 Another opposition came from Muslim politicians from the east 
of the island. They were demanding direct participation in the peace negotia-
tions and also for equal representation of Muslims in the P-TOMS, as their 
community was one of the most affected by the tsunami. All these events cul-
minated in the public rejection of the peace process and in 2005 the Supreme 
Court decided the proposal was unconstitutional. Thus, it was never imple-
mented.375 
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 3 Gaps in the Sri Lankan Peace Initiatives 
Transforming conflicts is a highly complex task. One of the basic conditions is 
an understanding of the myriad dimensions of the conflict; without addressing 
the deeper roots of a conflict most peace related programmes are destined to 
fail and violence will re-emerge. What happened in Sri Lanka was that the Nor-
wegian-facilitated ceasefire led to a stop of direct violence between the state 
and the LTTE, at least until 2005, and it certainly brought some normalisation to 
the lives of many people in the north and south of the island. Nevertheless, 
stayed more or less the same on a structural level, meaning the conflict could 
not transcend into peaceful structures. 
The interdependence gap outlines insufficient vertical relations within one con-
flict party. The peace process was held only by the Sri Lankan government and 
the LTTE. It sought only to enhance communication between these two frac-
tions. The problem, however, is that there is no common position within the con-
flict parties. First of all, there is a major power struggle between the two main 
political parties of the south, the SLFP and the UNP. 376 One main reason for 
failure was certainly the unsupportive dynamics between the UNP and SLFP. 
The SLFP President was not informed and excluded from the talks; she there-
fore impeded the process that finally led to general elections in 2004. Secondly, 
the Muslims were also not part of the official negotiations. They have been di-
rectly affected since the outbreak of the conflict because their homes lie within 
the proclaimed LTTE territory, thus any political decision would have a direct 
impact on the Muslim communities of the east. They therefore demand to be 
represented as an independent third party. Furthermore, Muslims were also not 
included in the P-TOMS agreement.377 This gives the impression that the pow-
erful only listen to voices equipped with guns. Currently there are rumours that 
Muslim groups are arming themselves. Having another armed party in the con-
flict would further escalate the problem.378 
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The third insufficiency within the vertical linkages refers to the Sinhalese nation-
alist voices of the south, especially the left-wing JVP and right-wing JHU. Their 
concerns and fears are often dismissed as irrational or racist.379 Their complete 
exclusion led to polarisation and “[…] both parties have flourished in opposition 
to the 2002 ceasefire and oppose any political settlement involving devolution to 
the predominantly Tamil regions.”380 Both parties are extremely critical of the 
West and their involvement; any well-intended effort will be looked upon with 
suspicion and regarded as a revival of imperialist agendas. In a constructive 
peace initiative the government would have to consider the voices and concerns 
of the nationalist JVP and JHU to guarantee that nationalist parties do not ham-
per the process.  
Within the Tamil party one finds interdependency gaps. In addition to the fac-
tions within the Tamil community that either support or vehemently oppose the 
LTTE, there are now further divisions among those who support Karuna and 
those who do not.381 The issue of ‘Colonel’ Karuna is a delicate one. Karuna, 
special commander of the eastern districts, was one of the close associates of 
the LTTE leader Prabhakaran and part of the LTTE negotiation team. In 2004 
he broke away from the LTTE “[…] claiming that the Eastern Tamils were being 
discriminated against by the leaders from the North.”382 He demanded a sepa-
rate cease-fire for the eastern district.383 The government then rejected his de-
mand, but later Karuna became a government ally. A further negotiation proc-
ess would have to include a faction representing eastern Tamils concerns.384  
The vertical linkages between the top and the grass-root levels within each 
party were also lacking. The government could not garner the support of the 
people for the peace initiative; cooperation efforts with the civil society had lim-
ited impacts. Neither the political leaders nor civil society leaders were able to 
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influence the other.385 Civil society has been largely marginalized in the peace 
process.386 Religion in Sri Lankan politics also plays an important role. In par-
ticular, Buddhist Bikkhus could have a positive influence among large sections 
of the Sinhalese population for a peaceful solution. Their relevance needs to be 
positively explored in order to enhance vertical communication linkages.387 
The second gap Lederach discusses is the justice gap. It indicates gaps be-
tween the expectation of peace and what is actually delivered.388 When the 
ceasefire agreement was signed in 2001 it was accompanied by much optimism 
among the Sri Lankan society. People throughout the country were tired of con-
flict and had great expectations. Regrettably, these expectations could not be 
met. Neither the ceasefire nor talks between the government and the LTTE ad-
dressed the structural causes of the conflict. Furthermore, there was no evi-
dence that the LTTE would change its tactics on the ground and there was little 
progress in the way of political solutions either.389 
During the peace process practically nothing changed for the better on the is-
land, especially in the war-torn regions of the north. Instead of being the open 
door towards peace the signing of the ceasefire agreement was the first and 
last step taken until a fresh round of violence broke out.390 Thus, sustainable 
peace building has to focus on positively transforming the social, economic, re-
ligious and cultural dimension. 391 
Thirdly, the process-structure gap points out the misconceptions of a peace ac-
cord. As mentioned above, signing an agreement is nothing more than ‘opening 
a door’. The structural dimensions of conflicts also need to change and with 
them attitudinal changes need to be encouraged, meaning that a culture of 
peace needs to be fostered. It is not about signing the agreement, rather adher-
ing to it and trying to expand peace onto all levels of societal interactions. This 
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includes the participation of all layers of societies, from elite to grass-root com-
munities.392 Media and education systems also have to reflect this attitudinal 
change. It needs to be an inclusive process with popular participation. This as-
pect leads us to the additional fourth gap of peace building, the authenticity gap. 
Peace must come from within the society. The elite levels of society cannot im-
pose it on civil society. People who are affected by conflict should be part of the 
process of peace. The Sri Lankan peace process lacked authentic engagement 
of the public sphere. Only when part of peace will people genuinely commit 
themselves to a culture of peace. According to authenticity, Norwegian foreign 
involvement became one stumbling block of the peace initiative. When the Nor-
wegians entered the stage of the Sri Lankan conflict in 2000, they first took on 
the role of facilitator to reinitiate the broken relationship and communication be-
tween the government and the rebels. For about two years they organized se-
cret meetings between the government and the LTTE, which culminated in the 
signing of the MoU. After the MoU the role of the Norwegians changed and they 
went from facilitator to mediator; should the governments and the LTTE’s inter-
ests’ conflict, the Norwegians were the ones to decide. This was perceived as a 
cutback in Sri Lanka’s national sovereignty. Sinhalese nationalist parties, includ-
ing the JVP, claimed that Sri Lanka had become Norway’s colony.393 The na-
tionalist factions encouraged xenophobic elements in the Sinhalese community. 
Local ownership and not international involvement needs to be emphasized to 
achieve a sustainable conflict transformation.394 
 4 Exploring Perceptions of Rural Sinhalese Youth: 
  Introspective Thoughts 
At this point of my thesis I want to look at the qualitative material that I collected 
in addition to studying literature. Twenty qualitative interviews were conducted 
two months before I finalized my decision to research explicitly Sinhalese na-
tionalism. Though the material was not used as an official source for the thesis, 
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the views and opinions expressed by the participants provided me with the 
needed stimuli and guiding lines to carry out my research. In addition to inspir-
ing me to work on Sinhalese nationalism, it also helped me to understand the 
dynamics of the manifold Sri Lankan realities, an experience I could not have 
gained by relying only on literature. Nevertheless, these experiences were sys-
temized through theories of nationalism, conflict, peace and identity. The goal of 
this chapter is to reflect critically on my process of research, meaning where 
and how I got my information and the impressions it left on my thesis. Going 
beyond introspection, I am trying to arrange my research procedure as trans-
parently as possible. With reference to Mayring, introspective data is recognized 
as a source of information, but only if it is declared as such.395 Therefore I want 
to state that the qualitative material collected during a three-month field study in 
Sri Lanka was crucial in the decision of how to conceptualize my work. The an-
swers I received from the participants provided me with the necessary incen-
tives to discern the peculiarities of the rural Sinhalese realities and helped me 
realize how wide the gaps in perception were between me as a foreign-based 
researcher and a rural Sri Lankan. Observing differences in socialisation and 
trying to comprehend them has proven to be the most difficult task of my re-
search. The general endorsement of Sinhalese nationalist values made me ask 
questions like: “Through what kind of a socialisation process must a person go 
to adhere to the rightfulness of Sinhalese nationalism? What kind of information 
do they base their opinions and decisions on?” In turn these questions shed 
light on my own social and cultural background: an urban, European born, eth-
nical Sinhalese female researcher. 
So far one notes that emphasis is placed on my personal comprehension of the 
individuals in this context. Selective quotations that surprised me, or influenced 
my work in one way or another will be presented here. I did not gain all of my 
insight from interviews. After my query I had the opportunity to spend time with 
the village youth. As my questions seemed to arouse specific thoughts, they 
mostly discussed aspects of the interview with friends and family. During that 
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time I listened to their conversations about Sri Lanka and gained further impres-
sions on history, identities, peace and conflict.  
 4.1 Methodological Choice 
Fieldwork is a classic area of qualitative research. The basis principle is about 
understanding a subject in its natural context, without distorting it through an 
unrealistic perspective from afar.396 According to Mayring the main object of 
qualitative methods are human subjects. They have to be a starting and an 
endpoint of the research.397 I chose a qualitative approach because this meth-
odology appears to be more suitable to gathering an in-depth understanding of 
the mindset of Sinhalese youth. Sinhalese youth are of particular interest when 
analyzing the dynamics of nationalism. They can be seen as the latest recipi-
ents of hegemonic nation building discourse, while at the same time unveiling 
the open spaces left for constructive changes in defining national identity. 
The research was conducted with semi-structured, problem-centred interviews 
in Kalutara. This interview method is particularly suitable to gathering personal 
opinions and meanings given to specific events. The questions dealt with the 
issues of Sri Lankan history, identity and communal relationships, and focused 
on the individual perception and interpretation of the interviewees. Historical 
facts were less important than feelings, beliefs and attitudes expressed by the 
participant. Even though semi-structured interviews lead towards a certain prob-
lem, they provide the interviewee with the needed space to answer the question 
according to his own view.398 This methodological tool had a standard list of 
open-ended questions, but made it possible to expand any theme if it appeared 
to be important.  
 4.2 Participants 
The participants of the study were twenty Sinhalese youth (eleven males and 
nine females) from Kalutara, about 40 km south of Sri Lanka’s capital. All of 
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them were Sinhalese Buddhists from a predominantly rural area. Out of the 
twenty interviews, all participants were 18 to 28 years old and from low to mid-
dle income families. Every interviewee had attended Ordinary Level Education, 
and four of them were currently enrolled in Advanced Level Education. I con-
ducted my interviews in the context of an ongoing warfare between the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan Army. Each of the participants 
was in some way directly affected by the conflict because their friends or family 
members were army recruits and/or indirectly affected through the rise of the 
cost of living. During the intensifying hostilities between both factions an epi-
sode of bombings in and around the country’s capital Colombo took place, kill-
ing and wounding hundreds of civilians, including people from my area of re-
search.399 The sampling method for the study was a snowball convenience 
sampling. As such, the participants were recruited through a circle of friends 
and acquaintances.  
 4.3 Procedure 
The interviews were conducted between February and April 2008 in Kalutara, 
Sri Lanka. Each interview lasted from 30 to 60 minutes. Most of the interview-
ees understood English, but choose to respond in their mother tongue Sinhala. 
As my knowledge of Sinhala is limited, I was assisted by a female Sinhala-
English translator. If the participant agreed to the interview, the date and time 
was set. Most of the interviews were held in the participant’s or the translator’s 
house. The interviewee was informed about the research and guaranteed confi-
dentiality. One difficult aspect was that friends and families of the interviewee 
were eager to attend the happening. In some cases it seemed that their atten-
dance was disturbing or seemed to hamper the process, therefore they were 
asked to leave. The interviews were recorded when permission was given to do 
so.  
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 4.4 Picturing My Own Experiences and Thoughts on Interview-
ing Rural Sinhalese Young Adults 
As a researcher it is important to reflect on one’s own position. It is relevant be-
cause it explains the decisions taken and the perspective on the research sub-
ject. Experiences gained during the three months I stayed in Sri Lanka definitely 
influenced my work. The following lines will point out how these impressions 
and thoughts flowed into my work. 
First of all it is important to clarify that I am an ethnically Sinhalese female re-
searcher who was raised in Austria. As previously mentioned, feeling nationalis-
tic about something was not an experience with which I was very familiar; it 
more or less appeared obscure to me. Before beginning my fieldwork, most of 
the information available to me about Sri Lanka was, more or less, a Eurocen-
tric view on the south Asian island and its problems. From this perspective it 
becomes difficult to comprehend why Sri Lankans pursue nationalist ideals, but 
after carrying out fieldwork in Sri Lanka, the strong devotion felt for their mother 
country was a lot easier to comprehend and I would even go so far as to say 
that I suddenly discovered something similar to a devotion for the small island 
nation, but certainly my personal affection was different in its outlook. Another 
important aspect that deserves mention is that as a researcher one cannot iso-
late oneself from the process of research, meaning disregarding my inner so-
cialisation, my outer appearance will undoubtedly influence my research. Most 
people perceived me as an upper class Sinhalese, severely westernized and 
out of touch with Sinhalese tradition and culture. This attitude revealed itself in 
thankful remarks about my enthusiasm about and interest in Sinhalese heritage. 
Or, while having dinner at a participant’s house, people gathered around me, 
positively surprised that I ate dinner with my fingers in the same way they did. 
Naturally, people interacted with me according to what they believed was ap-
propriate to my ‘status’ and therefore presented a specific version of what they 
believed. Whereas it is impossible to eliminate this inter-relation between re-
searcher and subject, it is possible to be conscience of it and identify it for what 
it is. The following statements made about rural Sinhalese are my own assump-
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tions based on my own socialisation and are not intended to be of general valid-
ity.  
 4.4.1 Sinhalese are Very Hospitable People, Smiling and Friendly 
One of the first things I encountered during my interviews was that most partici-
pants had severe difficulties describing Sinhalese society and culture. While 
promoting the friendliness and hospitality of Sinhalese people came almost 
naturally, grasping a more refined description of ‘Sinhalesness’ proved to be a 
stumbling block. My explanation for this discomfort was that most of my inter-
viewees lived in a remote rural area; during their youth they seldom left village 
structures, when they did then mostly it was to go on a Buddhist pilgrimage or 
school trip. Hence interaction between rural Sinhalese youth with people from 
other communities, even urban societies, does not happen all too frequently.  
Another abetting factor is that they only speak, read and write in Sinhala. Their 
knowledge of any other language is limited. Sinhala is therefore the only lan-
guage in which they can access information. Furthermore, they all are educated 
in Sinhalese medium education system, only one of the participants parents 
could afford to send their daughter to an international school, where she learnt 
English language and about other cultures.  
When it came to the question of describing Sri Lankan history and the origin of 
the Sinhalese, all participants explained in detail the myth about prince Vijaya, 
which is based on the Mahavamsa, the oldest chronicle of the Sinhalese Bud-
dhist kingdoms. Interestingly, the history of Sinhalese genealogy is unquestion-
ingly combined with mythical components of the Pali chronicles. And if not, then 
it was implied that a distinct ‘Sinhalese evolution’ took place in Sri Lanka. This 
stance, combined with the repeated depiction of Tamils as invaders to Sri 
lankan soil, demonstrated that the impression that the Sinhalese were the le-
gitimate inhabitants of Sri Lanka was profoundly etched into their collective 
memory. 
“Sinhalese race started with the migration of the great king Vijaya. After 
king Vijaya came to Sri Lanka, Indian cultures came to Sri Lanka. Before 
Lord Buddha visited Sri Lanka and from that time the Sri Lankan popula-
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tion started, then Vijaya came. Buddhism started with Lord Buddha’s arri-
val and Sinhalese race came with arrival of Prince Vijaya.” 
(Participant 15, male, 18 years) 
“Before the arrival of Prince Vijaya, Sri Lanka was ruled by various inhu-
mane inhabitants. After Prince Vijaya arrival those people have vastly 
spread over Sri Lanka and after that only the civilisation has begun. Most 
of the great kings have ruled Sri Lanka, Duttugemunu, Parakramabahu”  
(Participant 4, male, 23 years) 
Sri Lankan history was presented as the history of Sinhala Buddhist kingdoms 
and the Mahavamsa had an important role to play in consolidating this perspec-
tive. An important section of the Mahavamsa is the battle between King Dut-
tugemunu and Elara. This event is a major focal point in Sinhalese Sri Lankan 
history and was introduced several times by the interviewees at various times 
during the inquiry. King Duttugemunu is described as the first Sinhalese Bud-
dhist king who fought for the unity of the country, while Elara appears to be the 
prototype of an aggressive Tamil invader. The fact that Elara is portrayed in the 
Mahavamsa as a good and tolerant ruler of the Sinhalese Buddhist and Tamils 
was not mentioned.400 Equally interesting is the strong belief that the Buddha 
had visited Sri Lanka: except for the Mahavamsa, there are no scripts that 
would prove this assertion. Furthermore, there is an underlying belief that the 
contemporary Sinhalese-Tamil conflict arises from those past times. 
“It is coming from the ancient times. In the ancient times the kings have al-
ready protected our country. Many great heroes have sacrificed their lives 
and it is coming up to now, because of that the state can’t give in to their 
all demand, as there are so many dedications and sacrifices made for the 
country.” 
(Participant 20, male, 18 years) 
It occurred to me that historical education in Sinhalese medium is predominately 
concerned with the Sinhalese perspective, instead of a combined Sri Lankan 
perspective. This worldview distorts interethnic understanding and harmony on 
an island that was and is home to so many communities. Furthermore, it ex-
plains the knowledge gaps about Tamil history and culture in Sri Lanka within 
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the rural Sinhalese areas. None of them knew that there is profound history of 
Tamil kingdoms in Sri Lanka. When I questioned them about when and how 
Tamils arrived in Sri Lanka, none out of the twenty participants was sure about 
the answer. Their guesses were a mixture of the idea that Tamils were ‘im-
ported’ by Sinhalese kings, the Dutch or the British as workers. Sri Lanka was 
not considered their native country. 
“These (Tamils) are the people who are brought from India as workers for 
the kings. Under the kings they came to do their work, before the British.” 
(Participant 18, male, 23 years) 
“In case of Tamils they were in India, some of them are very low, low caste 
and so. Those people have come from India and reached to Sri Lanka and 
been in coastal areas, by Trincomalee, Vavuniya and those areas. They 
have done fishing and so. After some time they expanded to other parts of 
Sri Lanka. They are the people who escaped to Sri Lanka because of their 
low caste and the increasing of the population and they have settled here 
at the coastal areas. They came before Christ.” 
(Participant 1, male, 18 years) 
“Tamils were coming to help us. Tamils were coming to our tea estates, 
rubber, tea and other things, during the Dutch period. I think they have first 
come with Dutch. These Sri Lankan Tamils, there are two different Tamils, 
Indian Tamil and Sri Lankan Tamils. I think Sri Lankan Tamils started also 
with Indian Tamils and from that on they started their own population in Sri 
Lanka.” 
(Participant 16, female, 20 years) 
“First of all they came as tea estate workers from Tamil Nadu, after invad-
ing of the British 1852. They imported some workers and those are the 
Tamils. I mean there are two kinds of Tamils, the estate Tamils and the 
Tigers, means Prabhakarans party. After that only Prabhakarans party 
came and they ask for separate state, equal rights”. 
(Participant 6, female, 18 years) 
“I have no idea when and how the Tamils came to Sri Lanka, but I heard 
there was a king called Elara. So some people say with Elara Tamils came 
to Sri Lanka. So I don’t know actually how they came to Sri Lanka.” 
(Participant 12, male, 28 years) 
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I assume if Tamils are sublimely defined as an immigrant community, any de-
mands for rights and autonomy on Sri Lankan soil will be considered less le-
gitimate than the Sinhalese demands. These gaps of knowledge are exactly the 
spots were Sinhalese nationalist propaganda can exert itself and find fertile 
ground. One reason for the popularity of the JVP and JHU in rural areas must 
be because of a single-sided educational system and the resulting gaps of 
socio-cultural knowledge. Furthermore, the media landscape is extremely polar-
ised and biased, reinforcing exclusive views and nationalist propaganda. Even 
for me as a foreigner it was difficult to inform myself properly and to maintain an 
unbiased view. 
Another aspect that came to my attention was the frequent use of the term ‘Ar-
yan’. Because I was raised in Austria, the word ‘Aryan’ connotes one of the big-
gest crimes committed against humanity: the Holocaust. I was therefore deeply 
surprised that the Sinhalese would define themselves as ‘Aryans’.  
“Past day there were a group of Indians called Aryan or so, have come to 
our country and from them we have, I don’t have a very profound idea of 
this, but anyway, I think from them we have originated as Sinhalese.” 
(Participant 9, female, 19 years) 
While describing differences many participants were using the term ‘Aryan’ for 
the Sinhalese race and ‘Dravidian’ for the Tamils race. There was an implicit 
assumption that Sinhalese and Tamils were mutually different in race and lan-
guage. Given that assumption I deem it important to deconstruct these rigid 
categories of ethnically pure communities. The concept of racial purity mixed 
with nationalism has proven to be far too dangerous to control. Furthermore, 
one participant mentioned that it was not important to know who first arrived in 
the country, but rather who built the country. By that he was implying that the 
country was built by Sinhalese kings and Sinhalese folks. All the glory belongs 
to the Sinhalese when combined with the misleading idea of two racially segre-
gated societies. 
Interestingly, when it came to the question of national heroes, many participants 
mentioned people from different ethnic origins who were associated with the 
independence movement. The effort of Anagarika Dharmapala for the ‘sake of 
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the country’ and Buddhism were frequently mentioned, thus I included a chapter 
focusing on his controversial achievements and the Buddhist Theosophical So-
ciety. With regards to heroes, emphasis was nevertheless given to ancient per-
sonas that bravely sacrificed their lives for the nation. 
“The original heroes are in the past. There is one great in 1818 and one 
1848. During that time we can see a lot of heroes. Senanayake and Pon-
nambalam are fighting for the political situation. They are fighting for the 
freedom of Sri lanka, but in the earlier period they are fighting for their 
motherland, without thinking about their lives. I have seen this in books 
and teledramas and so on. They are the most important national heroes in 
Sri Lanka. They are original national heroes, like Puran Appu.” 
(Participant 15, male, 18 years) 
It becomes clear that in addition to education, media also functions as a major 
element of socialisation. Ancient heroes and mythical stories were reinvented 
through television, similar to in India where the television series Ramayan 
reached unknown heights of popularity throughout India and created awareness 
of a common heritage.401 Talking about heroes and the glories of Sri Lanka was 
an easy task for all twenty interviewees.  
The next question dealt with events that made the participant feel ashamed of 
their country. I always had two possible answers in mind before I asked this par-
ticular question: the first one was the burning of the Jaffna library and the sec-
ond one the pogrom of 1983. No one mentioned either of the two events; even 
the killings connected to the JVP uprising were not mentioned. It simply did not 
occur to them. Instead, topics like alcoholism or betrayal were their answers to 
this question. 
“An example when they are going to make a construction for a bridge or 
road, they are making a big budget and they are asking people to pay. 
From the people they are just taking the money and not performing the ac-
tivity in perfect way and they are taking the money to contribute their own 
self. I am so ashamed of that.” 
(Participant 2, female, 27 years) 
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“From even in the ancient times it was like that. The people are betraying 
the kings. They are always telling for the sake of money or alcohol or 
those things they are betraying the country and become traitors to the 
country by providing the leaders to the British colonialist. Most of the peo-
ple who are betraying the country are providing details for the LTTE.” 
(Participant 20, male, 18 years) 
I had the impression that these young adults were kept insufficiently informed 
about tragic events. Talking about the past is not common in Sri Lanka although 
President Kumaratunga officially excused for the pogrom of 1983 and the burn-
ing of the Jaffna library in 2004.402 When unaware of the scale of these trau-
matic events, it is almost impossible to comprehend the Tamil uprising. The 
Tamil rebellions will naturally appear as irrational and mischievous. Then again, 
it is possible that the interviewees, who were eager to present a ‘positive’ pic-
ture of the nation, did not want to give a negative account to a ‘foreigner’. 
“Sinhalese think they treated well Tamil people … Tamil people thought 
Sinhala people don’t treat them well. This is the basic reason for the war. 
They thought Sinhala people always look down on them. There is no thing 
like that. Sinhala people always treated them well, it is only imaginary.” 
(Participant 17, female, 26 years) 
A topic into which I did not delve, but which was nevertheless frequently talked 
about, was the question about who can be seen as the rightful ruler to Sri 
Lanka. Even though Sinhalese and Tamil are both originally from India, Sri 
Lanka is considered the country of the Sinhalese, while India is the native, 
home country of the Tamils.  
“This is the only country for Sinhalese to live peacefully. So Sinhalese in 
my point of view, they can’t survive in whole world because there are no 
any other countries to live Sinhalese on their own; because Sri Lanka is 
the only country that using their mother tongue Sinhala. So I think, that is 
why I am always looking for Sinhala community as the major community in 
Sri Lanka. So I think there should not be any other nationality to become 
majority. For instance if we think Tamil became major nationality, there 
may be a problem because Tamil can live anywhere, they have other 
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countries, but with Sinhalese that’s not the situation. This is the only place 
where we can live peacefully and do what we want.” 
(Participant 13, male, 18 years) 
“We are the owners of Sri Lanka. If they want to live peacefully and freely 
in Sri Lanka, first they must give the ownership to the Sinhalese.” 
(Participant, 13, male, 18 years) 
“Or they have to go, instead of staying here to Tamil Nadu and live there, 
because they have a separate town. That is their native land.” 
(Participant 6, female, 18 years) 
“I think this country belongs to Sri Lankan people, so I give them chance to 
live in any part of the country, Tamil people also, as I think they don’t be-
long to this country. They have another country, like India. It is their moth-
erland.” 
(Participant 17, female, 27 years) 
Quotations of this manner speak for themselves. I consider them the rational 
conclusion of people provided with insufficient information and influenced by 
nationalist propaganda against foreign influences. In literature about Sri Lanka, 
one finds the common description of Sinhalese to be ‘a majority with a minority 
complex’. To a certain extent one has to agree with the statement, but the cur-
rent conflict has reinforced these fears within the Sinhalese. The demographic 
positioning of Tamil Nadu in such a close proximity to Sri Lanka has had an im-
pact on domestic problems in Sri Lanka. 
In turn a counter argument would be to ask the Sinhalese population to return to 
their land of origin- according to the Pali chronicles, this would be somewhere in 
Bengal. Of course, neither allegation is legitimate, fair or even necessary. Sri 
Lanka was and is an island of heterogeneous communities. What is neverthe-
less the most troubling factor regarding these statements is that the nation is 
defined in ethnic terms; ownership and entitlements in Sri Lanka are reserved 
for the one community that has no other place to go.  
I hope to have revealed more or less how the qualitative research influenced my 
thought process and my work. The interviews were used in the context of illus-
trating my thoughts and impressions. Hence I will conclude the chapter on per-
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sonal reflection with some positive examples brought in by the participants. De-
spite some irritating expressions made, which one can frown upon, there is a lot 
of hidden potential and unexpected openness within this section of society. Al-
though as a researcher I disagree with many of the opinions and attitudes ex-
pressed regarding the history, conflict and communal relationships, I strongly 
believe that the opinions of the participants are highly adaptable. Their access 
to ‘impartial’ information and higher education is limited, and so are the possi-
bilities of inter-ethnic comprehension. Self-reflection, criticism and creativity are 
not attributes that are encouraged by parents, education or society, and fur-
thermore, the participants live in the south of the country, far away from the con-
flict and war zone, which are one cause of their positive stance towards war and 
the military defeat of the rebels. 
Sri Lankan society needs to think outside the box and overcome the man-made 
boundaries of co-existence. Instead of focusing on exclusive or segregating as-
pects, one has to lay emphasis on inclusiveness, tolerance and openness. The 
following concluding statements are refreshing remarks made by Sinhalese 
youth that portray their openness and actual desire for change.  
“We have to chase away the politicians of this country because with them 
we will never achieve peace. We have to give their demand, but we should 
have to go to their place and they have the possibility to come to South 
also.” 
(Participant 11, male, 23) 
“I would invite Prabhakaran to my home and give him a flower (laughs). I 
would ask him to be united. And what he is asking I will give him, but there 
should be the possibility to go to their place and come and to stop the war 
and every killing and bomb blast, everything.” 
(Participant 11, male, 23) 
“They (the government) can give the LTTE the chance to come to parlia-
ment and they can democracy with the government.” 
(Participant 15, male, 18 years) 
“If I have a magic pen or magic anything, I think if I can change the relig-
ion, if everybody could use the common language, if everybody could wor-
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ship the common place. I think I would do this. I can’t say all Tamils and 
Muslim, come and use Sinhala. That we can negotiate. (Laughs)” 
(Participant 12, male, 28 years) 
“This is his country (Prabhakarans) and this is my country. We think about 
Sinhalese and he think about Tamils. This war is empty, come for the 
peace. I want him to realise that we can live together.” 
(Participant 15, male, 18 years) 
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 5 Conclusion: Peaceful National Identities 
Currently one finds exclusive nationalisms opposing each other in a violent con-
flict in Sri Lanka. This study was concerned with Sinhalese nationalism. 
Throughout the historical study Sinhalese nationalism was never explicitly de-
fined. There are different reasons for not doing so; first of all, during the colonial 
era nationalism was too embryonic to label it in ethnical terms, secondly, Sri 
Lanka had yet to become a nation and its first leaders were part of a multi-
cultural intelligentsia. Still, the era of colonialism, especially British colonialism, 
was the initial time and space for that ideological stream to grow. At that point in 
history when Ceylon was completely integrated into the world economy, the 
structural foundations were laid. The annexation had multiple effects on the is-
land and its inhabitants, for example changes to the social, economic and politi-
cal sphere. The introduction of a modern transport system opened up possibili-
ties of exchange and interaction. Local boundaries were upstaged and primor-
dial loyalties neglected due to the dramatic changes of inner and outer spheres, 
which created an ideological deficit. Theorists like Gellner have pointed out the 
connection between nationalism and the needs of a modern, industrial society, 
meaning nationalism creates the common culture and social homogeneity 
needed for the complex and constantly changing division of labour in modern 
societies. 
Only in the nineteenth century was the ideological vacuum filled with contents of 
religion and recently discovered artefacts of past glories. During that particular 
time Sri Lankan nationalism and also Sinhalese nationalism were born out of a 
reaction resulting from decades of foreign oppression. The societal conditions 
for nationalism were already laid, including modern communication facilities and 
mechanisms, which are prerequisites for nationalism to transform into a main-
stream ideology. To reference Anderson, one can label it the start of ‘Print capi-
talism’ in Ceylon. Propagandists like Henry Steel Olcott of the Theosophical 
Society and his indigenous associate Anagarika Dharmapala were the leading 
forces in a cultural change fundamental to the rise of Sinhalese nationalism. 
Dharmapala promoted a purification of Sinhalese Buddhist culture through au-
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thentication and engendered ethno-nationalist solidarity and self-assertion. Sci-
entific findings of that time supplied the needed material to construct the context 
of meaning, in particular the Mahavamsa and the Aryan theories of language 
and race. Dharmapala often quoted from the Mahavamsa and was an advocate 
of the Aryan theory; his teachings had a profound impact on Sinhalese national 
identity in present-day Sri Lanka.403 During the process of becoming a nation 
state it was not Dharmapala’s ethnically defined nationalism that prevailed in 
politics, it was a more secular form of nationalism set up by a small cosmopoli-
tan indigenous elite, which thwarted ethno-nationalist demands on the hinter-
land. It recruited members from various communities of different religious back-
grounds. The international atmosphere and interconnectedness of Ceylon’s 
capital Colombo had stimulated the formulisation of an integrative and multi-
ethnic national identity; a vision of national identity that should have tran-
scended communal barriers.404 But the introduction of universal adult suffrage 
changed the ‘universalistic’ political setting; suddenly ethnically defined nation-
alism was used in the power struggles of leaders and parties. Hence the elite of 
Ceylon functioned as an agent of socio-political change, influencing and ma-
nipulating the masses by emphasizing ethno-political awareness. This coincides 
with Smiths position on pre-modern ethnic ties and the modern nations, as well 
as with the belief that nationalism can only take root if it strikes a popular chord.  
The whole island had concomitantly suffered from the structurally violent system 
of colonialism. Moreover, the Sinhalese majority felt proportionally more op-
pressed and neglected based on the British ‘divide et impera’ policy. This com-
bined with the ideological adoption of past Sinhalese ethno-cultural heritage in 
Ceylon’s politics led to the gradual ‘Sinhalization’ of the state and its structures 
in order to maintain power and popularity with the masses. Therefore, Sinhalese 
nationalism in its current form took shape just around the mid 1950s, notably as 
a political force. According to Smith: 
“Certainly the states and political action play important roles on crystalliz-
ing ethnic sentiments and national identities, notably through protracted 
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warfare and territorialization. But ethnic ties and national sentiments are 
created by a variety of factors- ecological, social, and especially cultural 
and symbolic, such as religion, language and the arts.”405 
Sinhalese ethnicity was used for political manoeuvring and hence became a 
way for Sinhalese groups to seek political goals. In reference to Gramsci’s con-
cept of political pedagogy, a hegemonic agent/agency is only able to exercise 
consensus when they are able to get their ideas, values and norms accepted as 
the leading ones. This is a dialectical process between ruler and subject. The 
Ceylonese politicians did so by referring mainly to ethno-historical aspects im-
portant to the Sinhalese majority. The agent/agency’s multifunction of substan-
tiating, teaching and demanding consensus is achieved through nationalistic 
socialisation. Education therefore plays a major role; through standardized, pub-
lic mass education the state hopes to inculcate national devotion and a distinc-
tive, homogenous culture, as well as to propagate nationalist ideals of cultural 
authenticity. In independent Sri Lanka one finds three different education sys-
tems, all three teaching a distinct version of Sri Lankan history and culture, and 
thereby placing major obstacles in front of multicultural understanding and the 
creation of a common national identity. Another gadget of nationalist socialisa-
tion on the island was institutionalized religion, particularly Sinhala Buddhism. 
The collaboration of the Buddhist Sangha with the Sri Lankan state offered the 
cultural and moral charisma that attracted the Sinhalese masses during the 
processes of nationalist socialisation. Regardless of these overlapping efforts in 
nation building, there were severe shortcomings regarding the socio-economic 
situation, which disembogued in two youth uprisings, one of them staged by the 
Sinhalese youth, the other by the Tamil youth. Both militant movements were 
filled with socio-economic frustration and ethno-nationalist rhetoric. Even though 
the two movements changed their original form and aims, they still haunt the 
country in manifold ways. Currently, one links the nationalistic politics of the 
JVP and its conservative radical Buddhist counterpart, the JHU, to contempo-
rary Sinhalese nationalism in Sri Lanka; Furthermore, the Tamil youth rebellion 
monopolized by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam became the driving force 
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of equally exclusive Tamil nationalism. The long lasting violent conflict in Sri 
Lanka is constructed around notions of these two threatened identities, one 
within the Sinhalese majority, the other within the Tamil minority. Both of them 
struggle to protect their own identity against a perceived threat from the 
‘other’.406  
Coming back to my introductory statement, Sinhalese nationalism and national 
identity is difficult to define, and simply stigmatizing it will not lead us to a sus-
tainable solution to the Sri Lankan conflict. What is clear is that Sinhalese na-
tionalism has long historical roots, albeit not in its present form. Nowadays, in-
tellectuals and foreigners often dismiss this worldview as irrational or outdated 
without realising the dynamics behind it. It was born out of a need for empow-
erment, and has grown into an obstacle of inter-ethnic accommodation, appar-
ent in the 2001/02 peace process and the Tsunami related cooperation pro-
grammes. Sinhalese nationalism and to a similar degree Tamil nationalism are 
the main ideologies that nurture the Sri Lankan conflict and its agitators have 
been able to undermine many of the peace related programmes and projects. 
Considering the historical interconnectedness of the Western world and Sri 
Lanka, Western influences - in addition to the LTTE demand for a separate 
state - are now also perceived as a real threat to the Sinhalese national identity 
and their sacred lands.  
Having analysed these multi-dimensional processes regarding Sinhalese na-
tionalism, identity and conflict, I want to conclude with ways to promote peaceful 
national identities; but beforehand it is important to explain the nexus between 
international development and conflicts, in particular why it is important to ana-
lyse conflicts precisely while trying to conduct development programmes.  
 Violent conflicts, such as the one in Sri Lanka, cause extreme human suffering 
and socio-economic deficits, which again create the foundations for upcoming 
conflicts. Furthermore, they annihilate any development progress made so far. 
Peace is a precondition for economic welfare and development. Reducing the 
risk of conflict escalation through conflict sensitive approaches in developmental 
work are noted in the preambles of most public development agencies. Any de-
                                            
 
406
 See Orjuella 2008: 243. 
»» 124  
velopmental project or programme is an intervention that can have sudden con-
sequences. Hence the basis for ‘working in conflict’ or ‘working on conflict’ is 
being aware of the conflict symptoms and a having complex conflict analysis.407 
Without addressing these deeper roots any peace related programme is des-
tined to fail and violence will re-emerge, either in structural, cultural or direct 
forms. Mechanisms of this nature were analysed according to Lederach’s 
‘Three Gaps in Peacebuilding’, which have shown that it is important to create 
an inclusive, comprehensive and multi-dimensional peace process.  
Although the past Sri Lankan peace initiatives failed, one should regard them as 
a pre-condition for creating a new approach to fostering sustainable peaceful 
dialogue. One important aspect is the promotion of alternative discourses that 
challenge existing notions of nationalist identities. Sri Lankan identity politics 
have strengthened one-dimensional and simplistic understandings of identity, 
but identities are never monolithic and one should not take those politicised na-
tional identities at face value. Orjuella states that in theory just as much as on a 
practical level it is widely acknowledged that “[…] enemy images and polarisa-
tion have to be replaced by shared identities between the parties in the con-
flict.”408 At the same time it is important to be aware that the promotion of all-
inclusive identities, for example the ‘human’ or ‘Sri Lankan’ identity, hides 
hegemonic structures of dominance and subordination.409 Still, encouraging 
inclusive identities is relevant to set a peaceful process in motion because: 
“Nationalist extremism and ethnic polarisation are outcomes of and entan-
gled with power politics, state structures, competition over resources and 
experiences of violence. Opening up spaces for shared, inclusive identities 
across this polarisation can create opportunities for discussion about the 
underlying problems. It will however, in itself not solve those problems.”410 
Recognising hard line positions instead of further marginalising them is impor-
tant when working in or on conflict; engaging them in constructive dialogues 
should be one lesson learnt from former peace initiatives. In Sri Lanka it is im-
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portant to deconstruct politicised identities and challenge hard line stances in 
the public sphere, be it the Sinhalese version or the Tamil version. All of them 
are constructed and instrumentalized. A reformed education system would sup-
port this process by on the one hand valuing and stressing the achievements of 
all major communities in Sri Lanka and on the other hand by actively facilitating 
intercultural understanding between the Sri Lankan communities through com-
pulsory language and cultural classes. This might sound like a utopian ap-
proach, but understanding the language of the other can possibly lead to com-
prehension and empathy, which can further concretize the sentiment that the 
grievances felt by Tamils towards the Sri Lankan state are not very different 
from the feeling of marginalisation that the rural Sinhalese masses feel. Creat-
ing a common opposition towards the Sri Lankan state would certainly yield 
more results by forcing it to reform its outdated structures and provide opportu-
nities and perspectives to its multicultural communities. 
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VII Appendix 
Questions for the Interview: 
Introduction 
Introduction of myself and my work 
Information for the Interviewee: 
All the information given will be handled anonymously. If you for any reason feel 
uncomfortable with a question you may skip it and proceed to the next one. You 
can also quit the interview any time. I am interested in your assumptions, not 
your factual knowledge. If there is a question for which you cannot think of an 
answer, try to take your time and tell me what comes to mind. 
 
Personal Information of the Interviewee: 
a) Age: 
b) Sex:  
c) Study Program: 
d) Study Year: 
e) City of birth: 
f) Marital Status:  single  engaged  married  divorced  in a relation-
ship 
g) Profession of Parents:  Mother: 
Father: 
Part one: Perceptions of the Sinhalese  
1. Please introduce yourself. 
2. Every one of us identifies himself with a certain group or community. 
Which community is important to you? 
• Can you think of any other community? 
3. How would you describe the Sinhalese community? 
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• What is special about it?  
• Are there behaviours or phrases that you would consider typically 
Sinhalese? 
• Can you tell about some positive aspect of the Sinhalese? 
• Can you tell me what is negative about them? 
4. Are there differences within the Sinhalese community and how would you 
describe them? 
• Regional, cultural differences? Low country, up country? Caste? 
Colombo? 
5. Do you see yourself as a Sri Lankan first or as a Sinhalese?  
• In which context, situation? 
Part two: Community Perceptions 
6. How do you think the Sinhalese people perceive the Tamil community? 
• Are there any statements about Tamil people you sometimes 
hear? 
• Stereotypes? Good or bad things? 
• Why do you think these assumptions exist? Is there something 
true about it? 
7. How do you think the Sinhalese people perceive the Muslim Community? 
• What do the people say about Muslims?  
• Why do you think those assumptions exist? Is there any truth to it? 
8. How do you think the Tamil Community perceives the Sinhalese Com-
munity? 
• Why do you think those assumptions exist? Is there any truth to it? 
9. How do you think the Muslim Community perceives the Sinhalese? 
• Why do you think those assumptions exist? Is there any truth to it? 
10. How do you think the Western Countries perceive the Sinhalese? 
11. How would you describe the relationship between Sinhalese, Tamil and 
Muslims? 
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Part three: Retracing perceptions of history 
12. Can you give me a brief history of Sri Lanka? 
• How did the Sri Lankan people come to the island?  
• Is there any legend connected to the recovering of Sri Lanka? 
Is there another mythical story that comes into your mind? 
  Do you know the Indian epic Ramayana? 
13. When and how the Tamil population entered the Island? 
• Did they invade the island or did the come in peace? Had they al-
ready been there? 
• What about the up country Tamils? 
14.  Do you think it is important to know who entered the island first? 
• What about the Vedas in this case? 
15.  How did Buddhism arrive in Sri Lanka? 
16. Is there any famous song or poem that you have known since childhood 
that talks about Sri Lanka? 
• Can you tell me what this song/poem is talking about? 
17. Looking back at Sri Lankan history are there any specific battles or na-
tional heroes you can remember? Recent or past? 
18. As a Sri Lankan citizen are there any specific events that took place in 
Sri Lanka that you are proud of or/and ashamed of? If this is the case 
could you please narrate them? 
Part four: Conflict and Identity Perceptions 
19. Tell me something about the ‘Tamil problem’ in Sri Lanka. 
• When and how did it start? What are the reasons for it? 
20. Do you think that the conflict influenced the way people identified them-
selves? 
• If yes please elaborate. What kind of influence has it had on people’s 
life? 
21.  Do you think that the identification process influences the war? 
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• For example: Do you think that because people perceive themselves 
as totally different communities it has an influence on how the conflict 
is handled? If yes, please tell me your thoughts about it. 
22. Do you feel sufficiently represented by the current political party? 
23. Some political parties argue that Sri Lankan Buddhism is endangered 
and needs to be protected. Do you think there is any truth to that? If yes, 
please elaborate. 
24. Are you a patriotic person? Would you place the country’s interest before 
your own interest?  
• If yes, how far would you go sacrificing your personal need for your 
country? 
25. How would you feel if the government decided to give in to the LTTE 
demand for a separate state? 
Part five: Hybridism 
26. Thinking of the Sinhalese and the Tamil Community: What are the differ-
ences?  
• Tell me anything that comes to mind.  
27. Are there any similarities you can think of regarding for example the 
Tamil community?  
28.  Do you know any historical examples of mixed culture in Sri Lanka? 
• If yes, are they good or bad examples? 
• What about Kataragama, Lord Skanda/ Murga? 
29. Imagine you are married: Would you welcome it if your daughter/ son 
marry someone from a different community, regardless which?  
Part six: Peace 
30. Imagine you were given magical powers and you could change one thing 
in every Sri Lankan community to achieve peace on the island.  
• Which characteristic would you change concerning the Sinhalese 
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• Which would you change about the Tamil people? 
• Which would you change about 
•  The Muslim people? 
31. Which aspects of Sinhalese Identity can support peace in Sri Lanka, 
which should be more promoted in the public sphere? 
• What role should Buddhism play? 
32. What would you personally do to achieve peace in Sri Lanka? 
33.  If you could talk personally to the LTTE chief as a representative of the 
Sinhalese what would you say to make him change his war strategy? 
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Zusammenfassung 
Der srilankische Konflikt wird von zwei gegensätzlichen Nationalismen ange-
trieben, die jeweils ethnisch definiert werden, singhalesischer und tamilischer 
Nationalismus. Die koloniale Vergangenheit Sri Lankas legte die Wurzeln für 
den postkolonialen Konflikt zwischen der Singhalesischen Mehrheit und der 
Tamilischen Minderheit, sowie für die ideologische Basis der gegenläufigen Na-
tionalismen.  
In dieser Arbeit wurde die Entstehungsgeschichte und Rolle des singhalesi-
schen Nationalismus in Hinblick auf die Konfliktdynamik analysiert. Dabei wur-
den Theorien aus verschiedenen Disziplinen in einem Triangel, bestehend aus 
einer Strukturebene, Kulturebene und Akteursebene arrangiert um die Bedeu-
tungen und Funktionen des singhalesischen Nationalismus in Sri Lanka in sei-
ner Gesamtheit nachzuvollziehen. Zusätzlich wurden post-orientalistische An-
sätze miteinbezogen um irreführende Annahmen von „essentiellen“ ethnischen 
Identitäten zu dekonstruieren. Weiters wurden Interviews mit singhalesischen 
Jugendlichen geführt um das Wirken von singhalesischem Nationalismus zu 
illustrieren. 
Die ethnischen Identitäten „Singhalese“ und „Tamile“ sind moderne Konstrukte, 
die ausgehend von post-orientalistischen Studien früher in weitaus flexibleren 
Strukturen existierten, als heute im Mainstream -Diskurs verankert sind. 
Zunächst bezeichnete ein universal definierter „Ceylonesischer Nationalismus“ 
Selbstermächtigung nach knapp fünfhundert Jahren kolonialer Besetzung, und 
wurde dann mit der Einführung des allgemeinen Wahlrechtes in ethnisch defi-
nierte Bahnen gelenkt, dabei kämpfte man jeweils um die Gunst der eigenen 
Ethnien. Der srilankische Staat wurde dabei sukzessiv „singhalesiert“.  
Ab Mitte der 50er Jahre erfuhr der singhalesische Nationalismus einen ver-
mehrten Zulauf und kulminierte in zwei Jugendaufständen. Ursachen dafür la-
gen neben der strukturellen kolonialen Last, in der stagnierenden Wirtschaft, 
dem veralteten politischen System, sowie in einem Bildungssystem dass die 
ethnisch definierte nationale Identität untermauerte. Das aktuelle Wirken von 
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singhalesisch nationalistischem Gedankengut wird bei den Friedensverhand-
lungen von 2001/02 sichtbar. Die Friedensverhandlungen scheiterten an der 
Einflussnahme der singhalesischen Nationalisten, die vom Prozess ausge-
schlossen waren und im Volk gegen Verhandlungen mit den tamilischen Sepa-
ratisten wetterten. Jede zukünftige Verhandlung muss auch die Anliegen der 
singhalesisch nationalistischen Fraktion mit einbeziehen. Die Befragung von 
singhalesischen ländlichen Jugendlichen hat ebenfalls die weite Zustimmung 
von nationalistischem Gedankengut widergespiegelt. 
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Summary 
Currently one finds exclusive nationalisms opposing each other in Sri Lanka, 
Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism. Both nationalist ideologies provide fuel for the 
violent conflict. 
During colonialism the foundations for the postcolonial Sri Lankan conflict be-
tween the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority were laid, as well as the 
ideological basis for the two ethnic nationalisms.  
This study was concerned with Sinhalese nationalism. Therefore the origin and 
the function of Sinhalese nationalism and how it is related to the dynamics of 
the Sri Lankan conflict were analysed. I used theories from various disciplines 
and arranged them in a triangle to explain Sinhalese nationalism as an entity. 
The vertices of the triangle consisted of a structural level, cultural level and 
agency/agent level. Additionally a post-Orientalist view was included to decon-
struct seemingly fixed categories of ‘essential’ ethnic identities. Furthermore for 
illustration Interviews with rural Sinhalese youth were conducted. 
The ethnic identities of the Sinhalese and the Tamils are modern constructs; 
based on post-Orientalist studies, identity categories like Sinhalese and Tamil 
were far more porous and flexible in pre-colonial times. 
After about five hundred years of colonial subordination universally defined Cey-
lonese nationalism functioned as a tool for empowerment, just after the intro-
duction of universal suffrage ethnically defined nationalism was used for political 
manoeuvring. Thereby the Sri Lankan state was gradually ‘Sinhalized’. 
Around 1950 Sinhalese nationalism started to rise and culminated in two violent 
youth uprisings. Reasons for that were besides the structural colonial heir, the 
stagnating economy, an outdated political system and an education system that 
reinforced ethnically defined national identities. The influence and impact of na-
tionalist values became apparent in the 2001/02 peace initiative. The peace 
talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil separatist failed be-
cause of the Sinhalese nationalist fractions, which agitated against the process. 
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Sinhalese nationalist parties were excluded from the talks; any future peace 
initiative would need to address their concerns to lead to a constructive process.  
The interviews with Sinhalese youth reflected their positive stance towards Sin-
halese nationalist values. 
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